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This Study presents yet another result of the activities of the Ministry of
Social Affairs in the area of poverty research in Serbia and proposals for poli-
cy measures in poverty reduction.
Based on the Poverty Survey (Survey on the Living Standards of the
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Poverty Assessment and the Republic of Serbia Government’s Poverty
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depth and proposals for policy reform in the area of poverty reduction.
In comparison to the previous CLDS study – Poverty in Serbia and Reform
of Governmental Support for the Poor (2002) – this Study presents a major step
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research methodology; a new chapter on social transfers and inequality; new
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ing issues regarding poverty analysis methodology. 
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I The Poverty Profile in Serbia in 2002
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Defining consumption as an indicator of the population’s living
standard 
The elements needed for the poverty analysis are: aggregates for
measuring living standards, the poverty line, and a way of representing
individual consumer units that takes into account economies of scale.
The two main aggregates that may be used to measure living standards
are household consumption and household income. There are several
reasons for using household consumption as an adequate measure of
living standards, i.e. poverty. The first reason lies in the fact that house-
hold consumption is more regular than income, since in many coun-
tries in transition the salaries are paid irregularly . The second reason,
and perhaps the more important one, lies in the fact that the survey
participants/respondents usually tend to hide income coming from
illegal or semi-legal activities, but they don’t hide the expenditures
which derive from the income gained in such way. The extent of the
gray economy in transition countries implies that consumption is a
more adequate measure of poverty. The third reason lies in the fact that
consumption in kind, especially in rural areas, represents an important
component of the population’s nutrition, and it is not expressed in
terms of money income.
In the research, poverty in Serbia was analyzed on the basis of con-
sumption bearing in mind the previously mentioned advantages of the
use of this aggregate. Income is being used only for the purpose of com-
parison with previous poverty studies in Yugoslavia, which were based
on household income. It is also used to make comparison on how much
those who are poor according to the consumption measure are also poor
according to the income measure. Besides consumption, the inequality
analysis is based on income since this has two advantages over consump-
tion. Firstly, analysis of income inequality provides international compa-
rability compared to analysis of the consumption inequality. Secondly,
inequality measured by income provides an insight into the income
sources that contribute most to income inequality.
Household consumption is defined as the sum of expenditures for
food and other current expenditures including goods purchased, own
produce and gifts. The main components of consumption include:
9
1) Consumption of food, tobacco, and beverages;
2) Expenditures for clothing and footwear;
3) Expenditures for hygiene and household items;
4) Expenditures for accommodation and transportation;
5) Expenditures for education;
6) Expenditures for health care;
7) Imputation of the service value by using consumer durables
(including depreciation of   consumer durables);
8) Imputed rents for house/apartment owners.
An imputed rental value for house/apartment owners is defined in
such a way that, first of all, the average market value of the apartment is
assessed, according to its market characteristics (using real estate agen-
cies) for 24 areas in Serbia. Thereafter, a yearly value of the use of the
apartment by owners is defined assuming that the depreciation period
is 100 years, i.e. the depreciation rate is 1% per year.
Consumption outlined in this way is deflated by the regional price
index. Namely, consumption is a good living standard indicator only if
higher expenditures mean higher consumption or consumption of bet-
ter quality products, but not in the case where higher levels of con-
sumption are caused by higher prices.
Defining equal units of consumption1
Household consumption (income) needs to be adjusted by house-
hold size bearing in mind economies of scale since some of expendi-
tures are shared among the household members, such as expenditures
for household items, using the car, daily newspapers, etc. Economies of
scale can be approximated by adjusting household size to a variable
representing units of equal consumption. For example, a household
having 3.5 consumer units spends 3.5 times more in relation to a sin-
gle-adult family. Besides household size, the sex and age of household
members also have an effect on the necessary household
income/expenditure size, so consumer units may include these house-
hold characteristics and its members as well.
Consumer units can reflect household size only, so they depend on a
parameter θ. The following formula2 may represent household con-
sumption for a consumer unit POTpj:
POTpj =  ,
POT – household consumption
n – number household members
θ – parameter
θn
POT
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1 The related term for cosumer unit is the equivalent adult, i.e. the first (or the only)
gown-up individual in the household
2 J. Braithwaite, C. Grootaert, and B. Milanovic – Poverty and Social Assistance in
Transition Countries, Palgrave Macmillan, 1999
A special case, when θ = 1, represents per capita consumption.
OECD uses the value θ = 0.7. For a typical household in the countries
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the quoted formula
represents a simplification of the OECD scale where the first adult
equals 1, the second one = 0.7, and children = 0.5. However, the previ-
ous exponential formulation simplifies the calculation.
Consumer units in this study are established on the basis of data
from a survey using the Engel method. The basic assumption of this
method is the existence of an inverse and monotonic relationship
between economic well-being of a household and participation of the
food expenditures in overall consumption. Namely, two households
are at the same level of economic well-being only if and if only they
have equal participation of food in their consumption. The following
non-linear regression was used, which was estimated by the non-linear
least squares method:
UH – food share in total household consumption
Consumption – total household consumption
Adults – number of adults in household
Children06 – number of children age 0-6
Children718 – number of children age 7-18
ε – estimation error.
Parameters β0, β1, α1, α2, θ are estimated from the quoted regression
Table 1 presents an estimation of the equivalent scale developed by
use of the Engel method. The resulting equivalent scale can be simpli-
fied for easier use. Using the estimated coefficients, Serbia’s equivalent
scale may be formed, which is then regressed using the following vari-
ables: adults, children06, and children718. In this way, parameter θ dis-
appears, and the equivalent scale becomes of the OECD form:
Serbian Scale =
= (1 + 0.81* (adults – 1) + 0.24*children06 + 0.75*children718).
This equivalent scale was used to represent household consumption
in terms of consumption per consumer unit.
In order to compare poverty with the previous period, consumer
units from Household Budget Survey (APD) were applied (those that
were used earlier in the poverty research). They are calculated for each
household through adjustments for the difference in consumption of
the household members based on differences in sex, age and occupa-
tion. The consumer unit value for men varies from 0.33 (for up to 1-
year– old children) to 1.50 (for miners and industrial workers per-
forming heavy-duty labor). For women, it varies from 0.33 (for chil-
dren less than 1-year-old) to 1 (for industrial workers and farmers).
i
iii
i
i
)8Children71ChildrenAdults(
nConsumptio
lnUH ε+



α+α+
β+β= θ
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10
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Defining the poverty line
The definition of poverty depends on the definition of the poverty
line. The poor are considered to be those with an income level below a
certain subsistence minimum (poverty line), which is necessary to sat-
isfy minimum needs of life. Subsistence needs of an individual or a
family can be defined on various levels, which makes the poverty line a
somewhat arbitrary concept depending on the period of time and area
for which it is defined.
There are two types of poverty lines: absolute and relative. The
absolute poverty line establishes the absolute minimum living stan-
dards, and it is usually based on the fixed consumer food basket neces-
sary for satisfying minimum needs for a certain quantity and structure
of calories. It is decreased by the amount of other expenditures, such as
clothing, hygiene, heating, electricity, etc. Such defined absolute pover-
ty line varies from one country to another depending on the consumer
basket structure. For the purpose of international comparability, it is
calculated in US$ at the same buying power. For example, the official
poverty line in Slovenia is fixed at an amount of 37,000 tolars (DM
370) referring to the head of the household, and for other household
members, coefficients are in the range 0.3 – 0.8 reflecting economies of
scale.
The relative poverty line defines poverty in relation to the national
standard of living and it is used for international comparison of char-
acteristics of the poor. It is usually defined as a certain percentage of
median or average household income, so it changes depending on
movements of the average living standard of the population. In the
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Table 1.
Evaluation of the Equivalent Scale Using the Engel Method
(standard errors quoted in parenthesis)
Estimated parameters Values
α1 0.299
(0.171)
α2 0.944
(0.156)
θ 0.905
(0.048)
β0 1.235
(0.031)
β1 -0.080
(0.003)
R2 0.084
Broj opservacija 6386
Source: The Living Standard Survey (AZS), 2002
republic of Macedonia, for instance, the relative poverty line is defined
as 60% of the median annual income of the population.3
The consumer basket calculated by the Federal Statistics Office
(SZS) has been used so far as the poverty line. It is defined as a mini-
mum consumer food/beverage basket of a 4-member household,
which is necessary for satisfying minimum needs for food in accor-
dance with nutritionist requirements. The main shortcoming of the
SZS consumer basket lies in its somewhat more extensive list of
food/beverage items than actually needed for a basic minimum subsis-
tence. On the other hand, it does not include expenditures for clothing,
for maintaining basic accommodation conditions, as well as for ele-
mentary hygienic, health care and educational needs. This poverty line
has been used also for defining the absolutely poor, i.e. persons whose
income falls beyond 50% of the poverty line.
In this study, the poverty line shall be defined in two steps. In the
first, the food poverty line is defined as absolute poverty. It is estab-
lished on the basis of the minimum consumer food basket. In reality,
the minimum daily average amount of calories, based on the AZS con-
sumption structure, is established and adjusted to the FAO nutritional
requirements. It amounts to 2,288 calories on average. This consumer
basket reflects the actual consumption structure in Serbia, where con-
sumption per item should be at least equal to the consumption of the
lowest decile4, and, at the same time, it has the lowest value expressed
in current prices from the period May-June 2002. So, the minimum
consumer basket for a 4-member household (man and women of the
working age, a male child up to 7 years old, and a female child 11-13
years old) amounted to 7,605 dinars per month, expressed in average
prices in Serbia from the period May-June 2002.
Table 2. presents the nutritional content of different food baskets
(AZS, SZS, RZS). The minimum consumer basket calculated on the
basis of the AZS data is the actual average food basket in the two lowest
deciles.
The AZS consumer basket value is significantly smaller than that of
the SZS amounting, for the same period of time, to 11,746.5 dinars for
a 4-member household. That is not surprising if we have in mind the
SZS consumer basket structure, not including the minimum necessary
calories, but its content is far extended.
The RZS consumer basket is closer to the minimum basket, but its
value is lower than the AZS basket. For the same period of time, it
amounted to 6,680 dinars for a 4-member household. The key reason
for this lies in the fact that the Republic’s basket uses unrealistically low
prices of bread which are not to be found on the market at all (19
dinars per kilo of bread). The basket based on AZS is based on the actu-
al prices for the items over the reference period, which is the case with
13The Poverty Profile in Serbia in 2002
3 D. Johnson – Restructuring Social Welfare Allowance, Working Paper: Seminar for
Government Officials, 2000
4 10% variation from the first decile spending is allowed
bread as well (around 30 dinars per kilo). In addition, the Republic
Statistics Office (RZS) adjusts the contents of the basket monthly to
reflect seasonal variations, using only the calorie criteria. As a result,
some products are removed from the basket, others are added, and the
quantity of other products are adjusted. This results in some arbitrari-
ness in the formation of the basket’s contents and may represent a
nutritionally inadequate minimum level. Table A1 in the Annex pres-
ents the composition of the minimum food basket from AZS, SZS,
RZS, and WFP.
Thus, the basket based on the Survey represents the best and most
realistic minimum. It uses a nutritional equivalent scale based on FAO
standards, and it is differentiated into 19 groups by age and sex.
The second step defines the total poverty line, which besides food
expenditures also includes other expenditures (clothing and footwear,
hygiene and household items, transportation, health care, education,
etc.). It is defined as total consumption of those households whose
food consumption equals the minimum consumer basket. This was
how the poverty line was established for a 4-member household at the
amount of 13,827 dinars per month, i.e. 4,489 dinars per consumer
unit.
In order to estimate the total consumption corresponding to the min-
imum consumer basket, we should start with the following formula:
MKH*NES
UPH
  OH  =
14 Poverty and Reform of Financial Support to the Poor
AZS SZS RZS
min. min. min.
Energy 99% 106% 98%
Proteins 140% 156% 137%
Fats (up to max. rec. intake) 99% 116% 98%
Iron 166% 147% 156%
Vitamin A 52% 227% 188%
Thiamin 197% 203% 219%
Riboflavin 133% 169% 159%
Niacin 133% 132% 141%
Folate 265% 284% 302%
Vitamin C 229% 389% 434%
Table 2.
Nutritionist Contents of Different Baskets in Relation to Standards
Information source on standards – UN FAO, on nutritional structure of food – USDA.
OH is the relationship between a household’s food consumption
and household’s minimum consumer food basket; UPH is total house-
hold’s food consumption; MKH is household’s minimum food basket;
POTpj is consumption per consumer unit (equal consumption units),
as defined in the previous section; UP is the total household’s con-
sumption; ES is the equivalent scale (consumer units); and IC is the
price index. Variable OH equals one when a household spends on food
exactly as much as the minimum consumer food basket amounts.
In order to obtain the poverty line corresponding to the consump-
tion required for the minimum consumer food basket, it is necessary to
estimate the following relation using the non-linear least squares
method:
Where i represents a household; α0, α1, α2 are parameters to be esti-
mated; and ε represents the error term.
We solve the estimated regression for the level of equivalent con-
sumption when a household’s expenditure on food equals the amount
to purchase the contents of the minimum consumer basket, or for
OH=1:
, 
where represent regression parameters; and LS is the pover-
ty line estimate. By solving this equation, we obtain:
i.e. the poverty line which includes other expenditures, in addition to
expenditure on food, and amounts to 4,489 dinars per consumer unit.
The second poverty line is intended to measure and determine the
characteristics of the population near poverty, meaning near the pover-
ty line of 4,489 dinars. This is the poverty line corresponding to the end







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=
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Table 3.
Poverty Lines Used in This Study
Poverty Line expressed 
per consumer unit
Poor 4,489 dinars
Materially insufficiently supported individuals (MNO) 5,507 dinars
of second decile. It amounted to 5,507 dinars and (as per definition)
20% of population is below this line (population with the lowest con-
sumption per consumer unit).
The establishment of this poverty line is completely arbitrary. Such
poverty lines are established mostly in other countries in order to com-
pare profiles of the poor with those who are near the poverty line and
who are sensitive to outside shocks that can easily push them below the
poverty line and into the category of the poor.
In order to compare poverty in 2002 with the previous period, the
SZS consumer basket has been used because it represented the poverty
line in previous poverty studies. Since the SZS consumer basket
referred to a 4-member household, it was necessary to calculate the SZS
consumer basket value per consumer unit based on the APD consumer
units. The SZS consumer basket, amounting to 11,746.5 dinars in the
reference period (May-June 2002) was divided by 3.3 consumer units,
and thus, a poverty line of 3.560 dinars for an average consumer unit
per month was obtained.
Basic poverty indicators
The most frequently used indicators can be defined according to
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) in the following way:5
,
α – parameter
z – poverty line
ci –equivalent consumption of the unit i
n – total number of persons
For α =0, P(0) is the poverty index representing the number of the
poor as a percentage of the total population. However, this poverty
indicator does not tell us anything about how poor these people are, i.e.
to what extent their consumption (income) is below the poverty line.
The poverty indicator that takes this into account is that showing the
depth of poverty (poverty gap), which is obtained for α =1. So, P(1)
can be defined in the following way:
P(1) = P(0)*(average deficit)
where the average deficit represents the average consumption (income)
deficit of the poor as a percentage of the total population. The poverty
depth (P1) represents the average consumption (income) deficit as a
percentage of the poverty line among total population (poor and those
α
=
∑ 

 

 −
=α
n
i
i ,
z
cz
max
n
)(P
1
0
1
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5 Making Transition Work for Everyone, World Bank, 2000
who are not). When the average deficit of the poor is multiplied by the
number of poor individuals and expressed as a percentage of GDP,
then the minimum funds which are necessary for the elimination of
poverty are calculated, assuming that it is perfectly targeted.
Finally, for α =2, we get P(2) which is called severity of poverty. This
indicator measures inequality among the poor, since it puts more
weight on those poor being further away from the poverty line.
In this analysis, all three indicators will be used as poverty indicators;
the poverty index P(0), poverty depth P(1), and severity of poverty
P(2).
THE DATA SOURCE
Poverty in Serbia was analyzed on the basis of the Survey on the
Living Standards of the Population (AZS), which was conducted in the
period between May 15 and June 15, 2002 in Serbia (without Kosovo-
Metohija). The basic sample included 6,386 households, or 19,725
individuals. The additional sample included 500 households, recipients
of family material support (MOP), which were used for the analysis of
this important social transfer. 
AZS is the largest and most comprehensive survey on living stan-
dards conducted in Serbia so far. The survey sample includes the per-
manent population of Serbia6 meaning that IDPs were included in this
research to a limited extent. Previous poverty research was based most-
ly on the Federal Statistics Office Household Budget Survey (APD),
including around 2,500 households in the territory of FR Yugoslavia
which are also a part of the permanent population).
A two-stage stratified sample was applied. Primary sample units are
the census districts, and secondary units are households. Census dis-
tricts are selected randomly, so census districts with more households
are more likely to be selected. Eleven households were selected by ran-
dom in each census district. When selecting households, the household
list according to the census districts from the April 2002 census in
Serbia was used. Households were selected with equal probability with-
out replacement. Stratification was performed by cross-linking territo-
ries (Vojvodina, Belgrade, Western Serbia, Central Serbia, Eastern
Serbia, and Southeastern Serbia) and types of settlement (urban,
rural), which resulted in 12 strata. The final analysis included 6,386
households, or 93.5% of the total sample originally selected.
The main aim of this survey was to collect representative data, at the
household and individual level, on the living standards of the popula-
tion in Serbia in 2002. Thus, the survey was conceived in such a way as
to provide detailed data on household consumption, as well as other
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6 Permanent population is defined according to the UN Instructions on the Census
which were used for the 2002 census in Serbia. Thus, the permanent population
includes all individuals living in Serbia for longer than one year, excluding diplo-
matic and consular staff
elements of living standards of the population (accommodation condi-
tions, durable consumables provision, accessibility to education, health
care, and so on). The instrument (questionnaire) itself includes a few
components. These include:
1. Main demographic characteristics (sex, age, education, marital
status, household composition, residential location and changes
therein);
2. Durable assets (elementary information on apartment/house
type, accommodation and maintenance costs, durable consum-
ables);
3. Agriculture (agricultural production of households cultivating
more than 10 ares of land or cattle breeding);
4. Health care (health care accessibility, use and cost of health servic-
es, including informal payments);
5. Food expenditures and other household expenditures (clothing,
footwear, transportation, hygiene, household items, sports, cul-
ture, entertainment, etc.), including purchased products, own
produce and gifts; this component includes also family income
not related to work;
6. Education (education accessibility, use and cost of services,
including informal payments);
7. Working activity (main and additional employment, unemploy-
ment, income from work);
8. Social programs (inclusion and benefits).
Data on monthly food expenditures were obtained on the basis of a
diary that was kept by a household over a 7-day period, and other
expenditures were recorded over a one-year or one quarter period,
depending on the expenditure type. In this way, the main shortcom-
ings of APD were removed, where the household expenditures were
not recorded in a diary (from the beginning of nineties), but relied on
participants’ memory or on their voluntary records, which raises ques-
tions of arbitrariness of the reported values and quantities.
MAIN POVERTY INDICATORS IN SERBIA IN 2002
Poverty in Serbia was analyzed using household consumption as a
main aggregate for measuring poverty. The only comparison with pre-
vious poverty research in Yugoslavia was based on household income
in order to use the same aggregate indicator for measuring poverty as
in previous research.
In 2002, nearly one in every ten inhabitants in Serbia (10.6%) lived
in a household whose consumption per consumer unit was in average
less than 4,489 dinars or US$72, meaning $2.4 per day (Table 4.). The
standard error in the estimate of the poverty index shows the extent of
statistical certainty with which we can talk about the percentage of the
poor. With 95% statistical certainty, the actual poverty index is situat-
ed in a statistical interval around two standard errors of our estimation
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of 10.6%. In another words, the actual poverty index is between 9.4%
and 11.8%.
The poverty depth (gap) was 2.2%, which indicates that if the state
allocates funds amounting to 2.2% of the poverty line for each individ-
ual (poor or not) and targets these funds to the poor, poverty would be
theoretically eliminated, given that assistance to the poor is perfectly
targeted. More details on the funds needed for the elimination of
poverty will be offered in Section 6. Severity of poverty, the indicator
which takes into account the fact that some poor have a greater depth
of poverty and are thus further away from the poverty line than others
(and thereby attaches more weight those further away from the pover-
ty line), was 0.8%. Based on these data, we can draw the conclusion
that the poverty gap and severity are not significant, which is in line
with the relatively low level of inequality in Serbia (see the Section on
inequality of income and consumption).
The relatively low poverty index in 2002 may be encouraging but it
should not mislead us since the population concentration around the
poverty line is significant. It further means that a small drop in actual
earnings and other income of population or the unemployment
increase in the upcoming period may significantly increase the share of
the poor. That is why we are of the opinion that besides poor popula-
tion, it is also necessary to analyze those who are directly above the
poverty line and who are vulnerable to dropping below the poverty
line. We should bear in mind that the number of unemployed is
expected to grow during economic restructuring.
Pic.1 shows how a small shift in the poverty line upwards significant-
ly increases the percentage of those below the poverty line. An increase
in the poverty line by just over 20% increases the poverty index by 100
percent points. In another words, an increase in the poverty line from
4,489 dinars to 5,507 dinars leads to a doubling in the number of poor,
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Table 4.
Poverty Indicators in Serbia in 2002
(standard errors in parenthesis)
Materially The Poor
Insufficiently Supported
(poverty line=5,507 din.) (poverty line=4,489 din.)
Index Gap Severity Index Gap Severity
(P0) (P1) (P2) (P0) (P1) (P2)
Urban 16.0% 3.3% 1.1% 7.8% 1.5% 0.5%
(0.99) (0.27) (0.12) (0.70) (0.17) (0.07)
Rural 25.1% 6.1% 2,3% 14,2% 3,2% 1,1%
(1.44) (0.46) (0.21) (1.11) (0.31) (0.13)
Total 20.0% 4.6% 1,6% 10,6% 2,2% 0,8%
(0.84) (0.25) (0.11) (0.62) (0.17) (0.07)
Note: standard errors adjusted to the sample stratification.
Source: AZS 2002
as the poverty index moves up from 10.6% to 20%. The population
whose consumption was on average less than 5,507 dinars7 or US$ 89
per month is “close to poverty”, so we call them Materially
Insufficiently Supported (MNO). The depth and severity of their
poverty is much higher in relation to the poor category.8
We may draw the conclusion that in 2002 around 790,000 people in
Serbia were poor, and around 1.5 million had insufficient material
resources (i.e. income). In terms of households, 10.3% or around
250,000 households in Serbia lived in poverty, and 19.5% or around
474,000 households were MNO. 
The poverty picture in Serbia is certainly worse than this given that
these data do not fully include refugees and IDPs (less than 25,000 of
them are in collective centers) who are undoubtedly more vulnerable
than the permanent population of Serbia. Pic.2 may serve only as an
indicator of how much the poverty risk of the refugees/IDPs included
in the AZS is higher compared to citizens of Serbia/Montenegro.
Table 4 shows that the rural population is significantly poorer than
the urban population since the poverty index of the rural population is
almost twice as high as the poverty index of the urban population
(14.2% and 7.8% respectively). Its relative poverty risk was a third
higher compared to the average for the total population. Poverty has
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7 More details on this poverty line may be found in section 1.3. .
8 If we apply a subjective measure of poverty, based on an individual’s opinion on
the income level needed for satisfying their needs, then more than half of the pop-
ulation of Serbia would be poor.
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Figure 1.
Change of the Poverty Index with the Change of the Poverty Line
Source: AZS 2002
Poverty Line=5,507 din.
Poverty Line=4,489 din.
become a rural phenomenon as in many transition countries.9 It can be
explained by the fact that the growth in actual earnings of pensions and
of the employed (which constitute major income sources for the urban
population) was relatively higher than the growth in other income
sources. In addition, possibilities for working in the gray economy, as
one of the main strategies for survival, are more numerous in cities
than in other areas, so that the additional income coming from the gray
economy has an effect on consumption growth of these households.
Poverty depth and severity  in rural areas were also significantly higher
than in rural areas. 
In terms of the materially insufficiently supported population, a rel-
atively smaller difference can be observed between urban and rural
poverty and the poverty depth.
POVERTY TRENDS IN THE PERIOD 1995-2002
This study uses a standard methodology for poverty research, as is
applied in most countries in the world. Accordingly, the analytical
results of poverty in Serbia in 2002 are internationally comparable.
However, they are not comparable with previous poverty research in
Serbia/Yugoslavia due to the following differences:
1) The AZS sample is based on the last census of April 2002, whilst
the APD sample in the past decade was based on the 1991 census;
2) The AZS instrument (questionnaire) was designed to collect full
data on the total consumption of the population based on their
records kept in a diary; APD has abandoned this approach since
the beginning of the 90s as expenditures were not recorded in
these diary;
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Source: AZS 2002
9 In the majority of transition countries, the decrease in urban poverty was more
evident than that in rural areas. See Transition report 2002, EBRD
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3) Household consumption is being used as the poverty indicator
for the first time in this research, whilst previous poverty
research was based on household income;
4) In this research, consumer units were empirically established on
the basis of the Survey data, through the Engel Method (see
Section 1.2); previous poverty research was based on previously
established consumer units, which requires adjustments house-
hold consumption for differences in the consumption of house-
hold members according to age, sex and occupation;
5) In this research, the poverty line is defined as the consumption of
those households whose food consumption equals the minimum
consumer food basket established on the basis of the Survey. In
contrast, previous research used the SZS consumer food basket
as the poverty line.
The above quoted differences lead to the conclusion that the poverty
indicators in 2002 cannot be directly compared to the previous years’
results. Approximate comparability can be achieved only if household
income defined in the same manner as in the previous research and the
SZS consumer basket as the poverty line were used as poverty indica-
tors in 2002. It is also necessary for equal consumption units to be
adjusted to those from APD. This is how we can get to an approximate
picture on the development of poverty in Serbia in the past 10 years,
which has been done in this study. However, these methodological
adjustments did not succeed in removing differences that exist within
the data sources themselves (AZS and APD).
In order to obtain an approximate picture of poverty development
in the previous period, poverty in 2002 was measured in relation to
income per consumer unit since the poverty research during 1995-
2000 was based on household income because valid data on consump-
tion were not available. For the purpose of comparability, household
income was defined in the same way as before, meaning that household
income did not include income coming from either durable consum-
able goods or imputed rent values (details on other income compo-
nents can be found in the Section on inequality). Also for the purpose
of comparability, the poverty line is calculated on the basis of the SZS
consumer basket; as in previous poverty studies, it amounted to 3,560
dinars per consumer unit. Consumer units from APD are applied to
the AZS data. In this manner, all three components necessary for the
analysis of the growth in poverty have been disaggregated to a compa-
rable basis. The only problem is that the results from the two different
data sources are compared, AZS and APD having different samples and
instruments (questionnaires).
It is assumed that the AZS incorporates regular and irregular house-
hold income better than does APD, as the former survey (AZS) was not
conducted using official statistics as was APD for previous years. It has
been noticed that in many countries the income coverage was much
better in the surveys that were conducted by independent agencies than
in surveys conducted by official statistics agencies. It is more likely that
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survey participants/respondents would provide a more complete dec-
laration of their income (regular and irregular) to an independent pri-
vate agency rather than to the official state institution.10 If this assump-
tion proves to be correct, then it can be assumed that poverty was over-
estimated in the previous period. Consequently, comparisons between
poverty in 2002 and poverty in the past decade can be taken only as an
indicator of potential trends.
Poverty in Serbia has been significantly reduced with 14.5% of pop-
ulation being poor according to the 2002 income compared to more
than one third of the population in 2000 (Table 5.1). Real growth in
GDP, earnings and other income of the population in this period are
reflected in the growth in household consumption and in a decrease in
poverty. However, although the poverty index declined, the poor need-
ed more income to be able to get up to the poverty line. It means that in
spite of a lower percentage of the poor in the population, the poor were
on average poorer than two years before and even more than in com-
parison to 1995. The poverty depth (gap) in 2002 was 3.5% of GDP,
which is between the 1995 and 2000 values of this indicator.
COMPARING CONSUMPTION AND INCOME POVERTY
Components of consumption
Table 6 presents the structure of consumer consumption for the first
decile and by quintile broken down into urban and rural dwellers. The
average spend on food was 47.9% of the total spend for the whole pop-
ulation (in-kind food consumption was 11.3%). Rural dwellers spent
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1995 2000 2002
Poverty index, in % 28.9 36.5 14.5
Poverty depth, in % of GDP 4.1 3.1 3.5
Average income deficit, in % of 23.2 25.4 32.2
the poverty line
Table 5.
The Poverty Trends in Relation  to Income in the Period 1995-2002
Note: The population’s income is defined in a comparable way for the observed period
and it is disaggregated to consumer units from APD. The SZS consumer basket is used
as the poverty line for the period 1995-2002. 
Data for 1995 refer to FRY as in A. Posarac – Human Development Report Yugoslavia.
1997, and, for the period 2000-2002, they refer to Serbia without Kosovo-Metohija.
Source: APD for 1995-2000; AZS for 2002.
10 See more on a comparison of income between the regular and gray economy, par-
ticipation and unemployment rates from the Survey on Work Force conducted
by SZS and the Survey on Gray Economy conducted by the Economic Institute in:
G. Krstic – Empirical Analysis of the Formal and Informal Labor Markets in the
FRY, 1995-2000, Ph.D. thesis, Sussex University, Brighton, 2002
more on food on average than those in urban areas (53% and 45%
respectively). The difference in food consumption between rural and
urban areas increases if we observe in-kind food consumption (con-
sumption of the food that household produce for its own needs). Its part
in overall consumption in rural settlements was almost five times higher
than in urban settlements (22.4% and 4.6% respectively). Observing the
consumption distribution by quintiles, we note that, as expected, the
poorer population spends relatively more on food than wealthier indi-
viduals (56% and 41% respectively). Food is the most important con-
sumption item for the rural poor, and the least important item for the
wealthiest quintile in urban settlements (60% and 40% respectively). It is
also interesting to note that in-kind food consumption constitutes just
over one half of the food consumption of the poorest population (1st
decile) in rural areas, and much less in urban areas (20%).
Consumption and income poverty
Although this study uses poverty indicators based on household
consumption (because the consumption in general terms is accepted as
a better measure of living standards), it is interesting to analyze to what
extent poverty by the consumption measure coincides with that by the
income measure, i.e. includes the same people. The poor, in income
terms, are defined as those individuals with an income below the
poverty line, or less than 4,489 dinars per consumer unit per month.11
The materially insufficiently supported, in terms of income, are those
individuals with an income less than 5,507 dinars per consumer unit
per month.
Table 7 indicates that 5.6% of population is poor in relation both to
consumption and to income, so this population category we call very
poor or extremely poor. Namely, just over one half of population
(52.8%) who is poor in terms of consumption also proves to be poor in
relation to income. The situation is similar with MNO, too (Table 8). It
means that there is relatively little overlap between these two categories
of the poor. This is due to there being less than one half of those poor
(and MNO) in terms of consumption, are not poor in relation to
income, as their consumption was less than the poverty line, and their
income was above that line. This individuals have an income which
enabled them to spend more, but they used part of their income for
saving, gifts, etc.
On the other hand, only 30.6% of the poor in terms of income are
also poor in terms of the consumption (for MNO, that percentage is
40.6%). This points to a significant number of individuals whose
income was less than the poverty line, and whose consumption was
higher than that line. Finally, it is interesting to note that 76.7% of the
total population were not poor in terms of either of the criteria, either
consumption or income, (for MNO, that percentage is 62.9%).
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11 See sources of household income in the Section on inequality .
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1st dec. 1st quint. 2nd quint. 3rd quint. 4th quint. 5th quint. Average
Total
Food 56.5 55.8 54.1 51.9 49.7 41.4 47.9
Accommodation 19.8 19.1 17.5 16.7 16.5 16.8 17.0
Clothing,
footwear, 10.6 11.9 15.0 17.7 20.9 26.9 21.2
household 
items, etc.
Healthcare 3.5 3.6 4.4 4.6 4.3 6.8 5.3
Education 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.1
Durables 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.3 1.9
Imputed rent 7.1 6.9 5.9 5.4 4.5 3.3 4.6
In kind food
consumption 22.9 20.4 15.9 13.7 10.3 7.3 11.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Urban
Food 51.9 51.1 50.0 49.5 47.4 39.9 45.0
Accommodation 20.4 20.1 19.2 17.7 17.2 17.0 17.6
Clothing,
footwear, 10.4 12.0 15.0 17.4 21.3 27.2 22.0
household
items, etc.
Healthcare 3.5 3.3 4.0 4.2 3.9 6.8 5.2
Education 1.2 1.6 1.8 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.5
Durables 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.8 2.3 2.0
Imputed rent 11.0 10.3 8.3 7.3 5.6 4.0 5.7
In kind food
consumption 9.9 8.3 6.0 5.4 4.3 3.6 4.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Rural
Food 59.9 60.0 58.6 55.2 54.1 45.0 52.8
Accommodation 19.4 18.1 15.6 15.3 15.0 16.2 15.9
Clothing,
footwear, 10.8 11.7 15.0 18.2 20.0 26.1 19.8
household
items, etc.
Healthcare 3.4 3.8 4.8 5.0 4.9 6.8 5.4
Education 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.5
Durables 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.5 1.9
Imputed rent 4.3 3.9 3.2 3.0 2.4 1.9 2.7
In kind food
consumption 32.5 31.2 27.0 24.6 21.9 15.7 22.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 6. 
1st Decile Consumption and Consumption by Rural/Urban Dwellers
in Serbia in 2002
Note: The consumption defined as consumption per consumer units. Decile and quin-
tile defined on the basis of consumption per consumer units.
Source: AZS 2002
Resources necessary to eliminate poverty
Since the targeting of the existing MOP system (family support) was
carried out in terms of income, the minimum resources necessary for
the elimination of poverty is presented in Table 9, both in relation to
consumption and income.
If there were perfect targeting of social assistance to the poor, and in
order to eliminate poverty in Serbia in 2002, it would be necessary to
allocate between 9.1 and 37 billion dinars, or between 1% and 3.9% of
GDP12. The amount depended on which criteria were used to define
the poor – the poor in terms of consumption or of income (excluding
the costs of administering assistance). These are additional funds sup-
plementing the existing resources for administering support to the
poor by means of social assistance (MOP), child allowance, humanitar-
ian aid, and others As the assumption of perfect targeting is unrealistic,
actual resources necessary for the elimination of poverty can be several
times higher than the minimum amount. If the targeting of social assis-
tance was 60-70%, 11.8-12.7 billion dinars would be needed for the
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Consumption Consumption Total
poor non-poor
Income poor 5.6% 12.7% 18.3%
Income non-poor 5.0% 76.7% 81.7%
Total 10.6% 89.4% 100%
Table 7.
Consumption and Income Poverty in Serbia in 2002
The poverty line = 4,489 dinars
Source: AZS 2002
MNO Non-MNO Total
in relation in relation
to consumption to consumption
MNO in relation to income 11,7% 17,1% 28,8%
Non-MNO in relation to
income 8,3% 62,9% 71,2%
Total 20,0% 80,0% 100%
Table 8.
The Materially Insufficiently Supported (MNO) in Relation to Consumption and
Income in Serbia in 2002
The poverty line = 5,507 dinars
Source: AZS 2002
12 For all calculations, GDP for 2002 was used  – amounting to 948.3 billion din.
The total population of Serbia was 7.45 million.
elimination of poverty in terms of the consumption, or 48.1-51.8 bil-
lion dinars for the elimination of poverty in terms of income.
These funds are at least twice as large as the minimum amount nec-
essary for the elimination of poverty with perfect targeting in market
economies. In transition countries (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Estonia, and Russia) US$1 of social assistance costs between $1.5-8.0
(excluding administrative cost for paying benefits).13
WHO ARE THE POOR IN SERBIA?
Poverty by region
Two regions with an above average poverty risk are Southeastern
and Western Serbia. Southeastern Serbia (table 10) is the region with
the highest share of the poor. The poverty risk if this region is 56.6%
higher than the average poverty risk of the total population. Within
this region, a significant difference can be noticed between urban and
rural poverty. The poverty risk in rural areas of Southeastern Serbia is
twice as high as in the general population, whilst urban population is in
a much better position with a near-average poverty risk. The popula-
tion of rural areas in Southeastern Serbia is not only the poorest, but
poverty in that region is the deepest and  strongest. Western Serbia is
the next region with an above-average poverty risk (+27.4% compared
to the population average), particularly rural areas where the poverty
risk is more than a third higher than the population average (+35.8%).
The poverty depth and severity  in Western Serbia are also higher than
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Consumption Income
poor poor
Average consumption of the poor
(dinars/consumer unit) 3,539 3,131
Poverty line (dinars/consumer unit) 4,489 4,489
Additional consumption needed
(dinars/consumer unit) 950 1,358
Average shortfall (% of poverty line) 21.2% 30.3%
Budget needed for poverty elimination
(perfect targeting; in billion dinars) 9.1 37.0
(targeting: 70-60%; in billion dinars) 11.8-12.7 48.1-51.8
Table 9.
Funds Needed for Elimination of Poverty in Serbia in 2002
Source: AZS 2002
13 J. Braithwaite, C. Grootaert, and B. Milanovic – Poverty and Social Assistance in
Transition Countries, Palgrave Macmillan, 1999
average. The data indicate that the rural population of Southeastern
and Western Serbia was the most vulnerable. It represented 14% of the
total population and one-quarter of the total number of the poor. One
of the reasons for greater poverty being found in these two rural
regions in Serbia is the significantly higher share of one or two-mem-
ber elderly households which tend to be poorer than other households
(see table 15).14 When observing the MNO category, a similar picture is
obtained of regional distribution of poverty.
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14 The share of one and two-member elderly households in rural areas of SE/W
Serbia is twice as high as that in urban areas in these two regions in Serbia. These
households’ share in the total number of households in SE/W Serbia was 25% and
22% respectively, whilst the percentage in urban areas in these two regions was
11% and 13% respectively.
% %of the Relative Total Structure Poverty Severity
MNO poor poverty population of the depth of poverty
risk structure poor
Belgrade – total 15.0 7.9 –25.5 21.1 15.8 1.5 0.5
Urban 13.2 6.9 –34.9 17.2 11.2 1.2 0.4
Rural 22.9 12.2 15.1 4.0 4.6 2.9 1.0
Vojvodina – total 18.4 8.8 –17.0 27.1 22.5 1.9 0.6
Urban 16.0 6.8 –35.8 15.4 9.8 1.3 0.4
Rural 21.5 11.5 8.5 11.7 12.7 2.6 1.0
West Serbia – total 23.9 13.5 27.4 11.2 14.2 2.8 0.9
Urban 22.7 12.1 14.2 4.3 5.0 1.9 0.5
Rural 24.7 14.4 35.8 6.8 9.3 3.4 1.2
Central Serbia – total 19.5 10.2 –3.8 17.3 16.6 2.2 0.7
Urban 15.2 6.9 –34.9 8.5 5.5 1.4 0.5
Rural 23.7 13.2 24.5 8.8 11.1 3.0 1.0
East Serbia – total 17.4 10.1 –4.7 9.3 8.9 2.3 0.8
Urban 14.3 9.2 –13.2 4.4 3.8 2.0 0.7
Rural 20.2 10.9 2.8 4.9 5.1 2.6 1.0
SE Serbia – total 29.8 16.6 56.6 14.0 22.0 3.6 1.2
Urban 21.3 10.0 –5.7 6.7 6.3 2.2 0.7
Rural 37.7 22.7 114.2 7.3 15.7 5.0 1.7
Total 20.0 10.6 – 100 100 2.2 0.8
Table 10. 
Poverty per Regions in Serbia in 2002 (in %)
Note: The relative poverty risk is calculated as the percentage growth (drop) in the pover-
ty index of each group compared to the average poverty index of the entire population.
Source: AZS 2002
Other regions in Serbia had a poverty index below average. The
urban populations in Belgrade, Vojvodina and Central Serbia were in
the best position in terms of poverty risk, at one third less than the
average for the population. However, the rural parts of these regions
were poorer than average.
Poverty according to sex and age
Poverty was approximately equally distributed among men and
women with the percentage of poor men and women being almost
equal (table 7.2). Thus, the entire population structure according to sex
represents, at the same time, the sex structure of the poor population.
The same applies to MNO.
Observed according to the age, the poorest persons were those aged 65
or older. Their poverty risk was 40% higher than the population average,
and the depth was also significantly higher than average. They constitut-
ed 17.7% of the entire population and almost one quarter of the total. 
There is a higher percentage of poor among retired people than in
the entire population (10.9% to 10.6%). On the other hand, there are
fewer poor among them than among elderly (65+) who are not pen-
sioners (10.9% to 19.8%). It suggests that the pension system provides,
in principle, sufficient income for old age. Among all elderly of 65+,
the poverty rate is 14.8%.
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Table 11.
Poverty according to Sex and Age Groups in Serbia in 2002  (in %)
Note: The relative poverty risk is calculated as the percentage growth (drop) in the pover-
ty index of each group compared to the average poverty index of the entire population.
Source: AZS 2002
% %of the Relative Total Structure Poverty Severity
MNO poor poverty population of the- depth of 
risk structure poor poverty
Sex
Man 20.1 10.6 0.2 48.6 48.7 2.3 0.8
Woman 19.9 10.6 –0.1 41.4 51.3 2.2 0.7
Age
Children 0–6 14.2 6.9 –34.5 6.0 3.9 1.4 0.5
Children 7–14 22.2 12.7 20.1 8.5 10.3 3.0 1.1
Children 15–18 19.7 10.7 1.3 5.1 5.2 2.4 0.8
Adults 19–25 18.6 9.6 –9.6 9.5 8.6 1.8 0.6
Adults 26–45 17.3 9.1 –14.2 26.4 22.7 1.9 0.6
Adults 46–64 19.1 9.7 –8.0 26.8 24.6 2.0 0.7
Old 65+ 27.2 14.8 40.0 17.7 24.8 3.2 1.1
Total 20.0 10.6 – 100 100 2.2 0.8
The next category with a poverty risk above average is children 7-14
years old. Namely, 12.7% of the population belonging to this age group
lived below the poverty line of 4,489 dinars per consumer unit, and
thus, its relative poverty risk was 20% higher than the population aver-
age. However, the share of this age group in the poor population is
considerably smaller than that of the elderly, and amounted to 10.3%.
Even though children 7-14 do not represent a significant part of the
poor population (due to their low share in the entire population), their
poverty was relatively deep compared to other age groups. Children
15-18 years old also had a poverty risk which was nearly equal to the
population average. Other age groups of adults had a poverty risk
below average. The MNO share distribution within entire population
according to age does not differ from the age distribution of the pover-
ty index.
Poverty according to household type and composition
Poverty was more prevalent among households without children
than among household with children (table 13). The poverty risk of
households without children was above average (+8.5%) and they con-
stituted over 2/3 of the poor population. Their poverty depth and
severity was close to average. When observing poverty according to the
number of household members, it may be noticed that poverty does
not grow with an increase in the number of members. Although the
most vulnerable households are those with five or more members
(with a poverty risk of +26.3%), the next relatively vulnerable category
is one or two-member households (with a poverty risk somewhat high-
er than average). The least poor were three and four-member house-
holds (below average poverty risk). This is in line with the fact that
poverty is the least prevalent among households with children since
most of three and four-member households have children.
For households with children, it is interesting to point out that single
mothers with children have almost half the poverty risk compared to
the population as a whole. Table 14 presents poverty according to
household composition. Namely, the poverty index increases when
one elderly person joins the household, as do the other two poverty
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Table 12.
Poverty of the Elderly (in %)
Source: AZS 2002
Total Belgrade Vojvodina West Central East Southeast
Serbia Serbia Serbia Serbia
Retired 10.9 8.3 9.6 12.6 8.5 13.2 19.2
Elderly 65+.
with no pension 19.8 23.0 20.2 13.7 18.7 9.4 32.7
All elderly. 65+ 14.8 12.7 13.7 12.1 13.6 12.0 26.1
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Table 13.
Poverty according to Household Type in Serbia in 2002  (in %)
Note: The relative poverty risk is calculated as the percentage growth (drop) in the pover-
ty index of each group compared to the average poverty index of the entire population.
Source: AZS 2002
% %of the Relative Total Structure Poverty Severity
MNO poor poverty population of the- depth of 
risk structure poor poverty
Households
Without children 20.6 11.2 8.5 63.5 68.9 2.3 0.8
With children 17.6 8.8 –14.8 36.5 31.1 1.9 0.6
Number of
members
One member 20.4 11.3 9.1 17.4 19.0 2.4 0.8
Two members 21.0 10.9 5.8 24.7 26.1 2.4 0.9
Three members 16.5 8.6 –16.9 19.8 16.4 1.7 0.5
Four members 15.4 8.4 –18.6 21.6 17.6 1.6 0.5
Five and more
members 25.3 13.0 26.3 16.5 20.9 2.9 1.0
Total 19.5 10.3 – 100 100 2.2 0.8
Table 14.
Poverty according to Household Composition in Serbia in 2002 (in %)
Source: AZS 2002
% %of the Relative Total Structure Poverty Severity
MNO poor poverty population of the- depth of 
risk structure poor poverty
Single mothers with
children 13.4 5.4 –47.4 1.6 0.9 0.9 0.7
Other households 19.6 10.4 0.8 98.4 99.2 2.2 0.2
Household
composition
One member 20.4 11.3 9.1 17.4 19.0 2.4 0.8
2 adults. 2 children 12.9 6.9 –33.2 9.5 6.4 1.6 0.5
2 adults. 2 children.
1 elderly 23.8 10.8 5.1 1.4 1.5 2.4 0.7
1 adult with children 12.3 5.0 –51.9 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.2
1 adult. 1 elderly
with children 16.5 6.4 –37.6 0.5 0.3 1.6 0.4
2 elderly without 
children 30.9 16.9 63.6 7.4 12.2 3.4 1.2
Total 19.5 10.3 – 100 100 2.2 0.8
indicators go up: the poverty depth and severity. Yet, the most vulner-
able households were those with two elderly people without children.
Table 15 presents poverty among elderly households, where elderly
households are defined as households in which all members are aged
65 or over. As the previous table pointed out, elderly households have a
poverty index above average. Two-member elderly households were
the most exposed to poverty since their poverty risk was almost 2/3
higher than the population average. They constituted 12.2% of the
total number of poor households, and their poverty depth and severity
was considerably higher than average.
When the data are viewed by rural/urban areas, it is noticed that one
and two-member elderly households have a higher share in rural areas
(22.6%) than in urban areas (15.3%). The poverty risk of these house-
holds in rural areas was the highest – twice that of the population aver-
age, and 36.8% and 49.9% higher, respectively compared to the rural
area average. Their poverty was considerably deeper and more acute
than other households.
Poverty and education
Table 16 shows the relationship between education level and pover-
ty. It is easy to come to the conclusion that the share of the poor
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Table 15.
Poverty Among Elderly Households in Serbia in 2002  (in %)
* The relative poverty risk is calculated compared to the average poverty index of the
reference population
Note: elderly households are defined as households in which all members are 65 years
old and over 65.
Source: AZS 2002
% %of the Relative Total Structure Poverty Severity
MNO poor poverty population of the- depth of 
risk* structure poor poverty
Elderly-1 member 26.2 13.7 33.1 10.9 14.5 3.0 1.0
Elderly-2 members 30.9 16.9 63.6 7.4 12.2 3.4 1.2
Other households 17.6 9.3 –10.2 81.7 73.3 1.9 0.7
Total 19.5 10.3 – 100 100 2.2 0.7
Elderly-1 member 18.5 7.7 6.8 9.6 10.2 1.4 0.4
Elderly-2 members 25.6 10.7 47.7 5.7 8.4 2.2 0.7
Other households 14.1 7.0 –4.0 84.7 81.4 1.2 0.4
Total urban 15.2 7.3 – 100 100 1.3 0.4
Elderly-1 member 34.2 20.0 36.8 12.8 17.5 4.7 1.7
Elderly-2 members 35.2 21.9 49.9 9.8 14.7 4.6 1.5
Other households 22.9 12.8 –12.4 77.4 67.8 3.0 1.1
Total rural 25.6 14.6 – 100 100 3.4 1.2
declines with education level. Individuals who have not completed ele-
mentary school have the highest poverty risk. The poverty risk of these
people was twice as high as the population average, and the depth and
severity were considerably higher compared to other education levels.
On the other hand, the highly educated (junior college and
University) had a below average poverty risk. Only 2.9% people with
completed junior college and 2% people with a university degree were
poor. This disaggregation of poverty by education indicates that educa-
tion is worthwhile since the labor market awards education. A very
similar picture is obtained when observing MNO according to the edu-
cation level.
Poverty and status on the labor market
The labor market in Serbia is characterized by relatively low rates of
participation of the population in the labor market and relatively high
unemployment. Table 17 presents the participation and unemploy-
ment rates according to rural/urban areas, defined in two ways: accord-
ing to the ILO (International Labor Organization) standards and
according to the respondent’s self-declaration.
The participation rate, calculated as the ratio between the active
population and the population capable of work (men 15-59 years of
age, women 15-54), is 62.2% according to the ILO definition; it is
somewhat higher according to self-declaration, at 65.2%. However, it is
particularly important to emphasize that the unemployment rate
(defined as the ratio between the number of unemployed persons and
the active population), by the ILO definition is considerably lower
compared to the unemployment rate according to self-declaration. The
source of this difference lies in the fact that the ILO definition, to
ensure international comparability, starts from the fact that unem-
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Table 16. 
Poverty according to Education in Serbia in 2002  (in %)
population over 15 years of age 
Source: AZS 2002
% %of the Relative Total Structure Poverty Severity
MNO poor poverty population of the- depth of 
risk structure poor poverty
Uncompleted
elementary school 36.1 21.5 102.5 17.5 35.4 5.1 1.8
Elementary school 25.4 14.3 33.9 23.3 31.2 3.1 1.0
Secondary school 15.1 6.9 –35.1 47.5 30.8 1.2 0.3
Jr. college 7.8 2.9 –72.8 5.1 1.4 0.4 0.1
University 5.6 2.0 –81.4 6.6 1.2 0.4 0.1
Total 20.0 10.6 – 100 100 2.2 0.8
ployed persons are those who did not work during the reference peri-
od, but actively looked for a job and were ready to take up a job if
offered. There were 256,000 of these people, whilst a further 745,000
people defined themselves as unemployed, but a part of them actually
worked.15 It means that only one third of those who declared them-
selves unemployed are actually unemployed. Based on this, we can
draw the conclusion that the unemployment rate according to the
ILO’s definition, in line with international comparability, was 8.4%.
Disaggregated by rural/urban dwellers, a somewhat higher unemploy-
ment rate is found in urban areas than in rural areas.
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15 The data on 745,000 unemployed, which were estimated from the survey, were
very close to the number of the registered unemployed – there were 800,000 of
them in May 2002.
%Participation rate %Unemployment rate
ILO Self-declare ILO Self-declare
Urban 62.2 65.7 9.0 21.6
Rural 62.3 64.4 7.5 25.9
Total 62.2 65.2 8.4 23.3
Table 17.
The Participation Rate according to Rural/Urban Population
in Serbia in 2002 (in %)
Note: The unemployment rate is calculated for men 15-59 years of age, and women 15-54
ILO – The International Labor Organization
Source: AZS 2002
Table 18.
Gray Economy and Poverty in Serbia in 2002 (in %)
Note: the employed were defined as persons who performed any kind of job, during
the reference week, for money or any other benefit in kind.
Source: AZS 2002
% %of the Relative Total Structure Poverty Severity
MNO poor poverty population of the- depth of 
risk structure poor poverty
Employed
Main job in regular ec. 14.7 7.3 –16.4 69.4 58.0 1.4 0.4
Main job in gray ec. 22.7 12.0 37.1 30.6 42.0 2.5 0.8
Without additional job 17.5 8.9 2.1 89.2 91.0 1.7 0.6
With addition. job
(gray) 14.4 7.2 –17.3 10.8 9.0 1.5 0.5
Total 17.2 8.7 – 100 100 1.7 0.6
Another important labor market feature is the gray economy. The
gray economy as the source of primary employment was accounted for
by 30.6% of the employed who were defined as being in the active pop-
ulation (see the note accompanying table 18). They made 42% of the
poor being employed, and their poverty risk was much higher than the
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Table 19.
Poverty according to Socio-economic Status in Serbia in 2002 (in %)
based on self-declaration
*the relative poverty risk is calculated compared to the poverty index of the reference
population.
Note: the social-metric status categories are defined on the basis of the respondent self-
declaration.
Source: AZS 2002
% %of the Relative Total Structure Poverty Severity
MNO poor poverty population of the- depth of 
risk* structure poor poverty
(over 15)
Employed 12.7 6.2 –42.0 30.6 17.7 1.2 0.4
Employers and
self-employed 16.3 9.2 –13.3 5.1 4.4 1.6 0.5
Farmers 23.3 10.6 –0.5 5.3 5.3 2.0 0.7
Other active 23.1 13.2 24.6 1.4 1.7 2.7 0.8
Unemployed 29.2 16.9 59.4 11.9 19.0 3.6 1.2
Pensioners 22.0 10.9 2.9 24.1 24.8 2.4 0.8
Other non-active 23.7 13.3 25.2 21.7 27.1 2.9 0.9
Total 20.2 10.6 – 100 100 2.2 0.8
Employed 10.2 4.8 –38.6 36.4 22.3 0.8 0.2
Employers and
self-employed 13.6 7.4 –4.9 5.7 5.4 0.7 0.2
Farmers 13.3 8.6 10.6 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.5
Other active 22.3 8.8 14.1 0.8 1.0 1.4 0.2
Unemployed 26.9 14.4 86.1 11.6 21.6 2.6 0.7
Pensioners 18.0 7.9 1.3 26.0 26.3 1.5 0.5
Other non-active 19.2 9.3 19.9 19.0 22.8 1.8 0.5
Total urban 16.2 7.8 – 100 100 1.4 0.4
Employed 17.8 9.0 –37.2 23.1 14.5 1.9 0.6
Employers and
self-employed 20.9 12.4 –13.5 4.2 3.6 3.2 1.2
Farmers 23.9 10.7 –25.5 11.6 8.6 2.0 0.7
Other active 23.5 15.4 7.7 2.1 2.3 3.3 1.0
Unemployed 32.0 20.0 39.4 12.3 17.1 4.9 1.8
Pensioners 28.1 15.7 9.6 21.6 23.7 3.6 1.4
Other non-active 28.3 17.2 20.2 25.1 30.2 4.1 1.4
Total rural 25.4 14.3 – 100 100 3.3 1.2
average for the employed (+37.1%). Such a high share of the gray
economy among the poor employed clearly indicates that the gray
economy continues to be a main strategy for survival of a significant
part of the population. On the other hand, 10.8% of the employed had
an additional job in the gray economy. They were not confronted with
poverty since their poverty risk was significantly below average
(–17.3%). The gray economy was found mostly in agriculture, trade,
crafts, and other services.
Table 19 shows poverty according to the socio-economic status of
the population based on respondents’ self-declaration of their status.
The poverty indicators differ a great deal according to this status and
whether people were rural or urban dwellers. Within the labor market,
the unemployed had the highest poverty risk (59.4% higher than the
population average), and with the highest poverty depth and severity.
Other labor market participants had a below average poverty risk,
except for the category of other active ones. When disaggregated by
rural/urban areas, the unemployed in rural areas were the most vulner-
able since their poverty risk was twice as high as the population aver-
age, or 39.4% higher compared to the rural population average. By
contrast, the employed in urban areas enjoyed the most favorable posi-
tion – their poverty index was less than half the population’s average,
and 38.6% lower than the urban population average.
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Table 20.
Poverty among Pensioners in Serbia in 2002 (in %)
*the relative poverty risk is calculated compared to the poverty index of the reference
population.
Source: AZS 2002
% %of the Relative Pensioners Structure Poverty Poverty
MNO poor poverty structure of the poor- depth severity
risk* pensioners
Total pensioners 22.0 10.9 2.9 24.1 24.8 2.4 0.8
Pensioners-farmers 31.1 19.6 84.4 2.1 3.9 5.0 1.8
Other pensioners 21.1 10.1 –5.0 22.0 20.9 2.1 0.7
Total population 20.2 10.6 – – – 2.2 0.7
Total pensioners 18.0 7.9 1.3 26.0 26.3 1.5 0.5
Pensioners-farmers 22.5 12.5 61.0 0.6 1.0 3.5 1.1
Other pensioners 17.9 7.7 –0.1 25.4 25.3 1.5 0.5
Total urban
population 16.2 7.8 – – – 1.4 0.4
Total pensioners 28.1 15.7 9.6 21.6 23.7 3.6 1.4
Pensioners-farmers 32.8 21.0 46.5 4.1 5.9 5.3 2.0
Other pensioners 27.0 14.5 1.1 17.5 17.7 3.3 1.1
Total rural
population 25.4 14.3 – – – 3.3 1.2
Amongst persons participating in the labor market, poverty was the
most distributed among the other non-active category, which includes
persons with property income and other personal income, home-mak-
ers, children, students, those incapable of work, and other persons who
do not have an occupation. Pensioners were slightly more dispropor-
tionately represented in the total number of the poor compared to the
average. Whilst pensioners in urban areas were below average poor,
pensioners in rural areas had an above average poverty index (48.1%
higher than the population average, and 9.6% higher than the rural
population average).
Table 20 presents the status of poverty for pensioners. It is easy to see
that pensioners-farmers were considerably more vulnerable than other
pensioners, with a much higher poverty risk compared to the popula-
tion average, and with much deeper and more acute poverty compared
to other pensioners. They adversely affected the poverty picture among
pensioners as their pensions were very low and had significant arrears.
Disaggregated by rural/urban dwellers, pensioner-farmers in rural
areas were the most exposed to poverty; they constituted almost 6% of
the total number of poor pensioners in rural areas.
DETERMINANTS OF CONSUMPTION AMONG THE POOR
This section shows the results of research behind the factors affecting
living standards and poverty. Their identification could be useful in
implementing social policy for poverty reduction. This brief analysis
points out factors, which are connected with poverty, but does not
reveal cause-and-effect relationship. 
Although important determinants of poverty remain unidentified
(for example, personal ability/preference), the model which is used
identifies important factors related to poverty. The factors that are
researched include household characteristics (age structure, educa-
tion, sex and age of the household head, the household size), eco-
nomic characteristics (socio-economic status of the household head,
labor status and whether employment of household members is in
private or state sector), and location (region and rural/urban). These
factors are used as explanatory variables in a simple regressive
method where the consumption per consumer unit represents a
dependent variable. The model identifying factors which are the most
related to the consumption per consumer unit is estimated by the
least squares regression model (MNK), and the results are presented
in the next table.
The danger in relying only on the estimated regression, which is
based on mean values, lies in the fact that data may contain extreme
values (outliers). Consequently, the estimation of regression per quin-
tiles, which is less sensitive to extremes, may be more suitable
(Chamberlain, 1994). In this way, the effects of different variables can
be estimated on different parts of the distribution (for example, on
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10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile). Table 21 presents coeffi-
cients of the average regression and the median regression (estimated
by the method of the smallest absolute variance – MNAO) for the pur-
pose of comparability. The estimated coefficients for various per-
centiles are shown in the Annex. The Annex also shows the results of
the estimated poverty index regression, poverty depth (gap) and sever-
ity of poverty. In Table 21, in addition to the estimated regression coef-
ficients, standard errors are shown in parenthesis. By comparing the
values of the coefficients in the two regressions and their statistical sig-
nificance, we come to the conclusion that mostly the same factors
determine the consumption per consumer unit in both regressions.
Also, there are no statistically significant differences in the values of the
factors (coefficients). Thus, we shall comment only on coefficients of
the first regression – the average regression.
Household demographic characteristics have an important role in
explaining consumption levels. The number of elderly persons in a
household has a statistically significant negative effect on consump-
tion. It means that an increase in the share of the elderly (65+) in a
household, given an unchanged household size, leads consumption
per consumer unit to fall compared to the reference age category (per-
sons 46-64 years old). This effect is statistically significant not only on
average, but also across all parts of the consumption distribution
(table A2 in the Annex). Thus, given an increase in the number of eld-
erly people in a household compared to the reference age group, the
poverty index increases significantly, as well as the other two poverty
indicators – poverty depth and severity (see tables A3-A5 in the
Annex). The same effect can be seen with children 7-14 years old. An
increase in their share in a household, given an unchanged household
size, decreases consumption. This effect was not statistically signifi-
cant with the poorest and the wealthiest, but it was so with other parts
of the distribution studied. This effect was also insignificant when
looking at all three poverty indicators. It means that an increase in the
share of children 7-14 compared to the reference age category, given
unchanged other household characteristics, does not affect the pover-
ty index, nor the poverty depth or severity. At first glance, this result
appears to be different from the conclusion that children 7-14 are,
after the elderly, the next vulnerable population category. That is
because regression enables identification of the effect of certain factors
(for example, participation of children 7-14) on the dependent vari-
able, given the same other household characteristics. The share of
adults 19-25 and 26-45 years of age has a statistically significant posi-
tive effect on consumption. The total number of household members
significantly affects consumption. An increase in the number of
household members decreases consumption per consumer unit by
20% on average, given other conditions unchanged. This effect is larg-
er among the richest than among the poorest. An increase in house-
hold size significantly increases the poverty index and the poverty
depth and severity.
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Table 21.
Determinates of Poverty in Serbia in 2002
Dependent variable: ln(consumption per consumer unit)
MNK MNAO
Characteristics of the household
head or household Estimates s.e. Estimates s.e.
Share of children 0-6 in household 0.541 (0.074) ** 0.507 (0.079) **
Share of children 7-14 in household –0.149 (0.059) * –0.156 (0.060) **
Share of children 15-18 in household 0.039 (0.068) –0.004 (0.069)
Share of adults 19-25 in household 0.243 (0.053) ** 0.244 (0.052) **
Share of adults 26-45 in household 0.180 (0.035) ** 0.157 (0.035) **
Share of elderly 65+ in household –0.149 (0.026) ** –0.175 (0.025) **
Ln (no. of household members) –0.220 (0.020) ** –0.193 (0.019) **
Age of household head –0.003 (0.001) ** –0.003 (0.001) **
Woman head of household 0.011 (0.018) 0.001 (0.018)
Incomplete elementary education –0.267 (0.022) ** –0.262 (0.021) **
Elementary education –0.213 (0.017) ** –0.184 (0.018) **
Jr. college education 0.124 (0.025) ** 0.128 (0.027) **
University education 0.287 (0.024) ** 0.299 (0.026) **
Employer or self-employed 0.096 (0.040) * 0.134 (0.040) **
Farmer 0.028 (0.051) 0.061 (0.047)
Other active 0.038 (0.117) 0.082 (0.092)
Unemployed –0.060 (0.031) –0.041 (0.034)
Retired –0.018 (0.021) –0.012 (0.021)
Other non-active –0.145 (0.038) ** –0.139 (0.033) **
% employers or self-employed in household –0.026 (0.044) –0.100 (0.043) *
% farmers in household 0.011 (0.055) –0.049 (0.052)
% other active in household –0.074 (0.081) –0.143 (0.069) *
% unemployed in household –0.264 (0.027) ** –0.279 (0.028) **
% employed in a private registered firm 0.168 (0.019) ** 0.165 (0.019) **
% employed in a private unreg. firm 0.034 (0.024) 0.058 (0.022) **
% employed in other sectors 0.019 (0.051) –0.072 (0.050)
Belgrade – rural –0.136 (0.040) ** –0.170 (0.040) **
Vojvodina – urban 0.037 (0.021) 0.011 (0.023)
Vojvodina – rural 0.005 (0.025) 0.008 (0.025)
W. Serbia – urban 0.009 (0.032) 0.022 (0.034)
W. Serbia – rural –0.030 (0.030) –0.001 (0.030)
Central Serbia – urban 0.021 (0.025) 0.020 (0.026)
Central Serbia – rural 0.040 (0.028) 0.042 (0.028)
E. Serbia – urban –0.001 (0.032) –0.032 (0.033)
E. Serbia – rural 0.093 (0.038) * 0.102 (0.031) **
S.E. Serbia – urban –0.094 (0.026) ** –0.111 (0.028) **
S.E. Serbia – rural –0.154 (0.029) ** –0.197 (0.029) **
Constant 9.471 (0.056) ** 9.464 (0.054) **
F(37,6348) 50.80 [0.000] MSD 2338.1
Adj R squared 0.2481 RSD 2712.2
Root MSE 0.4745 PseudoR2 0.1379
Note: * indicates 5% of significance, ** indicates 1% of significance
Education is a significant determining factor of consumption and
poverty. The household head with low education levels has a lower
level of consumption and a higher poverty risk compared to persons
whose head of household has a secondary level education (reference
variable), given unchanged other conditions. By contrast, highly edu-
cated household heads (jr. college and university) have higher con-
sumption, a lower poverty index score, and lower poverty depth and
severity compared to the reference category. On average, households
with University educated heads recorded consumption which was one
third higher than in households whose heads only completed second-
ary school. This effect is relatively high compared to other transition
countries. Observed across different parts of the consumption distri-
bution, it is higher among the poorest than the wealthiest. Based on
these results, it can be concluded that investing in human capital, i.e. in
education, is one of the ways out of poverty since the labor market
awards high education.
The share of the unemployed in a household significantly decreases
consumption and increases the poverty risk compared to the share of
the employed (the reference variable). An increase in the share of the
unemployed in a household, given unchanged household size, decreas-
es the consumption level by 23% on average compared to the reference
variable. This effect is most significant across the median of the con-
sumption distribution, and smallest at very ends of distribution. If we
observe whether employment of household members is in the state or
private sector, we note the following: an increase in the share of the
employed in a household working in a private registered firm lead to
an increase in consumption compared to those employed by
socially/state owned enterprises (by 18% in average). Consequently,
the poverty index score declines. This effect increases if one moves
from the poorest towards the wealthiest part of population. It means
that employment with private sector pays off and that it represents one
of the ways to increase income and household consumption, and also a
way out of poverty.
Finally, household location has an important role when seeking an
explanation for consumption. Households in rural areas of
Southeastern Serbia have the biggest negative effect on consump-
tion. These households had 14% lower consumption levels on aver-
age compared to households in urban areas of Belgrade (the refer-
ence variable), and this effect is more prominent with the wealthiest
than with the poorest. These households had a higher poverty risk
compared to the reference variable. Similar but somewhat smaller
effect on consumption is noted with households from urban areas of
Southeastern Serbia. Other locations do not have a significant effect
on consumption, except for households in rural areas of Belgrade,
which have a negative effect on consumption compared to the city of
Belgrade.
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CONCLUSION
In 2002, 10.6% population of Serbia was poor as their consumption
per consumer unit was on average less than 4,489 dinars, or US$72 per
month, equating to $2.4 per day. The concentration of the population
around the poverty line is significant since a small upward shift in the
poverty line significantly increases the percentage of the poor. As a
result, in addition to the poor, individuals directly above the poverty
line has also been analyzed since a small drop in actual earnings and
other resources, or an increase in unemployment in upcoming period
may significantly increase the share of the poor. Thus, 20% of the pop-
ulation whose average consumption was under 5,507 dinars, or US$89,
per month was “close to poverty” or materially insufficiently support-
ed (MNO). The picture of poverty in Serbia is certainly somewhat
worse than this, since the quoted data do not fully include refugees and
IDPs, who are undoubtedly more vulnerable than the permanent pop-
ulation of Serbia.
Poverty in Serbia has been considerably reduced in recent years;
14.5% of the population was poor in 2002 compared to just over one-
third of population in 2000. The key factor affecting the reduction of
poverty was the growth in real GDP, and an increase in earnings and
other income of the population in this period. Yet, even though the
poverty index fell, the poor needed much more income in order to
reach the poverty line. In comparison with 2000, poverty in 2002
became more of a rural phenomenon, as is the case in most of transi-
tion countries.
The population categories that were most exposed to the risk of
poverty include: 1) poorly educated individuals; 2) the unemployed
and poorly supported; 3) those who have their main employment in
the gray economy; 4) the elderly (65+) and children 7-14 years of age;
5) households with five or more members; 6) one and two-member
elderly households, in rural areas in particular; 7) pensioner-farmers,
in rural areas in particular; 8) rural areas of Southeastern and
Western Serbia.
The main determinants of the consumption effecting reduction of
the consumption level and increase of poverty are: increase in the share
of the elderly in a household, increase in the share of the unemployed
in a household, given unchanged household size, and increase in the
household size. Also, these factors were identified as to increase the
poverty index and the poverty depth and severity. Opposite to that, an
increase of the share of the employed with private registered firms, as
well as an increase of the education level of the household head increas-
es consumption, decreases the poverty index, depth, and severity.
II Incidence of Social Transfers; Inequality
INCIDENCE OF SOCIAL TRANSFERS
In this section, we shall analyze the distribution of four social trans-
fers. They are (1) family income support (MOP from its Serbian abbre-
viation), the key social assistance transfer; (2) humanitarian assistance;
(3) municipal aid; and (4) child allowance. We shall focus on the fol-
lowing questions: (a) who receives them (are transfers  pro-poor?); (b)
how much of total spending “leaks” to the non-poor; (c) how impor-
tant are the transfers to the recipients’ households; and (d) how much
of the poverty gap they fill.
The poor. As we have seen before, 10.58 percent of individuals are
deemed poor, i.e. their consumption per equivalent adult is below the
poverty line. Similarly, 10.31 percent of all households are poor.  That
these two percentages are similar is rather unusual since generally poor
households are larger in size, and even after one accounts for
economies of scale, there are normally fewer poor households than
people. However, in the Serbian case, household size is, as illustrated in
Figure 1, remarkably stable regardless of income level.  Thus, the per-
centages of poor households and individuals are very similar.
Income-poverty is more widespread:  18.7 percent of households are
income poor. Only 5.6 percent of households are both expenditure-
and income-poor. These are presumably the most vulnerable house-
holds, or, in other words there is little doubt that they are indeed poor.
In accordance with the rest of the study, we shall treat the consump-
tion-poor, that is, the 10.58 percent of households described above, as
“the poor” – i.e. as the households who, in principle, should be recipi-
ents of social assistance. Our decision to use consumption rather than
income is motivated by the fact (discussed in Chapter II) that expendi-
tures, particularly during the transition, are a far more reliable indica-
tor of onee’s real economic status than income. Those who are poor
according to both income and consumption criteria are termed “very
poor.” 
How important are transfers and who are the recipients? Consider first
the data in Table 1 that show the size of transfers and the percentage of
households in receipt of MOP, humanitarian assistance, municipal aid,
and child benefits: (i) in the total population, (ii) among the poor, and
(iii) among the very poor. 
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The expenditures of the four transfers are equal to 0.9 percent of
total household consumption. By far the largest of the four are child
benefits (0.58 percent of total household consumption). MOP and
humanitarian assistance are about equal in total size (0.12-0.14 per-
cent), and municipal assistance is much smaller (0.03 percent).
The table shows that more than 18 percent of all households receive
at least one of these transfers and that child benefit is by far the most
important of the four. The table also shows that the percentage of
recipients steadily increases in all cases as we move toward the poorer
segments of the population. Thus for example, only 1 out of 100 house-
holds receives MOP, but that percentage rises to 4.7 among the poor
and to 5.6 percent among the very poor. The situation is the same with
all other transfers with the small exception of municipal aid, which is of
about equal importance to both the poor and the very poor. Of course,
that also implies that among the very poor a greater percentage of
households receive at least one transfer. Almost one-third of house-
holds receive at least one of the transfers vs. only 13.8 percent in the
entire population. If we exclude child benefits whose function is not
social assistance alone and consider the three other transfers, we note
that almost 13 percent of the poor and 16 percent of the very poor
receive at least one type of anti-poverty benefit. This is the same per-
centage as in Russia, but significantly less than in Hungary where
almost 25% of poor households receive social assistance. Of course,
another implication of these findings is that the transfers seem to be
generally geared (targeted) towards the poor. However, a more detailed
analysis of the distribution of the transfers is needed. 
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Note: Ventiles (5% of individuals) defined by the level of consumption per equivalent
adult.
Figure 1.
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Figure 2 illustrates where along the income distribution spectrum
are the households recipients of the four types of social transfers. On
the horizontal axis are households ranked according to their consump-
tion per equivalent adult and divided into percentiles from the poorest
to the richest. On the vertical axis, we show the percentage of house-
holds (within each percentile) who are receiving a given transfer. For
example, about 12 percent of households belonging to the poorest per-
centile receive MOP. This value is represented by a dot. The percentile
dots are connected by a solid line to show broader trends. For each
transfer, the overall average percentage of households who are in
receipt of the transfer is shown by a horizontal line. A vertical line at
x=10.6 divides households into poor and non-poor. 
Notice that in all four cases, the trend lines, that is the share of recip-
ients (or differently put, the simple probability of receipt of social assis-
tance) are downward sloping indicating that the percentage of recipi-
ents declines with the level of welfare. Consider now each individual
transfer. For MOP we see that, among the poor, the number of recipi-
ents is always above average. The incidence remains around the average
(1 household in a hundred) all the way to the fifth decile, and then
becomes negligible. Broadly, the same trend – but with a higher aver-
age incidence – is displayed by humanitarian assistance. Municipal
assistance is significant among a few poor percentiles, and then
becomes negligible. (As we have seen, very few households are recipi-
ents of municipal aid overall.)  For child benefits, the trend line is also
downward sloping, but the decline is much less steep than for the other
transfers. In other words, child benefit remains an important transfer
for many households all the way up to the top decile.  The sharpness of
the trend line already conveys a message about pro-poor targeting of
the transfer. We can easily see that MOP and humanitarian assistance
both seem more sharply downward sloping than child benefits – and
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Amount as % In total Among Among
of total population the poor the very
household poor
consumption
MOP 0.12 1.1 4.7 5.6
Humanitarian assistance 0.14 3.4 8.8 11.3
Municipal aid 0.03 0.5 1.3 1.0
Child benefit 0.58 10.1 14.4 18.9
At least one transfer 13.8 25.0 31.6
Excluding child benefit 4.6 12.8 15.7
Table 1.
Size of Transfers and Percentage of Households Who Are Receiving a Given Transfer
Note: Amount is total spending on transfers as reported in the Survey.
thus more concentrated on the poor. This is of course an expected
finding since, despite income-testing of child benefits, they cover a
broader section of the population than either of the two (or even three)
other transfers.
All households who are to the right of the x=10.6 line, i.e. all those
who are non-poor, should not in principle receive poverty-related social
transfers, that is all transfers considered here with the exception of child
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Figure 2.
Percentage of Households Recipients of Social Transfers 
by Level of Welfare (Consumption by Equivalent Adult)
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benefits. In an extreme case, where targeting is 100%, all transfers
would go to households on the left of (i.e. below) the poverty line, and
none to those above the poverty line. Everything to the right of the
poverty line is therefore “leakage.” In terms of the number of benefici-
aries, Table 2 shows that 43 percent of MOP benefits are received by the
poor, and that 52 percent of total MOP expenditures go to the poor.1
Consequently, MOP’s “leakage” is about half of the total amount. The
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1 From these two figures, we can readily conclude that MOP payments are, on aver-
age, greater for the poor than for non-poor. 
MOP leakage is significantly less than that of other transfers (see Table
2). Put differently, 2 dinars of MOP have to be spent, on average, in
order to transfer 1 dinar to the poor. This ratio is called the “spending
ratio” and is important when discussing the issue of elimination or
reduction of the poverty gap. It shows that the actual spending needed
to close the poverty gap is several times higher than the amount of the
poverty gap itself. Serbian experience is very similar to that of other
East European countries: if one focuses attention on benefits that are
basically social assistance (MOP, humanitarian assistance, and munici-
pal aid), we find that it is necessary to spend 2.7 dinars for each dinar
that reaches the poor. As Table 3 shows this is very much in keeping
with results from several East European countries, where the poor too
are defined as the poorest decile of the population.2
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Table 2.
Efficiency of Transfers: How much Do the Poor Receive?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percentage of Efficiency: Spending ratio
benefits being Percentage of (100/column 2)
paid to the poor money disbursed
to the poor
MOP 43 52 1.9
Municipal aid 26 19 5.3
Child benefit 15 17 5.9
All four benefits 19 24 4.1
(Excluding child
benefits) 29 37 2.7
Note: The spending ratio gives the amount of dinars that need to be spent on each
transfer in order to disburse 1 dinar to the poor. It is equal to 100/efficiency.
Country Spending ratio Year of survey
Serbia 2.7 2002
Estonia 2.9 1995
Hungary 3.7 1993
Bulgaria 4.8 1995
Poland 4.8 1993-94
Table 3.
Spending Ratios in Serbia and Several Other Countries
Source: Milanovic (1999).
2 For clearly, the larger the share of the poor, the greater the efficiency of transfers
and the smaller the spending ratio. (If the entire population is poor, every dinar
spent by definition closes poverty gap.) Thus, equality of the headcount is needed
for a meaningful comparison.
Where does the money go? We now move to a more detailed analysis
of each transfer. Tables 4-7 show how important each transfer is in the
total, how important it is for the poor, how much they receive on aver-
age, and how much of the poverty gap and consumption each transfer
covers. The tables present, as it were, a photograph or an ID card of
each transfer. We shall focus on four indicators that we believe describe
the role of each transfer: (1) the importance of the transfer in financing
the consumption of its recipients, (2) importance of the transfer in
financing the consumption of its poor recipients, (3) how much of the
poverty gap the transfers cover, and (4) the absolute amount of the
average transfer. 
Figure 3 compares the four transfers across the two first indicators.
We see that MOP stands out by being both more important for those
who receive it, and for poor recipients than other three transfers. To
see the difference, let us compare MOP and child benefits. For exam-
ple, MOP pays for almost 20 percent of the consumption of its recipi-
ents, while child benefits pay for less than 5 percent of the consump-
tion of its recipients. But this is because child benefits are disbursed to
many households, not all of which are poor, and understandably will
not play a major role in such households’ total income (or consump-
tion). What is less expected is the difference between MOP and
humanitarian assistance. The overall spending of the latter is some 20
percent higher than MOP’s (see Table 1). But humanitarian assistance
transfers are much smaller in absolute amounts (1038 dinars, on aver-
age, vs. 2761 dinars) and thus they tend to cover a smaller percentage of
its recipients’ consumption. 
The next Figure illustrates the importance of each transfer in reduc-
ing the poverty gap. This is called effectiveness. Here child benefits are
the most effective simply because they are the largest. They eliminate
almost 8 percent of the poverty gap. Yet MOP is not far behind (elimi-
nating 5.2 percent of the poverty gap) even if total spending on MOP is
less than one-quarter of spending on child benefits.  Overall, the four
transfers eliminate about one-sixth of the poverty gap.3
Finally,  Figure 5 illustrates the average amount of each transfer (per
household). Not surprisingly, child benefits are by far the most impor-
tant, amounting to 6500 dinars on average per recipient household.
But MOP, which is – as we have seen –fairly concentrated, comes sec-
ond with an average disbursement per (recipient) household of 2700
dinars monthly.   
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3 Since total spending on the four transfers equals 1 percent of GDP (BM: check),
the implication of this finding is that—with unchanged efficiency—it would be
necessary to spend 6 percent of GDP to bring all the poor up to the level of the
poverty line. 
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Figure 5. Average Amount of Each Transfer 
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Total Poor Non poor
MOP (amount in DIN pm) 197,246 105,281 94,387
(100) (52) (48)
In DIN million p.m.
Consumption 160.4 6.3 153.2
(100) (3.9) (96.1)
Consumption of those with MOP>0 1.05 0.24 0.81
Poverty gap 2.03 2.03 –
MOP as percentage of 
consumption 0.12 1.67 0.06
consumption of those with MOP>0 18.8 43.9 11.7 
poverty gap 9.7 5.2 –
MOP per recipient household (DIN pm) 2761 3309 2341
Consumption per capita 
of those with MOP (DIN p.m.)a/ 5064 2698 6877
Memo: Consumption per capita
(overall average DIN p.m.)a/ 8788 3110 9441
Table 4.
MOP: Reduction of the Poverty Gap and “Leakage”
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Total Poor Non poor 
Humanitarian assistance 225,835 60,416 166,467
(100) (26) (74)
In DIN p.m.
Consumption 160.4 6.3 153.2
(100) (3.9) (96.1)
Consumption of those with HA>0 3.78 0.52 3.26
Poverty gap 2.03 2.03
HA as percentage of
consumption 0.14 0.96 0.11
consumption of those with HA>0 6.0 11.6 5.1
poverty gap 11.1 3.0
HA per recipient household
(DIN pm) 1,038 1,010 1,049
Consumption per capita
of those with HA  (DIN p.m.)a/ 6,076 2,993 7,204
Memo: Consumption per capita
(overall average DIN p.m.)a/ 8,788 3,110 9,441
Table 5. 
Humanitarian Assistance: Reduction of the Poverty Gap and "Leakage"
Total Poor Non poor
Municipal aid 48,401 9,342 39,180
(100) (19) (81)
In DIN p.m.
Consumption 160.4 6.3 153.2
(100) (3.9) (96.1)
Consumption of those with MA>0 0.57 0.07 0.50
Poverty gap 2.03 2.03
MA as percentage
of consumption 0.03 0.15 0.03
consumption of those with MA>0 8.51 3.3 7.8
poverty gap 2.4 0.5
MA per recipient household
(DIN pm) 1,461 1,062 1,601
Consumption per capita of those
with MA  (DIN p.m.)a/ 6,811 2,775 8,221
Memo: Consumption per capita
(overall average DIN p.m.)a/ 8,788 3,110 9,441
Table 6.
Municipal Aid:  Reduction of the Poverty Gap and “Leakage”
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Total Poor Non poor 
Child benefit 930,772 159,895 772,638
(100) (17) (83)
In DIN p.m.
Consumption 160.4 6.3 153.2
(100) (3.9) (96.1)
Consumption of those with CB>0 19.25 1.35 17.90
Poverty gap 2.03 2.03
CB as percentage of 
consumption 0.58 2.54 0.50
consumption of those with CB>0 4.8 11.8 4.3
poverty gap 45.9 7.9
CB per recipient household  (DIN pm) 1,450 1,638 1,417
Consumption per capita
of those with CB (DIN p.m.) a/ 6,520 2,813 7,165
Memo: Consumption per capita
(overall average DIN p.m.) a/ 8,788 3,110 9,441
Table 7.
Child Benefit:  Reduction of the Poverty Gap and “Leakage”
Notes: p.m. = per month. HH=household.
a/ Mean across households.
Poverty gap calculated for the situation prior to the payment of the four
transfers considered here. 
The poor who do not receive any transfers. We have seen above (Table
1) that 25 percent of the poor receive at least one of the four transfers. If
we leave out child benefits, the proportion falls to 12.8 percent.
Consequently, 87.2 percent of the poor are excluded from any type of
social assistance (child benefits are not social assistance). This is called
“error of exclusion” (since ideally all these households should be receiv-
ing some assistance) and is the converse of “leakage” which we discussed
before. There are two questions that we can ask with respect to the error
of exclusion: first, does it decline with income or not—or in other words,
are the poorest among the poor more likely to receive assistance or not;
second, what explains the fact that a household is excluded. We shall
consider these two questions separately for (i) the three types of social
assistance transfers combined, and then (ii) for child benefits. 
Figure 6 shows that the percentage of the excluded poor declines as
one moves toward the less poor, a fact which indicates improvements
in targeting together with increasing depths of poverty. It is worth not-
ing that the exclusion among the very poorest percentile of people is 76
percent, much less than the 95 percent exclusion among those just
below the poverty line. However, improved targeting as people become
poorer should not allow us to forget the fact that 87 percent of the poor
receive no social assistance of any kind at all (see the line drawn at
y=0.87 in Figure 6).  
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Table 8.
Percentage of Households Receiving Child Benefits
In total Among Among all Among the
population the poor who have poor who have
children children
1 month question 10.1 14.4 27.2 45.4
12 months question 10.9 14.4 29.2 45.4
Figure 6. 
Failure to Deliver Social Assistance (Share of the Poor Who Do Not Receive
Social Assistance)
Figure 7.
Failure to Deliver Child Benefits (Share of the Poor Who Do Not Receive
Child Benefits)
Note: Social assistance defined as MOP, humanitarian assistance and municipal aid.
Average exclusion error shown as the horizontal line.
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Error of exclusion for child benefits does not occur when poor
households as such do not receive child benefits, but when poor house-
holds with children fail to receive child benefit. The average of this error
of exclusion is 55 percent. In other words, more than one-half of poor
households with children do not receive a child benefit. As Figure 7
illustrates, this percentage does not show any obvious pattern among
the poor although the fact that among the very poorest the error of
exclusion is the highest (more than 75 percent) should be a matter of
concern. However, we need to point out again that child benefits (as
discussed before) have not been satisfactorily covered in the Survey, in
other words there is an almost certain downward bias in reporting of
child benefits. The question, of course, is whether this bias is constant
across all households (irrespective of their income level) or is decreas-
ing (or increasing) with income.
Households have also been asked if they have received child benefits
during the previous 12 months (rather than during the last month
which was the question asked for all the transfers discussed so far). The
results, despite what one might expect, are practically identical (Table
8). Both questions give the percentage of all households with children
who are receiving benefits to be 27-29 percent, and the percentage of
poor households with children who are receiving benefits as 45 per-
cent. Thus, exclusion is 55 percent in either case. So, if there is a sys-
tematic lack of reporting of child benefits, this is not due to the dura-
tion of the reference period but simply to the fact that some house-
holds fail to report receiving benefits whatever the period they are
asked to remember.
Why are some poor excluded? After addressing the issue of how many
poor are excluded from getting the benefits that ideally (or legally) they
should receive, the next question is to try to find out the reasons why
they are excluded. Obviously, many of these reasons may be idiosyn-
cratic or unobservable, e.g. the lack of information about the transfers,
long physical distance from the relevant administrative office, compli-
cated procedure, etc. 
First, note (Table 9) that 92 percent of the poor and 95 percent of the
excluded poor have not applied for MOP. Thus, the error of MOP
exclusion appears to be almost entirely explained by households’ lack
of application for the benefit. Only 5 percent of those who are exclud-
ed have applied for MOP and have been rejected by the social assis-
tance offices.4 Thus only 5% of the error of exclusion may be ascribed
to social assistance offices’ making a wrong decision (not to allocate
MOP). Note also that applying is crucial to receiving MOP and to
avoiding error exclusion, as reflected in the fact that 37 percent of the
poor who receive MOP have applied for it.5
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4 The reason for rejection (among these 5 percent of excluded) were: lack of fulfill-
ment of financial or other criteria (37 percent), negative assessment by a social
worker (31 percent), and other reasons (32 percent). 
5 The difference between 37.3 and 4.6 percent in column 2 of Table 9 is statistically
significant at less than 1 percent 
Applying is therefore crucial to receiving social assistance transfers.
But why did 95 percent of the excluded poor fail to apply for MOP?
Table 10 shows some of the reasons given by the poor, and by the
excluded poor. Among both all poor and the excluded poor, one in five
believe that they do not need MOP (and presumably the other two
types of social assistance too6). So these people can hardly be treated as
excluded since they themselves do not believe that they need assistance.
Similarly, one-fifth believe that they do not meet the criteria. The
largest group—almost 40 percent of both the poor and the excluded
poor—are not informed about the existence of the program. It there-
fore appears that lack of information about the existence of MOP is the
most important reason for exclusion. An implication of this finding is,
of course, that better and more widespread information is critical in
order to increase the take-up rates among the poor. Finally, relatively
few households adduce complicated procedure as the reason for not
applying for the benefits.
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Table 9.
MOP: The Excluded and Non-Excluded Poor
During the previous 12 months
Error of exclusion have you applied for MOP
Yes No Total
No 37.3 62.7 100
Yes 4.6 95.4 100
Note: Yes = error of exclusion = poor who do not receive transfers.
No = the poor who receive transfers.
Table 10.
Why Poor Do Not Apply for MOP?
The reason for not applying All poor The poor excluded 
for MOP from three types
of SA
I didn’t need it 18.3 19.8
I wasn’t informed
such a program existed 37.8 36.9
I don’t know how to apply 18.5 18.0
Administrative procedure is 
too complicated 5.5 5.3
I know I don’t meet the criteria 18.6 19.8
I have applied earlier and was refused 1.3 0.2
Total 100 100
6 In the survey, the question was asked for MOP only. .
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Is failure to apply the main cause of exclusion in the chase of child
benefits too?  We turn to this question next. Indeed, as Table 11 shows,
in 83 percent of cases  exclusion (poor households with children who
do not receive child benefits) is due to the failure to apply. In only 17
percent of cases, the “true” error of exclusion seems to have occurred
as poor households have applied for benefits and have presumably
been rejected. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the
main reason for avoiding the error of exclusion lies in households
applying for the benefit (91 percent). Thus, for child benefits, no less
than for the MOP, applying is key for receiving them.
Figure 8 shows how we can break the error of exclusion down into
its various components. Our starting point is that 87 households out of
each 100 poor households do not receive any social assistance. But, as
we have seen, 95 percent of them (83 households) fail to apply for
MOP. Furthermore, among these 83 poor households, 40 percent (34
households) believe that they either do not meet the criteria or think
that they do not need social assistance. These people are therefore
unlikely to apply even if information was more accessible and wide-
spread. They therefore should not, strictly speaking, be treated as
excluded. Only those in gray circles in Figure 8, i.e. 53 out of 100 poor
households, can be truly considered as excluded. An overwhelming
majority of them are excluded because of lack of information and
insufficient knowledge on how to apply. 
Conclusion. At first sight, the error of exclusion for both social assis-
tance and child benefits seems large. It amounts to 87 percent for the for-
mer, and 55 percent for the latter. But for social assistance, more than
9/10 of the error of exclusion is due to poor households not applying.
And among those who do not apply, almost one-half do not do so
because they are not informed about the program (MOP). For child ben-
efits, similarly more than 80 percent of the error of exclusion is explained
by the lack of application for the benefits. We do not know why house-
holds fail to apply for child benefits (this question was not included in
the Survey) but, by analogy with the MOP-related question, one cannot
rule out that lack of information may be the main reason here too. 
Table 11.
Child Benefits: The Excluded and Non-Excluded Poor
During the previous 12 months
Error of exclusion have you applied for child benefits
Yes No Total
No 90.6 9.4 100
Yes 17.1 82.9 100
Note: Yes = error of exclusion = poor with children who do not receive child benefits.
No = the poor with children who receive child benefits.
INEQUALITY
Overall inequality of consumption and income. The distribution of
consumption per equivalent adult (CEA) follows a lognormal distribu-
tion almost perfectly, as illustrated in Figure 9. This is not the case with
income which is, in its log form, skewed to the left, implying the exis-
tence of a very poor (left) tail of the distribution.
Figure 10 shows the consumption-income ratio by ventiles when
individuals are ranked by their household equivalent consumption or
income. First, note that, calculated across individuals (each individ-
ual counts the same), consumption is 2.3 times greater than income.
This is not in contradiction with the fact that consumption (in the
aggregate) is only 17 percent greater than income. This is because the
consumption-income ratio is low (below 1) among the richest house-
holds. Thus as Figure 10 shows, the top 10 percent of people accord-
ing to their income are the only people who make some saving. Also,
these very poor according to consumption have consumption-
income ratios close to 1, indicating that they have no “room” to
increase their consumption; that is, their consumption is low because
their income is low. This is not the case with those with low income
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Breaking Down the Error of Exclusion for MOP
(total excluded poor = 87 out each 100 poor people)
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Figure 9.
Distribution of Consumption and Income per Equivalent Adult (CEA and YEA)
Note: the variable is log of consumption or income per equivalent unit (both are
population-weighted).
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whose consumption is several-fold higher than income.7 This is, by
the way, one of the reasons why consumption is a better indicator of
one’s welfare than income. As we would expect, the consumption-
income ratio monotonically decreases as income goes up. It also
increases although not nearly as monotonically as consumption per
equivalent adult goes up. Thus for the top 5% of the population
according to their consumption, consumption is more than 3 times
as high as their (reported) income. 
The correlation coefficient between consumption and income per
equivalent adult is 0.48, the marginal propensity to consume of one
additional dinar is only 0.45,8 and as we have seen before, consumption
is about 17 percent greater than income. Table 1 shows the Gini coeffi-
cients for the four different definitions of welfare: income and con-
sumption, per capita and per equivalent unit. The differences are min-
imal. Normally, the use of equivalent units rather than per capita meas-
urement reduces inequality because it increases income (or consump-
tion) of large families (since children count less than adults). As large
families seem relatively poor when one uses a per capita measurement,
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Figure 10.
Consumption-Income Ratio
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7 These could be households whose income is temporarily very low, in some cases
close to zero (the income-poorest 1% persons have equivalent income of less than
900 dinars per month). For comparison, CEA for the poorest consumption per-
centile is about 2500 dinars.
8 Calculated from a simple regression of CEA on YEA and a constant.
the use of equivalence scales tends to reduce inequality. However, in
our case where-as we have seen-household size is about the same at all
income levels, the use of equivalence scales reduces inequality only
marginally. On the other hand, the use of income rather than con-
sumption increases inequality by about 3 Gini points: from about 30 to
almost 33. This, of course, was already visible from the more skewed
distribution in Figure 9. According to our preferred measure – con-
sumption per equivalent adult – inequality measured by the Gini is
slightly less than 30, a level that is about average for East European
transition countries (see below). 
A different measure of inequality is the decile ratio, which measures
the ratio between the income (consumption) of the top and bottom
decile.  The data are given in Annex Table A6.  Since this statistic focus-
es only at the two ends of distribution, the differences between income
and consumption results are much greater than in the case of the Gini
coefficient. This is not unexpected since there are people with very high
incomes (who, as we know from Figure 10, save some of their income)
and there are also people with extremely low incomes (whose con-
sumption is larger). Table 13 shows that the decile ratio is less than 7 in
the case of consumption and exceeds 8 and 9 in the case of income.9
Contribution to income inequality. Total household income can be
broken down into its components. In our case, we have eleven compo-
nents (income sources): labor income, property income, net agricul-
tural income (that is, total revenues minus total expenses), pensions,
unemployment benefit, other social transfers, consumption in kind,
school stipends, refunding of health-related expenses, imputed income
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Table 12.
Gini Coefficients
Per capita Per equivalent adult
Consumption 30.0 29.7
Income 33.3 32.2
9 Across the world, the average decile ratio is about 9 to 10. The bottom decile gen-
erally receives only  about 1/3 of mean  income, the top decile three times as much
as the mean. 
Table 13.
Decile Ratios
Per capita Per equivalent adult
Consumption 6.8 6.7
Income 9.8 8.1
from consumer durables (including their depreciation), and imputed
housing income (rent from owner-occupied housing) Thus we can
write 
where Y=total income, Xi = different income sources (in this case
k=11), and si = share of i-th income source in total income. 
The Gini coefficient of total income is equal to the weighted average
of concentration coefficients for each source (Ci). The weights are the
income shares (si). The concentration coefficient is, in terms of its cal-
culation, the same thing as the Gini coefficient except that it shows the
distribution of an income source when households or persons are
ranked according to a different criterion (in this case, according to total
income). The Gini coefficient, of course, shows the distribution of
income when households are ranked according to income as well.
(Thus, in the Gini coefficient, the ranking criterion and the distribu-
tion variable are the same; in the concentration coefficient, they are dif-
ferent.) For example, in calculating the concentration coefficient we
rank all households according to their income and then look at the dis-
tribution of social assistance across these ranked households. Indeed, if
social assistance is disbursed mostly to poor households, the concen-
tration coefficient will be negative: the poor receive more of it (in
absolute amounts) and social assistance will reduce overall inequali-
ty.10 For such an income source whose Ci<0 we say that it is pro-poor
in absolute terms: the concentration curve of such a source would lie
above the 45-degree line (the line of equality). Of course, the situation
is exactly the opposite for income sources that are important for the
rich, as for example, income from property (see Figure 3). Their Ci will
be greater than the Gini, and the concentration curve will lie below the
45 degree line. The decomposition formula for the Gini is thus
The percentage contribution of each source to total inequality will
depend, of course, not only on the value of its concentration coeffi-
cient, but also on the share of the source in total income. This is obvi-
ous if we reflect that an income source that is pro-poor will not have
the same effect on inequality if the source is very small, or if it accounts
for a large share of total income.
Table 14 breaks down total income into its eleven components
(sources) and shows their contributions to inequality.11 As expected,
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10 Notice the negative correlation between the ranking criterion (income) and the
source (social assistance).
11 The analysis has been conducted for income per equivalent unit.
the most important source is labor income which accounts for 45.5
percent of total income. Since labor income is distributed almost exact-
ly as total income (concentration coefficient is 33, almost the same as
total income’s Gini of 32.2), labor income also contributes a little less
than one-half of total inequality. 
Next come three sources, which are of approximately, equal impor-
tance: pensions (16.3 percent of total income), consumption in kind
(12.8 percent) and net agricultural income (11.4 percent). Both pen-
sions and income in kind are distributed more equally than total
income and their contributions are each about 4 Gini points or about
11-12 percent of total inequality. It is interesting to note that consump-
tion in kind, although somewhat more equally distributed than total
income (see Figure 11), is not much of an equalizer, as some people
might believe (or as it might have been the case in the past). Net
income from agriculture has a fairly high concentration coefficient
(46) and this explains more than 16 percent of total inequality.
When we therefore add these four key income sources (labor, pen-
sions, consumption in kind and net agricultural income) we account
for 85-86 percent of total income and of total inequality. Other sources
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Amount in Share Concentration Contribution Contribution
dinars per in total coefficient to Gini to total
equivalent unit income (2)*(3) inequality
(%) (u %)
(4)/total Gini
Labor income 3,976 45.5 33.0 15.0 47.0
Property income 331 3.8 55.3 2.1 6.6
Net agricultural 
income 999 11.4 46.1 5.3 16.5
Pensions 1,427 16.3 24.9 4.1 12.7
Unemployment 
benefit 36 0.4 –13.6 –0.1 -0.2
Other social transfers 30 0.3 30.8 0.1 0.3
Consumption in kind 1,121 12.8 27.3 3.5 11.0
Stipends 14 0.2 12.8 0.0 0.1
Health aid 19 0.2 27.8 0.1 0.2
Imputed income from
consumer durables 1/ 412 4.7 30.0 1.4 4.4
Imputed rent 382 4.41 0.4 0.5 1.4
Total gross income 8,747 100.0 32.23 2.2 100.0
Table 14.
Structure of Total Income and Sources’ Contribution to Total Income Inequality
1/ Includes depreciation of consumer durables. All amounts are population-weighted.
are too small to have much of an impact on inequality. Only unem-
ployment benefits are distributed in a pro-poor fashion in the sense
that poor households receive more of them in absolute amounts than
rich households. Their concentration coefficient is negative, indicating
that the concentration curve lies above the 45-degree line (see Figure
11), and they reduce total inequality.12 This is not the case with social
transfers whose net effect on inequality is zero—that is, their concen-
tration coefficient lies very close to the line of equality. 
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12 Although, as the figure shows, unemployment benefits are not important for the
very poor.
Figure 11.
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Finally, note that neither imputed income from durables nor imput-
ed rent has much of an impact on inequality. Imputed income from
durables has almost an identical distribution as overall income, imply-
ing that the distribution of durables is about the same as the distribu-
tion of income. But then imputed rent seems to be pro-poor in relative
terms13 with a concentration coefficient of only 10.4.  Thus, when we
add housing and durables, their distribution is less skewed than the
distribution of income, an interesting and perhaps unexpected conclu-
sion since we normally expect durables and housing (=wealth) to be
more unequally distributed than income. However, it could be that
privatization to tenants of the housing stock, which in the past, under
socialism, was allocated rather equally, has contributed to the fact that
at least housing wealth is fairly evenly distributed.  
Comparison with other countries
Table 4 shows that Serbia’s income and inequality lie about the aver-
age for a group of East European transition economies. Particularly
interesting for us are comparisons with neighboring countries, which
have moreover had surveys very similar in design and definition of the
aggregates as Serbia.14 Bosnia, Macedonia, and Slovenia have lower lev-
els of inequality, Bulgaria the same, and Croatia higher. The range
spans Gini values from 26 to 36, with Serbia’s (income) inequality of 33
around the mid-point of the range. Generally speaking, Central
European countries (as can be seen here too) tend to have fairly low
levels of inequality (under 30) while the former Soviet republics have
higher levels of inequality (Lithuania and Russia close to 40). Balkan
countries seem to lie somewhere between these two groups. In terms of
broader international comparisons, it may be noted that 33 is also
about the average level of inequality for the rich (OECD) countries. Of
course, the range there too goes from the very egalitarian, Finland,
Denmark, Sweden with Ginis of about 25-27 to the inegalitarian
Portugal, Turkey and the United States whose Ginis reach 40. 
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13 A source is pro-poor in relative terms if the share of that source in the poor’s
income is greater than in the income of the rich. 
14 Some of the other comparisons below need to be taken with caution since the sur-
veys and the definition of welfare aggregates may be quite different (e.g. the inclu-
sion of imputed rent and imputed income from durables would alone add some
10 percentage points to income, and might affect the calculated inequality). 
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Country (year) Income or Gini 
consumption coefficient
per capita p.a.
(in US$)
Hungary (income; 1999) 1800 26
Slovenia (income; 1998) 4900 26
Bosnia (consumption; 2001) 1300 27
Macedonia (consumption; 1998) 1000 29
Belarus (expenditures; 1999) 630 30
Serbia (concumption; 2002) 1630 30
Ukraine (income; 1999) 820 30
Bulgaria (income; 1999) 820 33
Lithuania (consumption; 2000) 1200 33
Serbia (income; 2002) 1480 33
Croatia (consumption; 1998) 3200 36
Estonia (income; 2001) 1600 38
Russia (income; 2000) 1000 40
Unweighted average 1360 32
Table 15.
Comparison of Serbia with Selected East European Countries
(countries ranked by the Gini coefficient; calculated on per capita basis)
Source: World Bank database. For Bosnia, Croatia and Belarus, consumption is
without imputed rent. 
III System of State Support to the Poor
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The system of state support to the poor is aimed at assisting poor cit-
izens and their families to meet their basic subsistence needs. The
Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for administering the system of
state support to the poor. The system is regulated by three Republic’s
laws: (1) The Law on Social Protection and Provision of Social Security
for Citizens (“The Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia” no. 36/91,
33/93, 67/93, 46/94, 52/96, and 29/01, (2) The Law on Social Protection
of Children (“The Official Gazette of the RS” no. 49/92, 29/93, 53/93,
67/93, 28/94, 47/94, 48/94, 35/96, and 29/01, and (3) The Law on
Financial Support to Families with Children (“The Official Gazette of
the RS” no. 16/02).
The Law on Financial Support to Families with Children is a new law
(enacted on June 1, 2002) which covered reforms to the system of state
support to the poor. The principal aim of enactment of this Law was to
separate clearly instruments of social policy from population measures.
According to previous legislation, these two types of policies were com-
bined within one instrument – child allowance. Thus, maternal
allowance, allowance for newborns (for necessary support), and com-
pensation for expenses of attending pre-school institution of third and
each subsequent child in the municipality with a negative population
growth rate were defined as population policy measures.
Eligibility for various forms of social protection is determined and
administered at the local level, through local administrative authorities
(municipality, or city) and through a developed network of social and
child protection, which is funded by the Republic (mostly in the case of
social protection) or local administrative authorities (funding children
institutions). Legislation distinguishes between two principal groups of
instruments of state support to the poor, which are legally and adminis-
tratively separate. The first group of instruments is instruments for pro-
viding citizens’ social security and they are implemented through various
social protection institutions. The second group of instruments contains
those covering social protection of children, which are implemented
through local administrative authorities and different child institutions.1
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1 Until 2003, child care institutions were within the remit of the Ministry of Social
Affairs, after which the Ministry for Education and Sports became competent for
them
Local administrative authorities (municipality, or city) provide fund-
ing for additional forms of state support to the poor established by law,
with various types of assistance being funded from local budgets,
including assistance in cash, in kind or in services: one-off assistance,
subsidizing utilities, assistance in paying rent and electricity, soup
kitchens, etc. In addition, with respect to entitlement to benefits for
children, municipalities (or city administrations) represent the first
decision point in terms of eligibility rights, and they provide funds for
financing certain programs (pre-school institutions, preventive health
care, vacation and recreation of children). However, it is not within the
remit of local administrative authorities to decide either on the amount
of assistance funded from the Republic budget, or if beneficiaries will
be entitled if they meet the legal criteria.
The network of social protection institutions consists of three main
types of institutions in the Republic of Serbia: (i) centers for social
work (121)), (ii) institutions for accommodation of beneficiaries2,
and (iii) day care institutions and home care.3 Social work centers
have the most important role in bringing decisions on eligibility for
one of types of social security of citizens, and they are first instance in
that process. Neither centers nor local administrative authorities have
discretion to decide on the assistance amount or on entitlement if
beneficiaries meet prescribed conditions, but they are obliged to check
on beneficiaries’ material status. On the other hand, Centers of Social
Work have discretion, when establishing the amount of entitlement to
MOP, to include missed earnings that directly affect the MOP
amount. Centers for social work employ nearly 2,500 people, of which
around 90% have a University education. Although the funding avail-
able for covering administrative expenses of the centers is indexed to
the growth in retail prices, a question has been posed in recent years
about whether or not the funds being transferred to particular centers
are sufficient for their normal operations since there is insufficient
expenditure control in the field. 
Institutions for children play an important role in implementing
rights in the area of social protection of children. They include 178 pre-
school institutions and 20 rest/recreation centers in Serbia.
The Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for: (a) carrying out
social policy in the Republic; (b) provides the majority of funds from
the budget for pay-outs to beneficiaries – all types of cash assistance to
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2 Accommodation institutions include: homes for children and youth, centers for
protection of nursing babies, children and youth, centers for family accommoda-
tion,  shelters for children and youth, homes for disturbed children, institutions
for physically handicapped children, educational institutes, shelter units, shelters,
homes for retirees and elderly people, geriatric centers, homes for disabled adults,
institutes for accommodation of mentally disturbed persons and mentally sick
persons
3 Institutions for day care and assistance at home include: day care centers for dis-
turbed children and youth, day care centers, institutions for day care of adults
and elderly persons, centers for assistance at home, and day centers
the poor; (c) provides funds for financing social protection institutions
founded by the Republic and for financing programs in pre-school
institutions (educational programs for children before starting elemen-
tary school, for disturbed children, for children without parental care,
and for children hospitalized for a longer period of time); and (d)
supervises the expert work of local administrative authorities and insti-
tutions of social and child care.
PRINCIPAL FORMS OF STATE SUPPORT TO THE POOR
Within the system of state support to the poor, as discussed above,
there are two principal groups of instruments that are legally and
administratively separated: (1) instruments providing social security
for citizens and (2) instruments of social protection of children.
Within each group of instruments, there are numerous different types
of assistance aimed at different categories of materially vulnerable pop-
ulation and funded from different sources.
Apart from cash benefits (MOP, child allowance, parental allowance,
maternity leave compensation, compensation for absence from work
for taking care of child and absence from work for taking a special care
of a child, maternal allowance, allowance for newborns4, caregiver’s
allowance, etc.), assistance in kind also has an important role in the sys-
tem (day care for children and elderly, assistance in the cost of heating
fuel and electric power, subsidizing utilities, organized meals in soup
kitchens, one-off aid in kind, and other).
Different criteria apply to different types of state support to the
poor. They are different for different types of assistance: fixed absolute
amount (child allowance, parental allowance) that is indexed to the
cost of living, the amount related to average wages in the Republic
(caregiver’s allowance), or variable amount – based on the supple-
menting of funds up to the established level of social security (family
support – MOP).
Various types of state support to the poor are funded from both the
Republic budget and local administrative authorities’ budgets. The
Republic budget funds the majority of assistance in the first instance.
Budgets of local administrative authorities provide funds for the
financing of various services, the one-off type of assistance and in-
kind assistance. They can also fund top-ups to MOP and other types
of assistance whose funding falls under the competence of the
Republic.
In last several years, those who participated in the funding of sup-
port to the poor were donors, foreign governments, humanitarian and
other NGOs, providing finance for different types of one-off assistance
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4 Applied on children born before enactment of the Law on Financial support to
Families with Children  until June 1, 2004
in kind and assistance for certain categories (for example, aid in food
for pensioners, psycho-social support programs for children, etc.), and
also cash benefits (MOP, child allowance, early payment of benefits to
direct recipients of child allowance and maternal allowance).
The structure of funding sources for different types of state support
to the poor is presented in Table 1.
CRITERIA FOR ENTITLEMENT TO STATE SUPPORT
Criteria for implementing rights to various types of state support to
the poor apply uniformly across the entire territory of the Republic.
The first and most important criterion for implementation of the
right to state support to the poor is an income level that is lower than
the established level of social security. There is not a uniformly estab-
lished level of social security for all types of state support to the poor,
and the social security level does not represent the country’s official
poverty line. 
The social security level for entitlement to MOP represents a kind
of proxy poverty line, as it is linked to average wage per employee in
the municipality or city over the last 3 months. It cannot be higher
than the Republic average wage per employee. Consequently, the leg-
islated social security level results in difference in the criteria for enti-
tlement to MOP on a geographical basis. It creates a horizontal
inequality – entitlement criteria are much more restrictive in under-
developed municipalities (cities), which causes individuals in differ-
ent municipalities with the same material position to be treated dif-
ferently. However, even without changing the Law on Social
Protection and Provision of Social Security of Citizens, in practice,
from August 2001 until December 31, 2002 through donations from
Great Britain and the World Bank, the social security level was made
the same for all citizens on the entire territory of the Republic. The
social security level was linked to the average wage in the Republic as
a whole and thus, all negative consequences of horizontal inequality
in the entitlement to MOP were removed in practice. The draft Law
(proposal) on Social Protection to legislate for equal criteria for enti-
tlement to social assistance throughout Serbia is currently going
through parliamentary procedures.
As for child allowance, the method of establishing the social security
level has been changed by the Law on Financial Support to Families
with Children – per capita income threshold is established for the
whole territory of Serbia and it is indexed by living costs. Since June 1,
2002, the child allowance amount has been fixed at an absolute
amount, and it has been monthly reconciled with the living cost index
since then. The differentiation among areas with low and high birth
rates has been abolished, and consequently the right of each third child
in the family to child allowance has been abolished too.
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An income realized below the established social security level repre-
sents a principal, but as is similar to other transitional systems,5 not a
sufficient precondition for entitlement to some types of state support
to the poor. It is necessary that citizens, i.e. families meet a number of
additional criteria referring to the ownership of significant movable
assets or real estate, making income from arable land, working status of
beneficiary and family members (the unemployed, children in regular
education, those incapable of work, redundant workers, persons in
need for assistance and attendance), interdiction of denying the entitle-
ment to inheritance, interdiction of making agreements on lifelong
support, etc.
The social protection system features mutual exclusivity of certain
rights. Thus, the overall income received through regulations in the
area of social security shall be counted as income for the family apply-
ing for child allowance. This does not apply to MOP, i.e. income from
child allowance shall not be counted when applying for MOP.
BENEFICIARIES
In 2002, the total number of beneficiaries of various types of state
support to the poor was slightly over 823,000, meaning that over 11%
of the total population of Serbia, excluding Kosovo-Metohija, were
included in the system of state support to the poor.
The total number of beneficiaries has varied significantly in recent
years (Table 2).
Amongst instruments of social care for children, the average month-
ly number of beneficiaries fell steadily during the period 1996-2000
due to irregular payouts, demographic reasons, the change in status of
Kosovo-Metohija, etc. Thus, in 2000, it was 44% lower than in 1996
when the number of beneficiaries was at its peak during the period
observed. Since 2000, along with more regular payments, the number
of beneficiaries has increased considerably; thus, in 2002 that number
was close to that in 1998. In 2002, the total number of beneficiaries was
reduced by 18,500 because of the reduced number of child allowance
beneficiaries (abolition of automatic entitlement to child allowance for
third child). In addition, the decrease in the number of beneficiaries
was caused by the abolition of some instruments of social care for chil-
dren through enactment of the new Law on Financial Support to
Families with Children (abolished maternal allowance, allowance for
newborns and compensation for the cost of pre-school for the third
child). In the first half of 20036, the number of beneficiaries of financial
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5 B. Milanovic – Income, Inequality and Poverty During the Transition from
Planned to Market Economy, World Bank, Regional and Sector Studies, 1998, p.
116
6 According to the Ministry of Social Affairs
support to families with children was stabilized, i.e. the number of
child and parental allowances was somewhat increased.
Amongst instruments for social protection for citizens, there was
also a declining trend in the number of beneficiaries between 1996 and
2000. After settlement of a significant portion of arrears and more reg-
ular payments in 2001 and 2002, the number of beneficiaries increased
significantly. In 2002, 1.5% of the total population in Serbia, excluding
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Table 2.
No. of Beneficiaries of State Support to the Poor in the Period 1996 – 2002.
*   The average annual number of beneficiaries. The real number of social support
instruments is higher by 11,500 families (MOP 2) which were funded by donations
from August 2001 until December 2002 (these are families that meet conditions to be
entitled to MOP if the social security level is linked to average wages per employee in
the Republic). The table quotes the number of MOP 1 beneficiaries that receive legally
guaranteed MOP amount, which is funded from the Republic budget.
**  Beneficiaries with refugee status are included  (1,200 beneficiaries in institutions
and 77 in family accommodation) and their accommodation cost is funded by
UNHCR.
Note: Until June 1, 1998, there was no unique data base on beneficiaries, so the
Ministry of Social Affairs’ assessment was used for those years.
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs data
INSTRUMENTS 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Social care of children 881,891 835,433 758,614 675,047 613,914 733,692 715,220
Child allowance
Families 409,508 391,041 329,913 305,175 247,592 345,238 324,650
Children 710,820 677,213 613,537 541,657 486,138 589,584 573,187
Children in pre-school
institution 69,661 74,867 76,339 74,422 75,225 76,067 75,384
Wage compensation for
women in childbirth 44,410 31,775 26,181 23,636 22,361 22,988 24,491
Maternal allowance 49,076 44,724 36,380 30,250 24,966 38,259 36,154
Allowance for newborns 6,936 5,869 5,232 4,220 4,514 5,904 2834
Assistance to refugee mothers 988 985 945 818 710 890 727
Parental allowance – – – – – – 2443
Provision of social security 
of citizens 121,138 110,557 105,300 102,439 87,530 106,532* 108,205*
MOP
Families 39,978 34,937 32,358 31,409 25,326 37,714* 38,310* 
No. of household members 85,742 75,292 70,417 67,532 52,413 85,121 87,362
Allowance for assistance
and attendance 17,426 17,295 16,901 16,902 16,825 18,664 20,243
Job training 670 670 670 670 650 650 600
Accommodation in
institutions 15,200 15,200 15,212 15,235 15,494 15,462** 14,942**
Family accommodation 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,148 2,097 2,216**
Total number of
beneficiaries 1,003,029 945,990 863,914 777,486 701,444 840,224 823,425
Kosovo-Metohija7, benefited from various types of assistance. The
breakdown of beneficiaries indicates that MOP beneficiaries accounted
for the highest share of beneficiaries, reaching 70% during the
observed monthly period. It is even larger when we include beneficiar-
ies who are not formally included in the system but were funded from
subventions. 
COST OF STATE SUPPORT TO THE POOR
Most of the funds for financing various types of state support to the
poor are provided from the Republic budget. In the period 1996-2002,
10.8% of the Republic budget on average was spent on financing
instruments of state support to the poor8 (see table 3). The real amount
of allocation for financing state support to the poor was actually higher
between August 2001 until December 2002 because, as indicated
above, the increased MOP amount (compared to the Republic average)
as well as MOP for beneficiaries who were not formally included in the
system (since they did not meet the necessary legal eligibility condi-
tions) were funded by donations of Great Britain (until August 2002)
and the World Bank (from Aug. 2002 to Dec. 2002). Since there are no
available data on how much was allocated from local budgets or from
various donors’ sources on the local level for different types of state
support to the poor, it is not possible to establish the total cost of state
support to the poor in the Republic.
The cost of state support to the poor shows considerable fluctuations
in the period 1996-2002 (see table 3). It should be noted that in the
period 1996-99 the real allocation was even less than quoted in Table 3
since many commitments were not realized due to the lack of funds.
This caused the accumulation of arrears in 2000 – arrears of more than
two years had accumulated for certain types of state support to the
poor. For example, in June 2002, delays in paying out entitlements in
the area of social care for children were: for child allowance – 27
months, maternal allowance – 23 months, allowance for newborns – 6
months, wage compensation for women in childbirth – owners of
enterprises and shops – 4 months, and wage compensation during
maternity leave – 3 months.
Due to obligations of the Republic of Serbia for child allowance and
maternal allowance under the earlier Law on Social Protection of
Children, the Law on First Emission of Long-term Bonds of the
Republic of Serbia should be applied (“The Official Gazette of the RS
no. 25/2000). Thus, child allowance shall be paid for entitlement that
beneficiaries had between August 1, 1998 and June 30, 2000. Total
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7 There are no accurate data on the number of beneficiaries of various types of in-
kind state support to the poor and of other forms of support funded at the local
level
8 Not including the year 2000
arrears on child allowance and maternal allowance obligations
amounted to 3,459 million YUD.
Thanks to efforts of the Government of Serbia and donations by
governments of other countries, arrears were significantly paid off
between December 2000 and the end of 2001.
The breakdown of costs of state support to the poor that are funded
from the Republic budget points to the fact that the majority of funds
are allocated for instruments of social care for children. In the period
1996-2002, these funds accounted for 78.3% of the cost of state sup-
port to the poor. In 2001, the cost of funding instruments of social care
of children reached nearly 84% of the total projected spending on state
support to the poor, which points to the importance of this group of
instruments in supporting the poor in Serbia.
The total executed amount of state support to the poor funded from
the Republic budget in 2002 was almost 260 million EUR or 1.64% of
the projected gross domestic product (GDP), which is a decrease com-
pared to 2001 when it amounted to 1.74% of projected GDP. However,
per capita transfers in Serbia, excluding Kosovo-Metohija, show a com-
pletely different trend – the per capita cost of state support to the poor
in 2002 was nearly 35 EUR, or 106 EUR per household (in 2001, it was
25.8 EUR per capita and 77.9 EUR per household).
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Table 3.
Cost of State  Support to the Poor, 1996 – 2002, in Millions YUD
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*
Budget of the
Republic of Serbia 10,232 13,826 16,811 17,638 32,703 127,340 170,000
Total projected cost of state
support to the poor 1,143 1,884 1,814 1,737 3,514 12,700 15,523
Share in budget, in % 11.2 13.6 10.8 9.8 10.8 10.0 9.1
Share of cost of social care 
of children in total cost of 77.8 73.2 77.3 78.8 75.8 83.6 81.5
state support to the poor
share of cost of provision of 
social security of citizens in
građana u ukupnim trošk. 22.2 26.8 22.7 21.2 24.2 16.4 19.5
total cost of state support to
the poor
* Projected funds. Data for other years are realized funds 
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs
THE MOST IMPORTANT TYPES OF STATE SUPPORT TO THE POOR
The most important types of state support to the poor, according to
the number of beneficiaries and the amount of funds allocated for
them, are MOP and child allowance (CA). MOP and CA beneficiaries
represent 79% of the total number of beneficiaries of state support to
the poor. Almost 60% of total funds from the Republic budget ear-
marked for financing various instruments of state support to the poor
are spent on these two instruments.
MOP
MOP is a form of state support to the poor belonging to the group of
instruments of provision of social security of citizens and it is regulated
by the Republic Law on Social Protection and Provision of Social
Security of Citizens. MOP is a type of monthly cash benefit for poor
citizens and their families who have insufficient funds to meet their
basic needs. Families meeting legally established criteria are entitled to
MOP. The most important criterion is that their income is below the
social security level. The family consists of spouses (married or in com-
mon-law marriage), children (born in marriage or out of marriage,
adopted or fostered) and relatives of direct-line (vertical) and distant
relatives up to second cousins (twice removed), provided that they live
in a joint household. In addition, a family member is defined to be
someone without income who does not live with his/her parents until
he/she gets married up to the age of 27, as well as a spouse (regardless
of where he/she lives) and a parent of the child incapable of work, and
parent of the child who is included in regular education. 
The social security level is established as a percentage of the basis
that, according to the law, represents the average wage per employee in
the municipality, or city, in the previous quarter. This basis cannot be
higher than the average wage per employee in the Republic in the same
period. However, as mentioned earlier, from August 2001 until
December 2002, it was introduced in practice, for the entire territory of
the Republic, a single social security level was introduced and linked to
the average wage per employee in the Republic. This had two main
effects on MOP beneficiaries: (1) the MOP amount was increased for
current beneficiaries formally included in the system (MOP 1), and (2)
a special category was introduced – MOP 2 – citizens who do not meet
the elibiligity conditions (the threshold is average wages in the munici-
pality, or city) but they have a lower level of income than the average
wage per employee in the Republic, and they are not formally included
in the system (but they received MOP from donors’ funds).
Apart from having an income that is lower than the prescribed social
security level, potential MOP beneficiaries should meet additional six
criteria:
(1) to have no other real estate but housing corresponding to indi-
vidual, or family, needs (one room per family member, or two
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rooms for a person receiving allowance for assistance and atten-
dance) and a house plot of 0.5 ha. The exception is if the registry
of the mortgage is approved up to the level of the market value
based on MOP entitlement;
(2) that an individual, or family member, who is capable for work,
and he/she does not perform any activity, is included in regular
education, registered at the Labor Bureau, and didn’t refuse an
offer of employment, or temporary or seasonal job, skill training,
retraining, additional training or education;
(3) that the employment of an individual, or family member, was
not terminated by himself/herself, consent or fault, on the basis
of disciplinary or criminal responsibility, except if 2 years have
elapsed since cession of employment or if such an individual
became incapable of work after the termination of employment;9
(4) that an individual, or family member, did not sell, be given as a
gift or denied the right to inherit real estate or if a period of time
has elapsed when from the market value of real estate that he/she
sold, gave as a gift or denied entitlement to inherit it was possible
to receive income;
(5) that an individual, or family member, does not own movable
assets which can be used or sold, without jeopardizing minimum
living needs, and provide funds amounting to six-times the MOP
amount – if that is established at the time of applying for MOP;
(6) that an individual, or family member, did not enter an agree-
ment for lifetime support.
For entitlement to MOP there are no restrictions regarding national-
ity of particular beneficiaries, or age, although it is a rare case that MOP
beneficiaries are children younger than 18 as they are under parental
custody. Entitlement to MOP does not exclude the possibility of using
other types of state support to the poor, such as child allowance, assis-
tance and attendance allowance, etc. Entitlement to MOP is limited in
time to 1 year, or 3 months for the employed if they receive a wage that
is below the social security level. Thereafter, an individual’s case is
reviewed with the possibility of unlimited extension as long as an indi-
vidual, or family, is in social need.
Volume of MOP
The MOP amount is the difference between the social security level
and an individual’s or family’s income. It means that for each individ-
ual, his/her monthly income is topped up to the relevant social securi-
ty level. It can be concluded that the implicit tax for MOP amounts to
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9 According to Art. 14 of the Law on Social Protection and Provision of Social
Security, as those incapable of work are considered: (1) women over 60 and men
over 65 years of age, (2) child until age of 15, and if the child is included in regu-
lar education in secondary school – until the end of the prescribed schooling
time, and (3) an individual totally incapable of work according to the regulations
on pension and disability insurance
100% as each additional dinar of an individual’s income leads to a
reduction of MOP by that amount.
Social work centers check individual or family income by examin-
ing relevant documents and by checking on the material situation in
the field. 
When establishing the income of a potential beneficiary, the follow-
ing income is taken into consideration: (1) average monthly income
and transfers received in the previous quarter, or an average of one
month or two months if there were no income or transfers for all three
months; (2) income from agricultural activity in the amount of cadas-
tre income in the current year made by owner, usufructuary or direct
user; (3) income from leasing real estate or movable property; (4)
income from other property rights if it is taxable; (5) income from sup-
port based on kinship and other legal basis; (6) average monthly
income of unregistered activity, made in the previous quarter, based on
the findings and opinion of the authority that decides on the entitle-
ment; (7) for citizens who perform independent activity, the amount
used as the basis for calculation of payments for pension/incapacity
insurance for the current year is used as income; and (8) for the
employed, earnings received are taken into consideration – the mini-
mum amount in the case of guaranteed net wages.
For establishing the income level of a potential beneficiary, the
following income is not taken into consideration: (1) child
allowance, (2) caregiver’s allowance, (3) compensation for physical
infirmity, (4) money received as awards or final payment as part of a
retirement package, and (5) transfers related to a student’s standard
of living.
The MOP amount is reconciled monthly with the growth in wages
in the municipality, or city, with the average wage in the Republic for
the relevant quarter representing a ceiling. The MOP amount for a
specific case depends on two criteria – family size and the beneficia-
ry’s place of residence. However, by introducing a unique social secu-
rity level and provision of donors’ funds for this purpose from
August 2001 until December 2002, in practice MOP depends only on
family size and income. In 2003, the place of residence is again an
important factor for the MOP amount, as the law has not been
changed and there is no donor funding for financing MOP up to the
uniform social security level (i.e. the average wage per employee in
the Republic).
The family social security level per capita drops with an increase in
the number of family members, from 16% to 6.4% (and even less) of
the average wage per employee in the Republic for families with 5 or
more members (see Table 4). Thus, multi-member families without
children are more vulnerable from the point of view of satisfying the
basic living needs of all members of the family, whereas families with
children receive child allowance.
In March 2003, the social security level for a one-member family
amounted to 2,446.72 YUD, or around 38.5 EUR.
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The MOP amount in 2002 was between 440 and 2,230 YUD for sin-
gle-member families, depending on the municipality. In December, the
average MOP amount for single-member families was 1,092 YUD or
17.5 EUR. The MOP amount per capita significantly drops with an
increase in the number of family members, as indicated in Table 5,
which presents the monthly range of MOP per family depending on
the family size in the period 2001-02.
Table 5 data indicate that in 2002, compared to 2001, the amount of
MOP paid increased in real terms, due to the real growth in average
wages in Serbia during the observed period.
Beneficiaries
In the period 1996-2002, the number of MOP beneficiaries fluctuat-
ed considerably. From 1996 until 2000, the number of MOP benefici-
aries was steadily falling; by November 2000, it was less than 36.7% in
relation to 1996 (see Table 6). At the beginning of December 2000,
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Family size Family social  security level Per capita
established by law, social security level, 
in % of average wage in % of average wage
per employee per employee
Single 16 16
2-member family 22 11
3-member family 28 9.3
4-member family 30 7.5
Family with 5 and more 
members 32 6.4 and less
Table 4.
Social Security Level for MOP
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs data
Family
March 2001 December 2002
size Amount Amount Amount Amount Per capita
(YUD) (EUR) (YUD) (EUR) amount (YUD)
1 member 181.5 – 1,233 3 – 20.55 440 – 2,230 7.3 – 37.16 440 – 2,230
2 members 254.1 – 1,726.2 4.25 – 28.75 600 – 3,060 10 – 51 300 – 1,530
3 members 326.7 – 2,219.4 5.45 – 37 765 – 3,900 12.75 – 65 255 – 1,300
4 members 344.85 – 2,342.7 5.75 – 39 820 – 4,170 13.67 – 69.5 205 – 1,042.5
5 and more 363 – 2,466 6 – 41.1 875 – 4,450 14.6 – 74.2 175 – 890
members
Table 5.
MOP Amount per Family,  2001 – 2002.
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs data
arrears amounted to almost 20 monthly payments. However, after set-
tling 14 months of arrears in December 2000 and reintroducing MOP
payments on a regular basis, the number of beneficiaries increased sig-
nificantly as of 2001. In 2002, the number of beneficiaries was close to
the number in 1996. If we remember that the real number of benefici-
aries is higher by 12,000 families (beneficiaries who are not formally
included in the system but are financed from donor funds), it means
that the number of beneficiaries is significantly above the level in 1996
when the largest number of MOP beneficiaries was recorded.
In 2002, 38,797 families received MOP (MOP 1 – funded from the
Republic budget; MOP 2 –increased amount up to the Republic aver-
age, funded by donors). This number represents 1.6% of the total
number of households in Serbia, not counting Kosovo-Metohija,10 i.e.
50,280 (including 11,483 families whose benefits were entirely funded
by donors), which represents 2.05% of the total number of households
in Serbia, not counting Kosovo-Metohija. The total number of benefi-
ciaries in 2002 was 88,483 (MOP 1), which represents just under 1.2%
of the total population of Serbia excluding Kosovo-Metohija.11 This
number should be supplemented by MOP 2 beneficiaries numbering
27,672 in December 2002. That gives the real number of 116,155 MOP
beneficiaries who meet the eligibility requirements conditions for
MOP if amendments to the Law link the social security level to the
average wage per employee in Serbia.
The most important group of beneficiaries entitled to MOP is the
unemployed and the incapable of work, which constitutes more than
96% of the total number (see Table 7). Share of the unemployed is the
highest, at over 61%, and those incapable of work almost 35%. If the
structure of entitlement holders in 2000 is compared to that for 2001, it
is noteworthy that there is a slight change in the structure of beneficiar-
ies in the direction of reduced relative participation of the employed
and incapable of work and a significant increase in the participation of
the unemployed. That was probably caused by the fact that in the
observed period the minimum wage was above the social security level.
80 Poverty and Reform of Financial Support to the Poor
Table 6.
Number of MOP Beneficiaries Funded from the Budget , 1996-2002.
No. of beneficiaries 1996* 1997* 1998* 1999* 2000* 2001** 2002**
No. of families 39,978 34,937 32,358 31,409 30,736 37,714 38,797
No, of beneficiaries 85,742 75,292 70,417 67,532 66,560 85,121 88,483
*    data from Dec.
** average monthly number
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs 
10 calculated according to the 2001 census .
11 calculated according to the 2001 census
The distribution of the total number of MOP beneficiaries according
to socio-economic status indicates that, apart from the unemployed,
children represent the most important group of MOP beneficiaries.
The relative participation of this group of beneficiaries was larger than
35% in 2002 (see Table 8).
Regarding the age structure of MOP beneficiaries, in 2002 children
represented the highest share in the total number of MOP beneficiaries
– the share of beneficiaries up to 20 years of age in the total number of
beneficiaries is somewhat over 40% (Table 9). Important age groups
are beneficiaries over 60 years of age (13.99%) and those between 30
and 40 (13.93%).
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Table 7.
MOP Beneficiaries according to Socio-Economic Status, 1998-2002.
Socio-economic 1998 % 1999 % 2000 % 2001 % 2002 %
status of
beneficiaries
Employed 877 2.7 771 2.5 827 2.7 294 0.78 144 0.37
Independent 
activity 80 0.3 79 0.2 88 0.3 122 0.32 115 0.30
Farmers 308 0.9 297 0.9 338 1.1 348 0.92 348 0.90
Retired 202 0.6 214 0.7 223 0.7 308 0.82 211 0.54
Unemployed 16,287 50.3 15,934 50.7 15,769 51.3 22,385 59.35 23,995 61.85
Children 401 1.2 364 1.2 329 1.0 401 1.06 414 1.07
Incapable of work 14,133 43.7 13,678 43.6 13,081 42.6 13,762 36.49 13,465 34.71
Others 70 0.2 72 0.2 81 0.3 94 0.25 105 0.27
Total 32,358 100 31,409 100 30,736 100 37,714 100 38,797 100
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs 
Social-economic status No. of beneficiaries Participation (%)
of beneficiaries
Employed 226 0.26
Independent activities 115 0.13
Farmers 657 0.74
Retired 313 0.35
Unemployed 37,407 42.28
Children 17,813 20.13
Incapable of work 31,441 35.53
Others 511 0.58
Total 88,483 100.00
Table 8.
MOP Beneficiaries according to Social-Economic Status in 2002
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs 
If we compare the structure of MOP beneficiaries in February 2001
to that in 2002, it is evident that the relative participation of children
increased as a share of the total number of beneficiaries by around 5%,
as did beneficiaries between 20 and 30. At the same time, the participa-
tion of older beneficiaries (over 60) significantly decreased, as did those
between 50 and 60, albeit by a smaller percentage.
The structure of MOP beneficiaries according to family size in 2002
indicates that single people represent an important group of benefici-
aries with a 46% share in the total number (see Table 10a). However,
data for the two successive years (2001 and 2002) also indicate that
within the observed period the relative participation of one-member
households considerably decreased in the total number of beneficiaries
(by 8%) and simultaneously, the participation of multi-member fami-
lies (families with 3 or more members) increased.
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Age of beneficiaries Participation in % Participation in %
(Feb. 2001) (2002)
Up to 7 years of age 12.9 16.1
7-20 22.6 23.4
21-30 10.4 12.3
31-40 13.4 13.9
41-50 12.4 12.4
51–60 8.6 7.9
Over 60 years of age 19.7 14.0
Total 100 100
Table 9.
MOP Beneficiary Structure according to the Age, 2001 – 2002.
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs 
Family size Participation in % Participation in %
(Feb. 2001) (2002)
1 member 54 46
2 members 18 18.40
3 members 11 13.17
4 members 9 11.89
5 or members 8 10.54
Total 100 100
Table 10.a
MOP Beneficiary Structure according to Family Size, 2001 – 2002.
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs data
There are differences in the structure of the total number of MOP
beneficiaries according to family size between data from the Ministry
of Social Affairs (Table 10a) and the MOP sample (Table 10b).
If characteristics of beneficiary age and family size are cross-linked
(Table 11), then the MOP beneficiary structure indicates that in most
cases individual MOP beneficiaries (80% of the total number of bene-
ficiaries) are people older than 46, and that 43% of the total number of
beneficiaries are individuals older than 65. In a smaller number of cases
the unemployed are an issue, whereas those incapable of work consti-
tute the majority12. The structure of beneficiaries of 4-member,
5-member, and larger households according to age indicates that these
are usually families with children where beneficiaries are between 20
and 35 years of age. 
The structure of MOP beneficiaries according to age and socio-eco-
nomic status leads to the conclusion that they are mainly unemployed
individuals.
The structure of MOP beneficiaries by the principal regions of Serbia
is presented in Table 12. Most of MOP beneficiaries live in central
Serbia, which is understandable, as it is the biggest region. Over one
half of beneficiaries come from central Serbia, around one-quarter
from Vojvodina, and 23% from Belgrade.
According to Table 12, it is evident that wealthier regions (Belgrade
and Vojvodina) have disproportionally more beneficiaries of social
assistance than poorer central Serbia. This comes as a consequence of
the previously mentioned system in which the poverty line is estab-
lished according to the average wage in municipality, and thus, poor
regions are discriminated against.
83System of State Support to the Poor
Table 10b.
Structure of MOP Beneficiaries according to the Family Size in 2002
Family size Participation in %
1 member 26.43
2 members 18.83
3 members 16.70
4 members 17.10
5 and over 5 members 20.94
Total 100
Source: AZS
12 As per structure of MOP beneficiaries according to age and social-economic sta-
tus. Source: The Ministry of  Social Affairs
A larger number of women receive MOP compared to men. Table 13
also points to a high correlation between the educational level of MOP
beneficiaries and the number of MOP beneficiaries. Namely, the num-
ber of MOP beneficiaries rapidly falls with increases in educational
level. Over 80% of MOP beneficiaries have some (including those who
have completed) elementary education, while only 1% has completed
university or junior college education.
Households with children receive slightly more MOP compared to
households without children, as they constitute a little over one-half of
the total number of households containing MOP beneficiaries (see
Table 14). Yet, bearing in mind that households with children consti-
tute only a little over one-third of the total number of households, we
may draw the conclusion that MOP targets households with children
compared to those without children.
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Number of family members
Beneficiary age 1 member 2 members 3 members 4 members 5/more Total
members
Up to 7 years of age 103 1,293 2,307 3,334 3,946 10,893
7 to 14 66 1,633 2,863 5,120 8,254 17,936
15 to 19 89 1,065 1,713 2,080 3,072 8,019
20 to 35 1,558 3,090 4,986 5,820 5,158 20,612
36 to 45 2,172 2,043 2,568 3,272 3,470 13,525
46 to 65 7,095 4,446 2,495 1,508 1,3971 6,941
Over 65 years of age 8,256 1,997 345 128 202 10,928
Total 19,339 15,567 17,277 21,262 25,499 98,944
Table 11.
Structure of MOP Beneficiaries according to Age and Family Size
in December 2002
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs 
Region Structure of MOP Population
beneficiaries, in % structure, in %
Belgrade 22.7 17.4
Vojvodina 26.02 2.4
Central Serbia 51.3 60.2
total 100 100
Table 12.
Structure of MOP Beneficiaries and Population according to Region in 2002.
Sources: AZS; census 2002
Funding of MOP
The MOP amount guaranteed by law is funded from the Republic
budget as a whole, but local administrative authorities make additional
payments if they have funds available. Also, in the period between
August 2001 and December 2002 part of MOP was financed by dona-
tions (increased MOP amount for 54,897 families and full amount of
increased MOP for 11,483 families). Almost 703,000 EUR was allocat-
ed from donations for this purpose. There are not up-to-date data at
the Republic level on funds allocated for this purpose at the local level.
In the period 1998-2000, the average share of MOP in overall expen-
ditures for the provision of social security amounted to 12.6%, and in
2002, it increased to 26.6% (see Table 15). Until 2000, funds for financ-
ing MOP increased more slowly compared to the growth in expendi-
tures for state support to the poor, which indicates that its share in over-
all expenditure of state support to the poor was actually decreasing.
Nevertheless, since 2001, a more rapid growth of funds for financing
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Table 13.
Structure of MOP Beneficiaries according to Gender and Educational Level in 2002
Participation in %
Gender
Male 45.55
Female 54.45
Educational level
Uncompleted elementary school 56.64
Elementary school 23.87
Secondary school 18.18
Junior college 0.48
University 0.83
Total 100
Source: AZS
Table 14.
Structure of Household Type Receiving MOP in 2002
Households Participation in %
Households with children 52.57
Households without children 47.43
Total 100
Source: AZS
MOP has taken place in relation to the growth in overall expenditure of
state support to the poor since their share in this expenditure has
increased. Such an increase in funds for financing MOP can be
explained by the increased number of beneficiaries caused by more reg-
ular payments.
Administrative characteristics
In the first instance the administrative responsibility for approving
entitlement to MOP rests with social protection institutions, i.e. social
work centers. Citizens (families) submit their applications to social
work centers at their place of residence. Along with their application,
they are obliged to submit papers on the number of family members,
income, ownership of real estate and movable assests (on the basis of
certificates from the Tax Office) and land (certificate from the Land
Registry). Based on a review of the submitted documents and possible
checks on a family’s material status in the field (rarely), employees of
social work centers make decisions on applications, i.e. on entitlement.
In doing so, they have no discretion to decide on the MOP amount, but
they can do so directly through calculation of missed earnings.
Decisions on approvals are sent to the Ministry of Social Affairs, which
makes benefit payments directly to beneficiaries. Based on these deci-
sions, the Ministry enters data on new beneficiaries into the database of
MOP beneficiaries. Most of the data on a beneficiary’s characteristics
remain at the local level – at social work centers.
If the Center for Social Work rejects an application, it is possible to
lodge an appeal (based on a review of the material status of the poten-
tial beneficiary in the field). That is the Ministry of Social Affairs, the
86 Poverty and Reform of Financial Support to the Poor
1998 1999 2000 2001* 2002*
Republic budget 16,811 17,638 32,703 107,600 170,000
Expenditure for social
security 411.1 369.1 849.2 1,700 3,000
share  in budget (%) 2.4 2.1 2.6 1.6 1.8
MOP 63.5 52.36 68.6 516 799
share  in budget 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.47
share in u soc.
security 15.5 14.2 8.1 30.4 26.6
share in expenditure
for state support 3.5 3 1.95 4.1 5.5
to the poor
Table 15.
Expenditure for MOP, 1998 – 2002
In million YUD
*Note: data for 2001/2002. Represent projected funds, whereas realised funds are quot-
ed for other years 
Source: the Ministry of Social Affairs
City Secretariat for Children and Social Protection if the applicant’s
residence is in Belgrade, or to the competent Provincial authority if the
applicant’s residence is in Vojvodina. A review of eligibility is per-
formed annually, except for those beneficiaries who are employed for
whom checking on a possible change in material status is done every 3
months. In recent years, checking on the spot is increasingly rare due to
a lack of funds for this purpose.
Child allowance
Child allowance is a type of state support to the poor belonging to
the group of instruments of social protection of children. It is regulat-
ed by the Law on Financial Support to Families with Children. Until
June 1, 2002, the right to child allowance was regulated by the Law on
Social Protection of Children and it was an instrument of both social
policy and population policy (without an unconditional right to child
allowance for the third child). Nevertheless, child allowance became an
instrument primarily of social policy after enactment of the new law.
Child allowance is a form of monthly cash benefit to the family with
children with an aim to support the improvement of living conditions
for each child who lives and goes to school in the Republic. The main
precondition for being entitled to child allowance in the Republic is the
poor material status of the family, guardian or foster parent. In prac-
tice, it means that the benefit is paid to families with a total monthly per
capita income, after deduction of taxes and other duties, is less than
3,054.73 YUD (in May 2003) in the quarter prior to the month in
which application is submitted. This threshold is increased by an addi-
tional 20% for single parents, guardians, foster parents, and parents of
a disturbed child who is not placed in an institution.
Along with the conditions already mentioned, an applicant must ful-
fil an additional criterion: that cadastre income per capita is no greater
than 3% of the average cadastre income per 1 ha of arable land in the
previous year or if income is earned on land smaller than 0.5 ha on
which a house for living has been built. If the family does not have any
other income, then the financial threshold for entitlement is 7% of the
average cadastre income per 1 ha of arable land per family member in
the previous year. The Minister of Social Affairs establishes the nomi-
nal amount of the monthly threshold on the basis of the increase in liv-
ing costs. In addition, calculation of family income includes income
received from other social transfers.
The right to child allowance can only be applied for the first four
children in the family. Foster parents and guardians are also entitled
for first four children, counting their own children and children with-
out parental care. The right to child allowance can be given to any
national or foreign citizen (if stipulated by an international agreement)
for children who live and go to school in Serbia (if not otherwise stipu-
lated by an international agreement). The right to child allowance is
limited in time to a maximum of 19 years of age if they are in regular
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education. For disturbed children, this right applies to age 26 years, i.e.
until the child is in an educational or job training program.
Volume of child allowance
The amount of child allowance is fixed and absolute, following
enactment of the Law on Financial Support to Families with Children.
The Minister of Social Affairs of Serbia establishes the nominal amount
of child allowance. In June 2002, the established level of child
allowance was 900 YUD, and in April 2003, it amounted to 998.40
YUD. Child allowance is monthly adjusted to the cost of living index.
The child allowance amount does not depend on the sequence of births
of children (as it was the case in the previous law), but it depends in a
specific case on the child’s status. The allowance is increased by an
additional 30% for a child with single parent and for a disturbed child.
Beneficiaries of child allowance
Child allowance beneficiaries represent the most important group of
beneficiaries of social protection with an average participation rate of
80% in the period 1996 – May 2002 (see Table 16). A change in the
number of beneficiaries in the period 1996-2000 points to two sub-
periods. First, until 2000, the number of beneficiaries (families and
children) was steadily falling; by 2000, it was 31% lower than in 1996.
Secondly, following payments of a significant portion of arrears in
December 2000 and improved regularity in payments as of 2001, the
number of beneficiaries started to increase considerably. In 2002, the
number of children who received an entitlement increased by
80,000. Thus, the average number of children receiving child
allowance was 573,187 per month, or 36.5% of the total population
up to 18 years of age or 7.8% of the total population of Serbia, with-
out Kosovo-Metohija.13
In May 2002, the share of families with one or two children was
nearly 78% of the total number of families (Table 17). The beneficiary
structure according to family size in November 2002 was somewhat
changed in relation to that in May 2002 due to the fact that in the sec-
ond half of 2002 only families with a maximum of 4 children were enti-
tled to child allowance, so the relative share of all families slightly
increased. In addition, the number of families containing child
allowance beneficiaries was significantly reduced in the second half of
2002. However, it should be noted that quite a number of new applica-
tions were only processed in the second half of that year, which might
explain the decreased number of beneficiaries.
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13 data on population are from the Federal Statistics Authority Population and
Natural Movements of Population in FRY in the 20th and the beginning of 21st
century, no. 040/2001
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Table 16.
Average Monthly No. of Child Allowance Beneficiary in Period 1996 – 2002.
Entitlement 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total no. of
beneficiaries of 881,891 835,433 758,614 675,047 613,914 733,692 715,220
social care
of children
Child allowance
No, of families 409,508 391,041 329,913 305,175 247,592 345,238 324,650
No, of children 710,820 677,213 613,537 541,657 486,138 589,584 573,187
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs data and reports
January-May 2002 June-November 2002
Veličina porodice No. of Relative No. of Relative 
children share (%) children share (%)
Families with 1 child 172,284 25.3 225,314 46.98
Families with 2 children 340,606 50.0 186,659 38.92
Families with 3 children 109,965 16.1 55,633 11.60
Families with 4 children 39,632 5.8 11,990 2.50
Families with 5 children 9,750 1.4 – –
Families with 6 children 4,686 0.7 – –
Families with 7 children 2,464 0.4 – –
Families with 8 children 1,256 0.2 – –
Families with 9 children 270 0.0 – –
Families with 10 children 150 0.0 – –
Families with 11 children 55 0.0 – –
Total 681,118 100 479,596 100
Table 17.
Structure of Total No. of Child Allowance Beneficiaries in 2002
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs data and reports
Table 18.
No. of Beneficiaries – Children Receiving Increased Amount in November 2002
Child status No. of beneficiaries
Children without parental care 47,786
Disturbed children 4,080
Total 51,866
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs
Around 11% of the total number of beneficiaries received the
increased amount in November 2002. The disaggregation of their sta-
tus is presented in Table 18.
The child allowance beneficiary structure by district in 2002 (Table
19) indicates that in Serbia out of the total number of beneficiaries
under 18 is 32%. In poor districts,Pirot, Toplica, Zlatibor,the share is
much higher than the average – from 44% to 52%. In Vojvodina, a
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DISTRICT Population Children Children % of children 
up to 18 receiving CA receiving CA
North-Bačka 200,140 41,705 12,180 29.21
Middle-Banat 208,456 43,703 15,801 36.16
North-Banat 165,881 34,691 10,256 29.56
South-Banat 313,937 66,786 22,587 33.82
West-Bačka 214,011 43,887 14,727 33.56
South-Bačka 593,666 128,431 36,108 28.11
Srem 335 ,901 74,713 23,809 31.87
VOJVODINA 2,031,992 433,916 135,468 31.22
Mačva 329,625 71,419 25,972 36.37
Kolubara 192,204 39,158 9,942 25.39
Podunavlje 210,290 46,315 18,435 39.8
Braničevo 200,503 41,050 5,687 13.85
Šumadija 298,778 61,439 21,539 35.06
Pomoravlje 227,435 45,095 14,001 31.05
Bor 146,551 29,184 7,035 24.11
Zaječar 137,561 23,193 5,652 24.37
Zlatibor 313,396 70,116 31,106 44.36
Morava 224,772 45,778 17,682 38.63
Raška 291,230 74,023 28,653 38.71
Rasina 270,810 53,371 20,592 38.58
Nišava 370,388 70,752 24,51 334.65
Toplica 102,075 21,804 10,084 46.25
Pirot 105,654 19,395 10,211 52.65
Jablanica 240,923 52,523 22,295 42.45
Pčinja 227,690 62,837 23,978 38.16
BELGRADE 1,576,124 309,342 48,795 15.77
SERBIA PROPER 5,466,009 1,136,794 346,172 30.45
TOTAL SERBIA 7,498,001 1,570,710 496,723 32
Table 19.
Structure of Child Allowance Beneficiaries by District in 2002
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs
higher concentration of child allowance beneficiaries is recorded only
in Middle-Banat district. On the other hand, the smallest number of
child allowance beneficiaries in relation to the total population of
children up to 18 is recorded in Branicevo district (13.8%) and
Belgrade (15.8%).
Funding of child allowance
Child allowances are funded completely from the Republic budg-
et. Significant funds are allocated for this purpose as a share of fund-
ing for child care instruments (nearly 54% on average for the
observed period), as well as within total expenditure for state sup-
port to the poor (around 42% in average). Expenditures indicate
that since 1999, the share of expenditure for funding child allowance
out of total expenditure for state support to the poor has been
steadily increasing. This points to the importance of this type of
assistance to the poor in Serbia.
The range of expenditures for funding child allowances in the period
1998-2000 is presented in Table 20.
Monthly funds allocated for child allowance transfers amounted to
nearly 11 million EUR in May 2002. Following adoption of the Law
on Financial Support to Families with Children, monthly funds allo-
cated for child allowance transfer have been reduced by over 10%;
thus, in September 2002, they amounted to less than 10 million EUR
(Table 21).
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1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*
Budget of  Republic
of Serbia 16,810.7 17,638.5 127,339.9 170,000
Social care of children 1,534.0 1,027.9 2,664.5 9,600.7 12,523 
Share in budget (%) 10.1% 3.9% 7.5% 7.4%
Child allowance 823.0 350.9 1,330.4 6,436.2 8,350
share in budget 4.9% 2.0% 5.05% 4.91%
share in expenditures for
social child care 42.3% 25.1% 37.86% 50.7% 53.8%
share in expenditures
of state support
to the poor 45.4% 20.2% 37.9% 50.7% 53.8%
Table 20.
Realized Expenditures for Child Allowances, 1998–2002, in million YUD
* projected funds
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs
Administrative Features
In the first instance the administrative responsibility for approving
entitlement to child allowance rests with local administrative authori-
ties – municipalities. Applications are submitted to municipalities
where applicants have their residence. Decision on eligibility is issued
on the basis of review of extensive documentation. If the applicant is a
child in a family containing both parents, it is necessary to submit 14
different documents.14 The number of required documents increases
for more children or when additional documents are needed for dis-
turbed children, single parents, foster parents or guardians.15 In order
to reduce possible errors as much as possible the new law has intro-
duced thorough checks into the family’s status in accordance with the
Law on Social Care of Children, as there is no checking of material sta-
tus of beneficiaries in the field.
A review of eligibility is performed twice a year. Positive decisions
are submitted to the Ministry of Social Affairs, which makes plans
accordingly and transfers funds directly to beneficiaries.
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May 2002 November 2002
DIN EUR* DIN EUR**
Monthly expenditures
for funding CA 651.4 10.9 605.2 9.8
Table 21.
Monthly Child Allowance Amount per Family in 2002, millions
* exhchange rate of 1 EUR = 60 YUD was used for the calculation
** exhchange rate of 1 EUR = 62 YUD was used for the calculation
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs data and reports
14 It is envisaged by the Law to submit the following documents: birth certificate for
all children, FRY citizenship certificate, copies of ID cards of all adult members,
copies of verified medical cards, certificate of income in the last 3 months prior to
the month in which the application is submitted for each household member
earning income, certificate on cadastre income in the previous year for each
household member earning income in this way, statement on joint household,
statement on taking direct care of a child, certificate on regular attending school
for the school child, evidence on ownership of real estate (Land Registry certifi-
cate – title deed, purchasing contract, tax papers, apartment lease), statement on
not owning liquid means or cash
15 To prove a particular status, it is necessary to submit the following documents:
certificate issued by a competent medical institution on the reasons for irregular
education attendance, document on classification of disturbed child, document
on the parental right extension, evidence proving single parent status (death cer-
tificate for other parent, evidence of entrusting child to one parent after divorce
or cession of common law marriage or birth certificate for children whose pater-
nity has not been established, certificate for military authorities, certificate of
penal-correctional institution), proof of unemployment (certificate, labor card),
evidence of foster care or guardianship (document issued by the competent
guardianship authority), and copy of current account card
CONCLUSION
The aim of the system of state support to the poor in Serbia is to
assist poor citizens and their families when they are in need of social
support, i.e. when they need assistance by the state in meeting their
principal living needs. It is a part of the social sector, which falls under
competence of the Ministry of Social Affairs.
The system of state support to the poor in Serbia includes a consid-
erable number of different types of assistance to the poor (as many as
26). They are legally and administratively divided into two groups of
instruments: (1) instruments for the provision of social security of citi-
zens, and (2) instruments for the social protection of children, i.e.
financial support to families with children.
Rights to various types of state support to the poor are established
and implemented on the local level, through local administrative
authorities (municipality or city) and through a developed network of
institutions of social and child care, which are founded by the Republic
(in most cases) or by local administrative authorities in charge of child
care institutions. Instruments for the provision of social security of cit-
izens are implemented through social care institutions, whereas instru-
ments for social care of children – through local administrative author-
ities and child care institutions.
Criteria for entitlement to different types of state support to the poor
are in practice uniformly regulated across the territory of the Republic.
The first and the most important criterion for implementing one of the
entitlements to state support to the poor is having an income level that
is lower than the established social security level. There is no unique
social security level for all types of state support to the poor. Apart
from low income, there are a number of additional criteria. These cri-
teria refer to certain limitations regarding possession of considerable
real estate and movable assets, income from arable land, from employ-
ment of the beneficiary and his/her family members (the unemployed,
children regularly attending school, those incapable of work, redun-
dant workers, individuals in need of assistance and attendance), pro-
hibiting denial of the right to inheritance, etc.
In the second half of 2002, the total number of beneficiaries of dif-
ferent types of state support to the poor amounted to over 800,000 or
more than 11% of the total population of Serbia, without Kosovo-
Metohija.
Funds for financing state support to the poor are provided by vari-
ous sources: the largest part comes from the Republic budget, then
local administrative authorities’ budgets, and donors’ funds. Executed
expenditures for state support to the poor (from the Republic budget)
were almost 260 million EUR in 2002 or 1.64% of the projected GDP.
Per capita expenditures for state support to the poor amounted to 35
EUR in 2002, or around 106 EUR per household. There are no avail-
able data on local level expenditures for financing various types of state
support to the poor.
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The most important types of state support to the poor, both accord-
ing to the beneficiary number and allocated amount, are family sup-
port (MOP) and child allowance. MOP and child allowance beneficiar-
ies constitute around 79% of the total number of beneficiaries of vari-
ous types of state support to the poor. The two instruments account for
almost 60% of total funds from the Republic budget earmarked for the
financing of various instruments of state support to the poor. 
In 2002, 38,310 citizens received MOP (the Republic budget
amount guaranteed by law), meaning more than 50,000 families (if
we include families that are funded from donations). The MOP
amount was between 7 EUR for individuals to 74 EUR for households
with 5 or more members. In December 2002, the average MOP
amount for individuals was 1,092 YUD. The most important groups
of MOP beneficiaries, according to the socio-economic status, are the
unemployed (43.2)%, children (35.5%), and the incapable of work
(20.13%). According to age, the distribution is: children up to age of
20 (over 40%), elderly over 60 (13.99%), and beneficiaries between
20 and 30 (13.93%). The most important group of MOP beneficiaries
according to education is beneficiaries with some or completed ele-
mentary education (80%); according to gender – women (nearly
55%); and according to family size – single-member households or
individuals (46%). The majority of beneficiaries live in central Serbia
(over 50%), one quarter in Vojvodina, and 23% in Belgrade.
Amongst multi-member households, MOP beneficiaries are mostly
households with children.
By the end of 2002, the average number of child allowance benefici-
aries amounted to 261,337 families per month, i.e. 479,596 children. In
April 2003, child allowance amounted to 998.40 YUD. Out of the total
number of children-beneficiaries, 11% of them are children without
parental care and disturbed children. Almost one half of the total num-
ber of child allowance beneficiaries comes from families with one child
(47%). In relation to the total number of children of age up to 18, most
of child allowance beneficiaries live in Pirot, Toplica and Zlatibor dis-
tricts (44-52%), and the fewer of them in Branicevo district (13.85%)
and Belgrade (15.77%).
It can be concluded that the system of state support to the poor in
Serbia has features of both centralized and decentralized systems. In
terms of funding sources, criteria for eligibility/entitlement, and
amounts, the system of state support to the poor is completely central-
ized. However, given the well developed institution network and the
important role of social care institutions and local administrative
authorities who decide on entitlements, the system has at the same
time characteristics of a decentralized system. The existing degree of
decentralization of the system provides important advantages in carry-
ing out social policy. Those advantages are: more efficient financial
control (all transfers are directly remitted by the Ministry of Social
Affairs to beneficiaries’ accounts), use of limited funds for this purpose
(the Ministry is the only competent authority for implementing social
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policy), and equal rights of all citizens under social protection (uni-
form criteria for the whole Republic). On the other hand, legal and
administrative separation of instruments for social support to the fam-
ily and programs of child care, as well as for financial support to fami-
lies with children, facilitates more efficient management of cash meth-
ods of state support to the poor.
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IV Proposal of Reforms of Financial
Assistance to the Poor
INTRODUCTION
There are many poor people in Serbia. A deep economic crisis in the
nineties, which has reduced the country’s GDP by half, has pushed
some people below the poverty line, and some below subsistence level.
Instead of earlier certainty and safety, uncertainty and insecurity dom-
inated. Employment itself was not a guarantee of being paid, and being
paid was not a guarantee to reaching the survival minimum at a time of
declining salaries and high inflation. Among vulnerable groups, the
status of pensioners seemed to be better as they received their pensions
on almost regular basis, and the average pension previously, at least at
times, reached the average salary level.
During the past ten years (up to and including the year 2000), prin-
cipal mechanisms of support to the poor were:
• Guaranteed employment, meaning protection of employees from
layoffs even when there was no more need for their work, but with
low salaries and delays in paying out salaries,
• Maintaining prices of principal goods (bread, flour, oil, sugar,
electric power, utilities, etc) at a low level, together with shortages
and autoselection (the poor had to queue up in long lines early in
the morning, whilst the well-to-do obtained goods on the black
market at higher prices),
• Modest system of social assistance to the poor, with no regular
pay-outs, and a rather extensive child allowance system, but also
with no regular pay outs,
• International humanitarian aid which, in recent years, has includ-
ed refugees, IDPs, pensioners with low pensions, and
• Greater tolerance of the gray economy where many citizens found
a source of income and goods at lower prices or products that they
otherwise could not find in stores.
Various family arrangements have contributed to poor individuals’
survival, with the better off sharing with relatives having very little –
through rural-urban links, by parents helping out their children, or
vice-versa, or by means of cash remittances from abroad.
By the end of 2000, Serbia began implementing a process of transi-
tion, moving towards political democracy and introducing a modern
market economy model. Such changes have caused a fundamentally
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change in the approach to social policy, including the one towards
poor citizens.
Absolute job security does not exist anymore. The new Labor Law
has significantly liberalized the ability to make redundancies, in line
with market economic principles. During 2002, many jobs were lost,
especially in companies experiencing bankruptcy and in a few large
enterprises undergoing restructuring. However, the number of newly
employed is not large, as the restructuring of a prevailing part of the
economy has not started yet. Thus, there have been almost no layoffs in
Government-owned enterprises and those with mixed ownership.
Prices of most goods have been liberalized, meaning that the previous-
ly low prices for basic goods have significantly increased. This has
meant that a very expensive and economically inefficient method of
supporting the poor has been abandoned. The social transfer system
(social assistance and child allowance) has been partly reformed by
developing the new Law on Financial Support to Families with
Children. The rights of the poor have increased to some extent, and
two-year payment arrears have been paid. In the last two years, donor
assistance has increased and has considerably mitigated the effects of
poverty. It is probable that the extent of humanitarian assistance will be
scaled back, thus potentially hindering poverty reduction efforts.  The
extent of the gray economy has been significantly reduced in some seg-
ments although it is still widespread and represents an important
income source for citizens.
THE CURRENT SOCIAL PROTECTION SITUATION
The two most important social protection programs in Serbia aimed
at reducing poverty are child allowances and social assistance (“Family
Assistance – MOP”). The main objective of both programs is to pro-
vide a minimum level of income for poor families, especially for those
with children.
Other social programs include accommodation in institutions, the
Transitional Fund, the Innovation Fund, parental allowance, atten-
dance and assistance allowance, and others, which also reach the poor,
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No. of individuals 2000 2001 2002
Social assistance (MOP) 67 115 125
Child allowance 494 665 497
Table 1.
Number of Social Transfer Beneficiaries (000)
Note: all data are from December of the relevant year
Source: The Ministry of Social Affairs
but they are not exclusively aimed for them as they are covering other
types of risk.
Child allowances
The system of child allowances is financially the largest program of
state support to the poor, and is 3-4 times larger than the social assis-
tance program. Its aim is to support poor families with children and to
create conditions for the normal development of children.
Poverty amongst children is not particularly high – at 10.4%, it
stands at the average level of the entire population of Serbia. Child
poverty levels are below the average level in Belgrade (6.8%),
Vojvodina (7.6%), and eastern Serbia (9.7%), whilst it is above aver-
age in central Serbia (11.2%), western Serbia (14.5%), and southeast
Serbia (16.8%). In Serbia, poverty increases in line with the number of
children in the family: the poverty rate of children in households with
one child amounts to 7.5%, it is 8.7% in households with two chil-
dren, and 18.9% in households with three children. However,
inequality (measured by consumption) among all children is moder-
ate and the Gini coefficient stands at 28.8, somewhat lower than for
the overall population.
The right to child allowance is given to those households with chil-
dren whose total income per household member is below the estab-
lished threshold, which was YUD 3,021 in March 20031; the threshold
is 20% higher for single-parent households. There is a single income
threshold applying throughout Serbia, index-linked to the cost of liv-
ing.  Another requirement is the lack of ownership of real estate, apart
from necessary housing, with an exception for agricultural households,
where agricultural buildings are included. A family is entitled to child
allowance for its first four children. 
In the child allowance program, economies of scale are not assumed,
but the same threshold is applicable to all family members, which
increases the number of families eligible for child allowance. This
results from the view that this program should include broader tiers of
the population, including families with lower medium income.
This child allowance system was established by the new Law on
Financial Support to Families with Children, which has been in force
since mid-2002. This Law has abolished the previous long-standing
system, which had a differentiated income threshold linked to the aver-
age municipal wage; the population component was emphasized creat-
ing a difference between areas in Serbia with high and low birth rates.
The new child allowance system has achieved a more accurate iden-
tification of poor families; the rights of all poor citizens of Serbia have
been leveled; and the real benefit value has been maintained through
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1 For income from agriculture, the percentage of average cadastre income per
hectare is: 7% for pure agricultural households, and 3% for mixed ones.
indexation of both the income threshold and child allowance by means
of the cost of living.
The amount of child allowance for all children (for the first four
children in the family) was YUD 978 per month in December 2002.
This amount increases by 30% for children of single parents. It should
be noted that the amount paid for child allowance is not differentiated
either by an unfavorable social position of the household, or by a
child’s age; a fixed amount is paid.
The number of beneficiaries of child allowance has increased from
494,000 children at the end of 2000 to 665,000 at the end of 2001, an
increase of 35%. This is because of greater interest in child allowances
from families with children due to the payment of more regular and
timely benefits following the settling of two-year arrears in benefit pay-
ments. In the second half of 2002, the number of children included in
child allowance was decreased due to the introduction of a moderate
asset threshold, an increase in real incomes, and the removal of the sys-
tem of making higher payments for more births (the third and subse-
quent children are no longer entitled to child allowance regardless of
household income). At present, every third child in Serbia receives
child allowance.
The poor with a newborn are well assisted with parental allowance,
which was introduced in 2002 as a population measure. It is paid to all
parents except those who are wealthy practically. The amounts paid are
55,000, 98,000, and 130,000 YUD for the second, the third, and the
fourth child in the family (March 2003).
Social assistance
The number of citizens receiving social assistance is not significant.
That number was reduced during the nineties to 67,000 beneficiaries
(Dec. 2002). A fall in the number of beneficiaries was certainly not due
to the reduction in poverty in Serbia, but due to a restrictive policy
within the system of social protection and inability to finance such a
modest assistance. In the last two years, the number of beneficiaries of
social assistance has increased: to 115,000 in Dec. 2001 and 125,000 in
Dec. 2002. That came partly as a result of a supplementary program of
social assistance funded by donations (28,000 in Dec. 2002), and partly
as a result of regular payments, which stimulated the interest of the
poor. Total payments for social assistance amount to 117 million YUD
per month (Dec. 2002).
The amount paid out for social assistance is modest. In December
2002, the average amount per person was 1,092 YUD. Transfers of that
amount can only insignificantly improve the financial situation of the
poor.
The social assistance program is based on calculating the overall level
of a family’s income and, if additional criteria are met (modest assets,
cooperation with the Labor Bureau, etc.), on topping up this income to
the level of the poverty line established by law. The income threshold
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for entitlement to social assistance is low even for single person house-
holds and amounts to 16% of gross wages in the municipality. This
leads to the relatively low legal threshold of 2,447 YUD in March 2003
in the relatively richer parts of Serbia, and to an even lower level in
municipalities with lower average earnings. The establishment of a sep-
arate poverty line for each municipality based on average wages repre-
sents a flaw in the social assistance program, as it undermines the prin-
ciple of equality of all citizens of Serbia. At the same time, it introduced
discrimination into the system for citizens from poorer parts of Serbia.
Apart from this, with an established relative poverty line, the number
of poor can be considered to be a given, unrelated to changes in income
levels. These imperfections should be rectified through amendments to
the law, which are already in the parliamentary procedure, and which
establish an absolute poverty line (expressed in YUD) that is equal for
the entire territory of Serbia and indexed by the living cost.
Problems of the system include: (i) an inability to include income
from gray economy, which is widespread in Serbia; as well as in the rel-
atively assumed economies of scale within a household, which puts
numerous families in an unfavorable position2. Namely, if we mark the
income threshold of the single person household with 1, then inclusion
of additional household members brings an increase of such threshold
by 0,375 for the second and third member, and by 0,125 for the fourth
and fifth member, whilst the sixth and seventh member are not taken
into account.
Social assistance is, in practice, well targeted to the poorest individu-
als. The empirical analysis has indicated that social assistance is the
most successfully targeted type of social transfer in Serbia (52% of
funds are received by poor citizens), and that it is better targeted than
in some other countries in the region3.
The predominant groups of social assistance beneficiaries are the
unemployed, those incapable of working, and their children. Other
categories, such as the employed, pensioners, or farmers, are represent-
ed with a minimum number among social assistance beneficiaries.
More than half beneficiaries have not completed elementary school
education. As for family size, one-member families are predominant
(around one half), which comes as a result of decreasing chances of
families with more members through the assumed high economies of
scale within the household.
In sum, the social assistance system in Serbia provides modest cover-
age, is restrictive in terms of normative standards, reasonably well tar-
geted to the poorest, favors small families and includes mostly those
less educated, the unemployed and people incapable of work.
Payment of arrears. In the area of social protection, by 2000 signifi-
cant arrears in social assistance, child allowance and other transfers had
101Proposal of Reforms of Financial Assistance to the Poor
2 Compensation for families with children is provided by child allowance. .
3 Chapter Two of this study. 
built up, accumulated over the previous two years. Given that the first
two years of transition are the most difficult for the poor, it is necessary
to direct as many funds as possible towards them. Thus, the first thing
that was done was to ensure that regular benefit payments were made
from the budget of Serbia in for social protection (on a monthly basis),
and the Fund for Onetime Assistance. All donors’ funds are being
directed through this Fund and, through it, arrears are being paid,
including 22-26 months of unpaid child allowances, social assistance,
and attendance assistance, as well as one-time transfers to all child
allowance beneficiaries, single parents whose children are beneficiaries
of child allowance, and on two occasions, to social assistance benefici-
aries and recipients of caregivers’ allowance. Apart from that, the Fund
provided in the period longer than a year, on a regular basis, social
assistance to 12,000 poor families who were ineligible for social assis-
tance only because of the locally-determined nature of the income
threshold in municipalities. 46,000 poorest families were temporarily
supported from budgetary funds at the time of price increase in elec-
tricity prices, and donors’ funds paid for a year-long accumulated
overdue electricity payments for social assistance beneficiaries.
The Transitional Fund is an extraordinary social protection pro-
gram aimed at larger enterprises being restructured or entering bank-
ruptcy: the Government of Serbia pays from it either a lump-sum or in
a small number of installments to redundant employees an amount of
around 100 for each year of service. In 2002, 57,000 employees were
paid off in this fashion, for which 7 billion YUD were spent. In fact, this
is an option that laid-off employees may choose instead of regular
unemployment compensation. The idea is to give the opportunity,
even with a small amount of money, to employees to start up a small
private business. Experience shows that it does not happen very often,
but the cash received is used by beneficiaries to meet their subsistence
needs for several months.
REFORM PROPOSALS
The previous CLDS Poverty Study4 suggested numerous changes to
the child allowance and social assistance systems, such as, for both pro-
grams, establishing a single poverty line for the whole of Serbia (instead
of different ones for different municipalities), replacing the relative
poverty line (in terms  of average wages) with the absolute poverty line
expressed in YUD and indexed to the cost of living. It was also suggest-
ed the population feature of child allowance be transferred to parental
allowance, and thus concentrating the child allowance program on
meeting social need through removing the link between child
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allowance benefit and the number of births.5 Accordingly, these pro-
posals will not be extensively discussed in this Study, but they will be
mentioned in summary, and we will concentrate on discussing other
reform proposasl.
Social assistance
This section will discuss potential improvements in key elements of
social assistance (MOP), such as the poverty line, equivalence scale,
position of those capable of work, and comprehensiveness of the types
of income included in the total amount of household income. 
The social assistance program should be expanded and financially
strengthened, so it can be a principal instrument of the state in terms of
poverty reduction. MOP is the best administered and targeted poverty
reduction policy in Serbia and it is the only program with the exclusive
aim of mitigating the consequences of poverty. On the other hand,
MOP is modest in coverage and the financial resources are significant-
ly smaller than similar programs in other countries in transition. The
main method of strengthening the social assistance program is to ease
the criteria for eligibility – primarily by raising the income threshold
(poverty line) and increasing the equivalence scale coefficient. 
Poverty line
Reassessing the poverty line that is incorporated in the Law on Social
Security is certainly justified when considerable systematic reforms are
at issue, and particularly if the intention is to shift the balance of budg-
etary policy for mitigating poverty in favor of social assistance. Of
course, by raising the poverty line, the pool of potential beneficiaries is
larger and more budgetary funds are required.
The poverty line used for analysis in this Study can certainly be a
candidate for the line, which could be the basis for the new law because
of its previously mentioned methodological benefits. However, it is too
high – it amounts to 4,489 YUD for a single person household, and the
existing one, at YUD 2,280 in June 2002, is much lower. Due to this
high level, approximately 18.7% of the population of Serbia has an
income level below the line of 4,489 YUD, and the average income of
the second decile for the first (equivalent) adult in the household
(4,379 YUD) amounts to approximately this poverty line. The average
income of the first decile is much lower and it amounts to only 2,569
YUD for the first (primary) adult.
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5 Some of these suggestions are incorporated in the new Law on Financial Support
to Families with Children, adopted in 2002, whilst others are included in the pro-
posal of the Government of Serbia on amendments and supplements to the Law
on Social Protection and Providing social Security to Citizens, which is in the leg-
islative procedure in the Parliament of Serbia.
Taking into consideration underdeclarations of income in the sur-
vey and reductions in the number of potential beneficiaries due to
failures to meet other conditions for eligibility for social assistance
(assets, the Labor Bureau programs, and so forth), the number of ben-
eficiaries would be less than 18.7% of the population, but higher than
the current number; social assistance payments would be considerably
higher per beneficiary, as the average poverty gap would be increased.
The combined effect of the increased number of beneficiaries and
considerably higher payments per beneficiary would result in a signif-
icant increase in budgetary expenditure for social assistance, which
would probably be unsustainable for the current level of budgetary
resources.
There is an interesting way of making a downward correction in the
poverty line. Household consumption, as well as the poverty line,
which is based on consumption, includes all resources, including in-
kind consumption, income from the gray economy, assistance to
households in cash and in-kind, and in this case the flow of services
coming from property (real estate, durables, etc.). As these categories
are not, and cannot for technical and conceptual reasons, be included
in the calculation of the income threshold for social assistance eligibili-
ty, it is possible to exclude them from the poverty line and thus
decrease it without harming potential beneficiaries’ social assistance
rights. In other words, the average household would declare part of its
resources for the calculation of a lower income threshold, while it
would not declare the rest (in kind consumption, assistance, imputed
rents); nonetheless, the household uses these other resources to
increases its household consumption.
If in-kind assistance to the household and imputed rent amounting
to 924 YUD (the average amount in the poorest decile) are excluded
from the calculations, the poverty line would be decreased from 4,489
to 3,565 YUD. It means that the poverty line of 4,489 YUD from the
Survey on Living Standards (AZS) would be brought down to its equiv-
alent level in the other coordinate system – one that is suitable for leg-
islative purpose.
There are two problems with this concept:
• The poverty line (income threshold) is still high – 50% higher
than that specified in the existing law,
• It is not realistic to suppose that these criteria apply to each house-
hold, namely that each household has exactly 924 YUD in
resources that are excluded from the calculations. This leveling
out to an average would affect those poor who have in-kind assis-
tance and imputed rents which are below average.
In order to check these assumptions, we have performed simulations
using the Living Standards Survey (AZS) by comparing the results of
two simulations: (i) with a poverty line of 3,565 YUD; and (ii) the ref-
erential simulation which (tries to) reproduce the current regulations
(as applied in May/June 2002).
The referential simulation is based on:
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• the poverty line differentiated across municipalities, according to
salaries at the time,
• coefficients of economies of scale from the existing law,
• limits on assets, such as land, real estate and vehicle ownership.
The referential simulation has produced the following results: the
number of households eligible for social assistance would be 104,000,
with 275,000 household members, and the amount needed to fund
social assistance would be 266 million YUD. By contrast, the number
of actual social assistance beneficiaries is approximately 50% less,
which can be explained, at least partly, by the following:
1. underestimation of declared income in the survey (already dis-
cussed), so that the number of the poor in terms of income is
smaller in actuality than that suggested by the survey data,
2. part of those eligible for social assistance do not apply for various
reasons: stigma, not being informed, and similar,
3. errors of simulation in failing to reproduce actual conditions,
including all additional legal conditions for program eligibility.
Even apart from the previously mentioned difference between the
results of the referential simulation results and the actual data, it can be
noted that the simulation error is equal in all simulations, i.e. that it is
not biased, so that a comparison of the two simulation results at least
approximately reflects the relationship between the actual condition
and the condition that would occure through the policy being dis-
cussed.
The introduction of a poverty line of 3,565 YUD across the entire
territory of Serbia, would increase  the number of beneficiaries by 60%
compared to the referential simulation and raise the poverty gap by
36%, which together would result in an increase in budgetary expendi-
ture by 114%.
The third option for the selection of the poverty line is its calculation
based on both the fiscal position of Serbia and social assistance policy.
This method certainly has a realistic approach, as it provides a lower
poverty line although an objection can be raised – that it does not
achieve the poverty line on which this Study is based. Anyhow, there is
an answer to that: the aim of social assistance cannot be uprooting
poverty in Serbia, but it is assistance to the poorest among the poor in
order to provide them with a minimum existence.
Raising the poverty line by 10 and 20% above the current level of
2,280 YUD (16% of the Republic average of gross earnings) would
result in changes shown in the next table. Prior to this, we note that this
changes consists of two components: the first one is unification of the
poverty line across all municipalities at a level of 2,280 YUD (which is
16% of average gross earnings in Serbia at the time). It would not have
any effect in richer municipalities, as the poverty line in these was
already at that level. Lifting the poverty line to 2,280 YUD in poorer
municipalities would result in an increased number of beneficiaries.
The second component would result in an increased number of benefi-
ciaries in all municipalities due to the higher poverty line.
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The first step – setting a uniform poverty line at 16% of the average
gross salary in Serbia, i.e. 2,280 YUD – would increase spending on
social assistance by 16%, which represents a combined result of the
increased number of covered households by 10% and increased aver-
age income deficit by 6%. The second step – additional lifting of the
poverty line by 10 or 20% in relation to the general poverty line –
would result in an increase in expenditure of 31 or 47% in relation to
the initial position.
It is important to note that raising the poverty line of 2,280 YUD
by 10 or 20% would cause a slight increase in expenditure on social
assistance – by 13 or 27%, which is a relatively small increase. Even
the number of covered households grows in a slower pace – only by 6
or 11%. These results indicate that the population density around
such poverty line is not high, so it is possible to raise the existing
poverty line considerably without resulting in significant growth in
the number of beneficiaries and expenditures, but to be fiscally
affordable. 
The equivalence scale
The poverty line cannot be, in any case, the same for single-mem-
ber and multi-member households, but it should be adjusted
according to household size and characteristics, so that for each
additional household member the poverty line would be increased to
a certain extent, but what is the appropriate amount?   Should the
lifting of the poverty line be proportional to the number of house-
hold members? So, if the poverty line for a one-member household
is for instance 1,000 YUD, does it mean that for a two-member
household it should be 2,000 or perhaps only 1,700? It would be rea-
sonable to assume (according to standard theory of economics sup-
ported by empirical work) that in order to maintain the same level of
welfare, the expenditure per household member required would
tend to fall with an increase in the number of household members.
In other words, there are economies of scale in households, so that
for each additional member less money is needed to maintain the
achieved level of welfare.
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Poverty line Transfer No. of Budget
amount households
Municipal average 100 100 100
2280 106 110 116
+10% = 2508 113 116 131
+20% = 2736 118 125 147
Table 2.
Effects of the Poverty Line Change  (in %) 
Economies of scale occur because certain goods that are used in a
household have characteristics which make them different from usual
goods, like:
• non-exclusivity, i.e. if some item is available for one individual, it
is available for others too, and
• non-rival consumption, i.e. consumption of a particular item by
one individual does not affect the consumption level of others.6
For example, if there is a light bulb in a room, then it can be equally
used by one individual or more individuals, with no additional cost.
There are many such goods in a household, such as utilities, car, news-
papers, TV set, and so forth. Other types of goods, such as food and
beverages, exhibit characteristics of exclusivity and rival consumption,
i.e. consumption by one individual excludes others and diminishes
their consumption. Goods of transitional character also exhibit both
exclusivity and rival consumption.
Economies of scale in households with equal individuals (for exam-
ple, they are all adult men with equal characteristics) means that for
maintaining the achieved level of welfare, the average expenditure (or
necessary income) is decreased per household member. However, if
individuals are not equal, but differ in sex, age, and other characteris-
tics, additional complications occur, as the marginal consumption
needs of each will be different (i.e. the consumption needs of a toddler,
teenager, adult female and elderly person wil be different) 
When assessing the needs of individuals living together in a house-
hold, it is necessary to take into consideration two components: 1)
economies of scale, which indicates that the marginal cost for an addi-
tional individual tends to fall, and 2) demographic structure of the
household, as consumption needs for different individuals are differ-
ent. On the other hand, cross-linking these two components, with dif-
ferentiation for each of them, would produce a large number of possi-
ble combinations of characteristics; these would not enable: a) empiri-
cal assessment of coefficientstoo many variables), and b) their incorpo-
ration into the relevant law (too complex). Hence, it is necessary to
simplify the concept to a certain extent according to the needs of
empirical assessment and an understanding of the law on benefits for
potential beneficiaries.
There are a number of methods for undertaking an empirical assess-
ment of equivalence scale, but no single one is particularly satisfacto-
ry.7 There are two principal groups of methods: firstly, those based on
econometric evaluation of data on expenditure/income of households
from surveys, and secondly, those based on expert opinion.
Within the first group, the methodology based on the Engel Rule
is often used, as it is in the first chapter of this Study, but its main
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6 In economic theory, such goods are usually called public goods .
7 See A. Deaton – The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconomic Approach to
Development Policy, John Hopkins University press, 1997, Section 4.3
weakness is in the assumption on which it is based – the share of
food in total spending is an accurate expression of welfare: as the
share increases, the level of welfare falls, and vice-versa. There are
good reasons for further discussion of this assumption. 
In the first chapter of this Study, equivalence scales for the popula-
tion of Serbia have been established by means of the empiric evaluation
of the Engel type based on the AZS in 2002:
Equivalence scale = 1 + 0.81* (adults – 1) + 0.24* children (0-6) +
0.75* children (7-18).
This scale is suitable for analytical purposes, but it does not meet the
needs of this chapter – to suggest directions for reform of the Law on
Social Security. That is because:
• it is based on the numerical analysis of household consumption
and the poverty line defined according to consumption.
Consumption of a household cannot be assessed in the current
legally-regulated procedure for establishing eligibility for social
assistance. By law, it is possible to monitor only the household
income as an indicator of the living standard level, which can be, at
least to a degree, detected by means of documentation and by
direct insight into the household;
• it is overly simplified, as it does not take economies of scale suffi-
cienctly into account, i.e. less expenditure/income is needed to
maintain the same welfare level for each additional household
member. Namely, it only recognizes the first and the second adult,
and for subsequent adults, it counts the same level of consump-
tion as for the second adult. Or, it counts the same level of con-
sumption of the second child and other children from the same
group as for the first child. Consequently, it looks more like a scale
of demographic composition of the household than of real
economies of scale. On the other hand, for the purpose of the new
law, it is necessary to diversify the scale to a larger extent in order
to respect different situations in differently sized households;
• it is calculated on the basis of the entire population, and for the
purpose of legislation, it would be better if it is assessed only on
the basis of data on the poor portion of the population – the por-
tion which is eligible for social assistance and other transfers to the
poor, because the equivalence scale may (and does) differ between
the wealthier and the poor strata. An attempt to establish the
equivalence scale by the same method, only for the poorest 30 and
40% of the population from AZS, did not resulted in an accept-
able outcome.
Using the Engel statistical method, assessments of some alternative
specifications of equivalence scales have been performed. Some of
them are not statistically significant (negative sign, coefficient >1 for
household members of lower order, etc.), while some which were sta-
tistically significant are given in the next table:
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From the table, we can draw the following conclusions:
• that the results are mutually very similar,
• that economies of scale is very low for the third and subsequent
family members, and
• that inclusion of children makes economies of scale stronger to a
certain extent, but does not change the results significantly.
One of the alternative calculation methods of the equivalence scale is
based on a subjective assessment of participants on the absolute mini-
mum income needed for meeting household subsistence needs, which
was one of the questions in the AZS questionnaire. As expected, the
survey replies suggested that significantly more funds are necessary
than the poverty line used in this Study, which means that two-thirds
of the population of Serbia, according to the assessment of partici-
pants, was below this subjective poverty line. Also as expected, house-
holds with lower income assessed the minimum subsistence level to be
lower than households with a higher income level, for the same house-
hold size.
The responses in AZS on the minimum subsistence level were used
for the assessment of the subjective equivalence scale for additional
household members. The new scale was calculated in the following
way: firstly, for each household type (no. of adults and no. of children),
a threshold was designed against which the necessary and declared
(available) household income is leveled to an average by means of
regression of the needed income on the available one. Thus, a subjec-
tive poverty line is obtained for each household type: if the declared
income is higher than the threshold, then the average household of the
given type is not considered as poor, and if it is higher, then it feels
poor. For example, by comparing subjective poverty lines for a one-
member adult household to 2-, 3- and four- member adult households,
a subjective assessment on additional cost for one adult is obtained.
Similarly, by comparing subjective poverty lines for a given household
of adults to households with an equal number of adults and 1, 2 or 3
children, a subjective assessment on additional cost for one child is
obtained.
The results of the assessment based on responses in the AZS are
given in the following table:
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Household type 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Only adults 1 0,79 0,72 0,69 0,65
Only adults (MOP basis) 1 0,79 0,72 0,68 0,66
With no difference between 1 0,78 0,68 0,63 0,57
adults and children
Table 3.
Some of Equivalence Scales
Note: the MOP basis is a special survey whose participants are members of 500 house-
holds receiving social assistance.
We note that:
1. coefficients for economies of scale are falling, which is in line
with the concept of economies of scale,
2. coefficients for adults are higher than for children, which is in
line with assessments from other countries; more rapid decreas-
es in the coefficients for children is a consequence of the fact that
more children in one household can use the same things
(clothes, footwear, toys, textbooks, etc.),
3. coefficients are lower than those calculated for the Engel
method,
4. coefficients are higher than against the current Law on Social
Protection (last column of Table 4).
Let us see what would be the effects of introducing a subjective scale
on a threshold for particular households differ in size.
With one-member households, of course, there would not be any
changes, and with two-member households, the difference would be
marginally in favor of the new equivalence scale. With further increas-
es in the number of household members, the difference would grow
rapidly. This means that two-member households would benefit from
this change, since coefficients would grow at an above average rate for
subsequent household members.
A related and simplified specification of the equivalence scale of the
same subjective method containing only the 1st adult, other adults and
children (meaning that it does not distinguish between adults and chil-
dren) produced the following results: 1st adult – 1, other adults – 0.52,
children – 0.35. These assessments are practically equal to the new ver-
sion of the OSCE equivalence scale (other adults – 0.5, children – 0.3).
Decisions on the selection of the equivalence scale is basically arbi-
trary because, as was noted, all methodologies have strengths and
weaknesses. Consequently, the selection of methodology cannot be
based on methodological characteristics of the particular model, but
on some other criteria.
We propose that the subjective scale referred to in Table 4 for the
equivalence scale should be incorporated into the new Law on Social
Protection, because:
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Subjective equivalence scale Current
Adults Scale Children Scale scale
1st 1.00 1
2nd 0.54 1st 0.52 0.38
3rd 0.43 2nd 0.32 0.38
4th 0.39 3rd 0.10 0.13
Table  4.
Proposal of the Equivalence Scale
• it includes all necessary components of a good equivalence scale:
both economies of scale and demographic structure of the house-
hold,
• it corresponds to the needs of the law : it is neither too simple, nor
too complex; it is able to reflect all important household charac-
teristics and also to be understandable for its beneficiaries,
• it is higher in value than the current scale from the existing Law
on Social Protection, which overestimates economies of scale and,
to a certain extent, discriminates against households with more
members. In line with that, the proposed equivalence scale is
more realistic and would provide better results on the minimum
number of households with a higher number of members,
• it better reflects the limited budgetary possibilities than alternative
specifications assessed by Engel’s method, which, since they have
higher values, would result in much greater budgetary obligations
towards beneficiaries,
• it is established on the basis of citizens’ opinion, so it is “demo-
cratic” in character, which gives it an advantage over alternative
scales. In other words, if the scale meets other necessary condi-
tions (and this one does), then its advantage is based on the fact
that it is in accordance with Serb citizens’ own assessment of how
much additional costs are caused by additional individuals in the
household.
We have assessed effective changes of the equivalence scale by means
of simulations based on AZS. For the referential scale, the first used a
poverty line of 2,280 YUD and an equivalence scale from the existing
law; the second combined the same poverty line with the newly pro-
posed equivalence scale. The results are presented in the following
table:
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Figure 1.
Suggested and Existing Equivalence Scale
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We can see that the replacement of the existing equivalence scale
would bring an increase of 11% in the number of households eligible
for social assistance and the deficit in their average income would
increase by 14%, which would result in increased expenditure for social
assistance by 26%. As expected, multi-member households would ben-
efit significantly by this replacement, and accordingly, the average
number of household members eligible for social assistance would be
increased from 2.65 to 2.83.
Combination of the increased poverty line and changed equivalence
scale
In previous chapters, changes have been suggested in both the
poverty line and the equivalence scale, and assessments of their sepa-
rate effects have been presented. In this chapter, we will show the
results of simultaneous application of both changes by means of the
AZS simulation.
We have compared the results of the referential simulation (the
existing equivalence scale and poverty line across municipalities) with
four alternatives containing the newly proposed equivalence scale and
the four previously mentioned poverty lines.
Of course, a more favorable equivalence scales and higher poverty
lines result in more households and individuals included in the pro-
gram, and higher transfer amounts per person (and household). The
final outcome is an even more rapid increase of budgetary funds for
financing certain variances of the social assistance program.
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Equivalence scale Deficit No. of households Budget
Existing 100 100 100
Proposed 114 111 126
Table 5.
Effects of Change of the Equivalence Scale, in %
Equivalence Poverty No. of No. of Transfer Total
scale line households individuals per person transfers
Existing Municipal 100 100 100 100
Proposed 2280 122 131 112 146
Proposed 2508 132 143 117 167
Proposed 2736 144 155 123 190
Proposed 3565 185 200 146 291
Table 6.
Effects of Change of Equivalence Scale and Poverty Line
Position of citizens capable of work
Any transfer, including social assistance, usually causes a certain
reaction by its beneficiaries, and here we refer to the impact of social
assistance transfers on potential job offers. If social assistance is high
enough to provide a normal or, at least, modest standard of living, then
a beneficiary who is capable of work will need to assess whether it is
more worthwhile him to try to find employment and earn money,
while risking losing social assistance, or to remain unemployed  and
lose potential earnings, but keep social assistance. The result of this
assessment depends on individual preferences, on the amount of social
assistance, and the amount of (potential) earnings in the labor market.
It is quite possible that, at least with a number of beneficiaries, this
assessment results in avoiding attempts at finding employment and a
decrease in job offers, which on aggregate could lead to a decrease in
the overall number of jobs in the economy and potentially lower  gross
domestic product.
This can be a serious problem as proved by experience of countries
with developed welfare state where a serious negative impact has been
found to take place on economic performance. Thus, in European
countries, (too) high social protection and generous unemployment
compensation has contributed to high unemployment (around 10%
over a long period of time) and increased wages for less-skilled work-
ers. It appears that many individuals assess that it is more worthwhile
to be unemployed and receive high compensation than to accept a job
which is less attractive than their old one. Similar experience, though to
a smaller extent, can be found in the USA. For this and similar reasons,
over the last ten years, the process of reducing the size of the welfare
state and its associated institutions welfare state has begun, which
should result in a more flexible labor market and higher employment.
This process has occurred in EU countries in recent years, significantly
reducing unemployment.
Social assistance is rather modest in Serbia, so the incentive for
avoiding employment is low. Yet, it does not mean that this will be the
case in the future because, along with economic development, social
assistance will grow in real terms and accordingly cause negative effects
on incentives for taking up employment. Secondly, particular reforms
that are being discussed in this Study may increase the need for social
assistance and result in negative incentives to beneficiaries in terms of
looking for employment.
Let us discuss some possible remedies for the problem of the
trade-off between earnings and social assistance and for its potential
negative effects on the readiness of an individual to enter the labor
market.
1. In many countries, standard conditions for eligibility for social
assistance refer to the readiness of the individual capable of work to
find employment or to be included in specific labor market programs
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(e.g. training). To be specific, an individual shall lose his/her right to
social assistance if he/she:
• refuses to accept an employment offered to him/her by the Labor
Bureau,
• refuses to be included in skill-improvement programs that are
organized by the Labor Bureau,
• refuses to be included in socially useful activities (arranging parks,
taking care of children, etc.), such as those which are requested,
for example, in the USA.
There are also attempts in Serbia to introduce incentives, through
legal means, for individuals receiving social assistance to find jobs.
That is a provision of the Law on Social Protection, which rules that a
person capable of work who refuses to take up the offered job or refus-
es to be included in Labor Bureau programs shall not be entitled to
social assistance. However, it seems that such provisions are not effec-
tive for the following reasons:
• in Serbia, labor bureaus seldom mediate in finding jobs and even
more rarely are they able to offer any kind of job to social assis-
tance beneficiaries,
• until recently, additional training and retraining programs were
scarce, so they could not be used as a key condition; lately, oppor-
tunities for this type of activity have been significantly increased,
but it is based mainly on donors’ funding and the question is if a
sufficiently high level will be maintained for a longer period of
time. 
The idea of socially useful work as a prerequisite for social assistance
is very good, but its relevance is questionable for Serbia since its imple-
mentation presupposes a developed system of social institutions which
does not yet existin the country.
We may conclude that the working conditions should definitely be
kept for eligibility of those capable of work for social assistance, but
without expecting sufficient impact on take-up of job offers.
2.  A radical solution to the problem, as applied in Estonia, suggests
the complete exclusion of an unemployed individual who is capable of
work from the income threshold calculation and social assistance
amount, as if he/she were absent from the labor market. This makes
assessment of the eligibility of a family for social assistance more diffi-
cult because a particular income level is associated with fewer members
and thus decreases the income threshold and thereby the social assis-
tance amount for the eligible family (since the difference between the
threshold and the given income is decreased). Of course, the goal of
this measure is not to worsen the economic situation of the whole fam-
ily, but to give incentives to look for job to individuals who are capable
of work.
Exclusion of individuals capable of work from the right to social
assistance can certainly be the solution to our problem as such an indi-
vidual does not receive social assistance, so new employment does not
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mean any loss for him/her and his/her family. The difficulty here is as
follows: it affects those who want to find employment, but they need
some material support to survive, at least temporarily while they look
for a job.
3. A more moderate variation on the previous solution is the follow-
ing one: an individual capable of work is entitled to social assistance for
a certain period of time after which he/she loses it. The idea is to pro-
vide basic social security to each individual without income for a peri-
od of time when he/she will have time to look for employment, and
after that he/she will be forced to address his/her lack of employment
by revoking social assistance, or to accept the consequences. This sys-
tem is applied in the USA and it has led to good results: unemployment
among social assistance beneficiaries has significantly decreased. 
Obviously, it is not possible to adjust the length of time in which an
individual capable of work can exercise the right to social assistance
according to a realistic time period within which to find a job, as cir-
cumstances differ for different individuals and can change rapidly.
Consequently, a “protected” period should be established.
4. In practice, when approving social assistance in Serbia, one other
method has been used: adding to the real household income two
other measurable incomes: “missed earnings”, which individuals
capable of work could have made (in agriculture or the gray econo-
my) but did not, and minimum wages guaranteed by law, which they
also did not receive. The purpose of the missed earnings is obviously
to decrease the number of those social assistance beneficiaries who
are capable of work, and the purpose of guaranteed wages was to
transfer the problem of insufficient real wages on to employees and
employers, with the rationale that the law provided/prescribed mini-
mum wages sufficient for survival for everyone , and that right had to
be implemented.
Difficulties with defining a measurable level of income are obvious,
for example, with missed earnings; if this calculation assesses the
income threshold, which is normal, then this method is the same as
exclusion of the individual capable of work from the right to social
assistance even when he needs it for survival. On the other hand, this
method has been applied selectively, both in geographical terms and in
terms of the eligibility of individuals, which is difficult to justify and
leads to the exclusion of some individuals from the right to social assis-
tance (i.e., it limits the number of exclusions). As for guaranteed wages,
the principal idea here is incorrect, meaning that the provision of the
law on the mandatory payment of guaranteed wages is sufficient pro-
tection of employees’ social position, i.e. that the enterprise can and
has to pay; but very often that has not been the case, because in the past
years it was a usual practice in many enterprises for salaries to be paid
late or not at all. It means that employees did not receive even the
assumed minimum guaranteed wages.
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5. The previously mentioned methods were based on the “stick”
principle in terms of giving incentives to working activities through
punitive measures. The opposite system, based on the “carrot” princi-
ple, is also possible, whereby the social assistance beneficiary capable of
work is rewarded if he/she finds a job. The problem with the standard
system is as follows: each dinar (YUD) of newly received earning
means losing one dinar of social assistance, so the (implicit) tax at the
time of taking on employment amounts to 100%, which represents a
disincentive for finding a job. It is possible to diminish this steep tax
rate through the deduction of a part of the income of the newly
employed person, when calculating the income on which entitlement
to social assistance depends. In this way, social assistance beneficiaries
are encouraged to find employment, as they will not be in the position
that 100% of their new income is calculated for eligibility for social
assistance and thus implicitly taxed at 100%. This method is used in
Bulgaria.
Difficulties with this method for solving the problem are three-fold:
firstly, this type of incentive for employment cannot be provided over
the long run (for example, a year or more), as it will negate the main
objective of social assistance – supporting those without sufficient
income; secondly, if the duration of such assistance is limited to a
shorter time period, then there is the issue of the level of incentive for
employment; and thirdly, positive incentives produce new costs – dif-
ferently from negative (punitive) ones, which actually save on public
expenditures.
6. The selection of the appropriate method for giving incentives to
find employment to poor citizens capable to work through the social
assistance system, should take into consideration existing policies with-
in the system of unemployment protection and other related programs
(for example, the Transition Fund), as such policies also support those
who have lost their jobs and who are threatened by poverty.
All of those who have lost their jobs enjoy the right to unemploy-
ment compensation. The duration of this compensation depends on
the previous length of service, and it is rather generous: up to 24
months for the older unemployed. In this way, the new unemployed
are provided with some income while looking for a job, i.e. they are not
immediately without any income. To be frank, it appears  that the state
is not able to pay out legally entitled compensation for the unemployed
and that arrears are increasing.
Employees who are going to lose their job have an extraordinary
right to choose between unemployment compensation and a one-time
payment from the Transition Fund, and they usually opt for the second
one. However, this money tends not to last long, and they often quick-
ly are left with no funds, and thus become candidates for social assis-
tance. This raises the question of whether it is appropriate to include
them in the social assistance program, as this tends to reward their
short-term profligacy, particularly in relation to those who receive
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unemployment compensation (equal funds but spread over the long
run). 
The third category of people capable of work are those who have
never been employed, at least not formally,  and who, consequently,
have no right to unemployment compensation. If they are poor, they
are eligible for social assistance indefinitely.
7. The previously mentioned options have their pros and cons.
Probably, the best option is the one that provides temporary support to
the poor who are capable to work because:
• it gives incentives for employment, as social assistance is tempo-
rary, and it represents an improvement over the existing policy of
indefinite entitlement,
• it provides a minimum income for those who are not eligible for
unemployment compensation, although there is a question of
whether or not the same thing should be provided for those who
receive (long term) unemployment benefit or resources from the
Transitional Fund; yet, in order to keep the universality of rules, it
would probably be recommended to differentiate the conditions
for acquiring the right to social assistance – between those who
have been receiving transfers on account of losing their job and
those who have not,
• it saves budgetary funds, which can be used for providing assis-
tance to those who are really vulnerable and incapable.
Such a system of truly providing incentives for employment to indi-
viduals capable of work probably is not necessary to be applied imme-
diately because the existing income threshold of social assistance bene-
ficiaries is low, so that the number of those who are eligible is not large.
Yet, if the income threshold will be raised in the future, then, sooner or
later, the problem of dealing with the capable of work will be relevant.
The list of income for MOP (or how certain categories of recipients can
benefit)
The list of the types of household income that is taken into consider-
ation when calculating the income threshold is both a technical and
conceptual question of utmost importance for eligibility for social
assistance. The exclusion of certain types of income from this list rep-
resents an advantage for those households which have them because it
represents an equivalent increase in the threshold based on overall
income, and makes it easier to become eligible for social assistance.
Let us first list all the different types of income. They include:
1) all legal and commercial income, i.e. that counted as income for
income taxpurposes,
2) income from unregistered activities (gray economy), and
3) income from social transfers, such as pensions and allowance for
the disabled, foster parent’s allowance, transfers in line with reg-
ulations on war invalids, parental allowance, attendance and
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assistance allowance, compensation for physical impairment,
unemployment benefit, child allowance, transfers from relatives
who are legally obliged to render support, the severance pay-
ments, and compensation from social programs.
For the income threshold calculation, the existing Law on Social
Security excludes the following categories of income: child allowance,
attendance and assistance allowance, transfers for physical impair-
ment, transfers based on bonuses and termination pay when retiring,
and transfers related to students’ living allowance.
In principle, it would be normal for all household income to be
included in the threshold calculation for eligibility for social assistance.
Social assistance is targeted to the poorest, so all others who do not
belong to that category, according to their income, should not receive
it. Possible exceptions to the rule of calculating all income should be
firmly established.
There are two important questions here:
1) whether to include in the list of income for calculation of the
threshold amounts received from child allowance and various
types of support to the disabled; and
2) how to treat substantial one-off payments, such as parental
allowance and severance payments in the case of redundancy.
Adv.1. Possible benefits for children (families with children) and
the disabled can be justified by reasons of social policy. Namely, chil-
dren or families with children enjoy special state assistance, which is
above the level of support for similar families without children. The
same need for special assistance also applies to the disabled with an
additional reason – the higher living cost of families with disabled
members in terms of greater levels of direct (care, drugs, aids) and
indirect (engagement of a family member which leads to income loss
on the other side, etc.).
Within the state financial support system, care for children is imple-
mented in the best manner through special instruments established for
that purpose: child allowance, maternal allowance, sick leave
allowance, tax policies, etc. Provision of benefits for children within
various social programs, even in those aimed for other purposes, is not
the best way of support – it is much better to achieve the desired level
through specialized programs and preserve the universality of other
programs, especially social assistance as a “residual” program.
Consequently, income from child allowance should not be excluded
from the income that is used for calculating the threshold for social
assistance, but should be used to find compensation elsewhere in the
system of acquiring the right to child allowance (to be discussed later).
The situation is somewhat different for entitlement of families with a
disabled member. While children do not add additional costs in rela-
tion to adults and the state wants to offer them strong protection
because they are children, the disabled are in a different situation
because they need additional support not based on a special privilege
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(like children), but due to additional costs caused by their condition
and the need of equalizing their position with other beneficiaries.
The answer to the question of how to treat income from different
sources of benefit for the disabled cannot be offered in this Study
before a detailed research of overall system of protection of the dis-
abled in Serbia is conducted, as this issue is very complex and thus far
insufficiently investigated.
Adv.2. High one-off transfers, such as parental allowance or redun-
dancy payments, should not be calculated on the basis of one month or
one quarter, as that could potentially distort a person’s circumstances
and thus be unfair. This would mean that an individual would receive
social assistance even though he earned a considerable income in the
previous month/quarter, which led to an increase in his/her living stan-
dard for several months to come.
An appropriate solution to this problem is in “time-demarcation” (a
term used in bookkeeping), meaning extending one-off income
throughout a longer period of time. So, for example, this period of time
could be 24 months for maternal allowance, and 12 months for redun-
dancy payments. The reason for such differentiation is the differing
amount of payments.
Child allowances
Basically, there is a conceptual dilemma about the desired feature of
child allowance, and the right to child allowance and coverage. Its
amount depends on the answer to this dilemma, based on a number of
factors. There are two essentially different models – one with wide cov-
erage, and the second with a narrow range of coverage.
Firstly, universal child allowance. The central idea is that all chil-
dren should realistically be covered by the child allowance program
based on the obligation of the state to provide the proper conditions
for ensuring a child’s well-being. Thus, child allowance should be a
universal benefit funded from the state budget based on the principal
of transferring resources from people without children to those with
children. The child allowance program would not be directed towards
the poor and specially linked to poverty mitigation despite the fact that
poor families would have the same entitlement to this benefit as other
well-to-do families. The concept of child allowance is historical (e.g.
France) and it is usually based on the need for a population policy in
countries with low fertility. Given that it is not linked to poverty, i.e.
that the right to benefits does not depend on the level of family income,
universal child allowance does not provoke a stigma or psychological
resistance towards procedures of application for social assistance,
which might otherwise occur with middle class members.
In this model, the amount of child allowance does not depend on
family income, and it either is equal for all children, or depends on the
sequence of births in the family and to the children’s ages. The lack of
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linkage between the allowance amount and a family’s income is implic-
itly based on the idea that the state equally funds the cost of upbringing
each child, i.e. it does not supplement the family budget in the amount
necessary to cover family expenditure for children.
Secondly, child allowance for the poorer classes. The basic idea
behind this model is completely different: the attempt here is to give
financial support to those who need it the most – poor families. Since
budget funds are always limited, they should be allocated in the most
rational way according to established priorities. Instead of distributing
the available funds to a vast number of children, as in the previous
model, they are, according to this model, targeted towards those from
poor families but in a higher amount, which could better meet the
needs of these children than child allowance with the unique amount,
as in the previous model.
One of the basic elements of the child allowance model with the
more narrow coverage is the standard theory of the declining marginal
use of money. Namely, each additional unit of resource brings less ben-
efit to individuals with a higher level of income than to those with
lower income. It further means that the same child allowance amount
brings less benefit, measured in terms of the amount of goods and serv-
ices able to be purchased with it, to middle class members than to the
poor. Thus, if the objective of social policy is to maximize people’s wel-
fare, then, given a fixed overall social transfer level, such objective, , will
be more easily achieved by targeting the poor than by a universal trans-
fer to all citizens.
According to this model, the child allowance amount cannot be the
same for all those eligible, but it has to take into account family income
according to the principle that child allowance is higher for those with
lower incomes. In this case, as with social assistance, the best concept is
that of topping-up the family’s resources, whereby the state provides a
transfer to the family in the amount representing the difference
between calculated necessary funds for one child and the available own
funds of the family. Of course, this model can take into account impor-
tant differences in the cost of children of particular categories (age,
sequence of births, etc) through particular policies when establishing
the appropriate level of benefit amounts.
A summary of these two models of child allowance is presented in
the next graph.
With the universal benefit model, the coverage of children is wide,
and the child allowance amount is fixed. On the other hand, with the
targeted model, coverage is much narrower and the child allowance
amount is different and usually much higher than with universal model.
Of course, it is also possible to have mixed regimes between the two
models, combining elements of both models. One variation in the first
model is restrictions in the right to child allowance in such a way that
children from the wealthiest social classes will not be covered, but the
income from child allowance does not represent a significant item in
their family budgets anyway. Thus, the coverage would be restricted to
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an extent – for example, to a minimum of 2/3 of the total number of
children. The intention of such narrowing of coverage is to save budg-
etary funds along with a belief that it will not cause negative social and
population effects since child allowance is transferred to all those fam-
ilies for which it makes sense in financial terms.
The child allowance model existing in Serbia now represents a com-
bination of the two models. It had been intended to be wide in coverage,
originally among the employed both in and out of the economy (based
on employment insurance), and later, as of 1992, in the general popula-
tion. The child allowance amount is fixed and does not depend on any
other criteria except meeting the income threshold and other general
conditions. Anyhow, the economic and financial crisis during the 1990s
decreased the threshold level and consequently the coverage of children.
In 2002, an additional considerable increase occurred when the growth
of real income and the introduction of assets as criteria for eligibility
caused a drop in the number of children covered by child allowance
from 665,000 in December 2001 to 497,000 in December 2002, which
represents one-third of the total number of children in Serbia.
A relatively low income threshold for child allowance is more in line
with the second model as it confirms its orientation towards poor stra-
ta of society: from low middle income levels to the poorest citizens.
Any discussion about reforms of social transfers, particularly, child
allowance, undoubtedly leads to the re-examination of the principal
basis of child allowance, the largest and most important transfer. 
Further in this text, we will present two options for reform of the
child allowance system: firstly, improvement of the existing model, and
secondly, a radical solution – integration of social assistance and child
allowance into a single social transfer, which could be termed family
allowance.
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Figure 2.
Two Models of Child Allowance
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Child allowance in Serbia is paid out in a fixed amount, which is
equal for all children included in this program, i.e. for all children who
are entitled to it. (The only exception is households with a single parent
and children with special needs). In other words, when establishing the
child allowance amount, neither household income nor the child’s age
is taken into consideration, nor any other characteristic except for the
fact that the household meets the conditions for eligibility for child
allowance. Thus, only two situations are possible: either the household
is eligible for child allowance or it is not. If it is, it receives the same
amount for each child, as established by law (around 1,000 YUD).
This type of benefit is widely applied in many countries in the world.
Some other countries have introduced child allowance that grows with
the sequence of births (i.e. it is higher for the third child than for the
second one, etc) as part of its population policy to give incentives for
more children, in response to a politically unacceptable slowing in the
birth rate.  However, we note that neither type takes the family’s social
status (i.e. income level), nor differing costs of supporting certain cate-
gories of children into account in the calculation of child allowance.
The basis of such approach is, as indicated, the idea of universal child
allowance and the intention of the state to equally assist in each child’s
upbringing.
Yet, the idea of an equal amount of child allowance can be ques-
tioned:
• even if we stick to universal child allowance, the question is
whether the amount should be equal or not. One of the advan-
tages of for equality is the concept of the state’s provision of equal
support for each child, but the question is: what is the meaning of
equal support – is it the state’s equal contribution expressed in
nominal terms or is it a partial leveling of living conditions for
each child? If it is the former, then the state aims to provide the
same amount of purchasing power (goods and services) and does
not try to directly influence uniformity; it considers that the goal
is achieved if it has facilitated each child to purchase part of the
consumer basket, regardless of all other circumstances. If the lat-
ter (the aligning of consumption), then it is necessary to approve a
higher level of child allowance to a child from a poor family in
order to make him even partially closer in living standard to the
child from well-to-do family,
• an important weakness of the equal child allowance concept with-
in a universal child allowance program (with wide coverage) is the
fact that, to wealthier families, the child allowance received means
little or nothing for maintaining or improving their living stan-
dards – such a small amount to richer families is marginal and
almost negligible in overall consumption. Consequently,
resources spent on transfers to the wealthy cannot be considered
as well employed. On the other hand, the same amount trans-
122 Poverty and Reform of Financial Support to the Poor
ferred to the poorest implicates a considerable improvement in
their living standards, meaning that it provides much higher mar-
ginal benefit for these families compared to wealthier ones. The
basis of the difference is the long time well known idea of declin-
ing use of money, which states that the increment in benefits
gained by additional consumption is a function of the consump-
tion level or income. In another words, one dinar (YUD) trans-
ferred to a poor person increases his welfare (and overall welfare)
more than a dinar given to a rich person; maximization of welfare
should be an objective  of social policy,
• the equal child allowance concept neglects the different costs asso-
ciated () with different children, even if differences in income are
disregarded. Namely, elder children require greater levels of
expenditure than younger children as the former have higher con-
sumption requirements than younger children, with the latter
“inheriting” some goods from their elder siblings. These demo-
graphic differences within a family simply cry for relevant han-
dling.
Thus, a weakness of the equal child allowance concept is that it pro-
vides equally for different children. This characteristic becomes espe-
cially prominent when the child allowance concept is not universal but
targeted to poorer families, as is the case in Serbia. Then, there is no
sense in neglecting the level of poverty and allocating the same child
allowance to all children. The right solution is in differentiating child
allowance. Slovenia and Croatia are among those that take into
account household social status and differentiate child allowance
amount according to household income.
There are two methods for differentiating child allowance:
a. firstly, paying out the difference between the income threshold for
child allowance and overall family income – this is a technique
that is used for social assistance benefit,
b. secondly, paying different child allowance amounts, depending
on family income.
We can note the main features of these two types in the following
graph.
The sloping line represents the child allowance amount according to
the method of supplementing the original household income up to a
given threshold (Option A). The line has a 45 degree downward slope;
thus, the child allowance amount decreases by 1 YUD for each dinar of
growth in family income, which is in line with the idea of assessing
family income when establishing the child allowance amount. Thus, a
household with an income of 1,000 YUD receives child allowance of
8,000 YUD, the household with 4,000 income receives 5,000 YUD, and
the household with 9,000 income does not receive any allowance.
An advantage of the method of topping-up benefits is a direct reflec-
tion of household income in the child allowance amount (in the oppo-
site direction, of course) and in the fact that it provides the same income
level to each household with particular demographic characteristics.
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In the previous graph, three horizontal lines represent three different
levels of child allowance depending on household income (Option B).
The poorest households receive child allowance of 6,000 YUD, those
medium poor – 4,000 YUD, and the least poor – 2,000 YUD.8
This method of child allowance actually approximates the top-up
benefit method in a rough way. Here, the child allowance amount does
not change gradually in the proportion of 1 YUD of income/1 YUD of
child allowance, as is the case with topping-up benefits. The amount of
child allowance is kept constant in a certain band of changes in income,
after which it increases substantially. However, the (rough) link
between household income and the amount of child allowance
remains. It is certainly possible to increase the number of categories of
child assistance levels, and in this way to diminish the “error” in rela-
tion to the method of topping-up benefits. Then, the question of
whether or not to use the latter method may be posed. The second
characteristic of this method is that, through leveling to an average, it
decreases the highest child allowances from the topping-up model, and
increases the lowest ones, as shown in the previous graph.
A variation of the previous model would be to establish categories of
the child allowance amounts, but these should not approximate the
top-up model.  Using values from the previous diagram, three cate-
gories could be established with the following child allowance
amounts: 3,000; 2,000; and 1,000 YUD. More realistic figures, based on
the existing system, would be 1,500; 1,000 (the current amount); and
500 YUD. 
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8 The quoted child allowance amounts are for illustration only .
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Actually, this model would simply be an extension of the existing
child allowance model, which is not very sensitive to changes in the
household income, with a partial adjustment in the form of differenti-
ation, but not taking into account the family income and bringing it to
the threshold level (directly as with supplementing or roughly as with
the first sub-variation of the category model).
Choosing the payment model certainly depends on the child
allowance concept discussed earlier.
The equivalence scale and the poverty line
The philosophy of child allowance is connected to the question of
whether to apply the equivalence scale (perhaps the one for social assis-
tance) to child allowances too. As a reminder, according to the existing
Law on Financial Support to Families with Children, economies of
scale are not used when calculating the household threshold for eligi-
bility, but the threshold is calculated on the basis of household per
capita income (the same threshold is used for each member, i.e. the
coefficient equals 1 for everybody). With this policy, the poverty line
for multi-member households is increased over that used for one-
member household.
On the other hand, one reason to use the equivalence scale to estab-
lish entitlement to child allowance is that it would take into account
the real vulnerability of the household based on the existing economies
of scale in expenditures for sustenance and different demographic
characteristics of the family. The existing policy of using per capita
increases in the threshold level is contradictory to this.
If the equivalence scale was introduced without any other changes in
child allowances, it would certainly make it more difficult to qualify for
this tranfer. It would also decrease the number of child allowance ben-
eficiaries, since in each household with children the income threshold
would be lower. Since the decrease in the number of child allowance
beneficiaries is not the aim of the review of the introduction of
economies of scale, it is necessary to include a compensatory mecha-
nism, which would facilitate eligibility in the system with the equiva-
lence scale. This mechanism would be to raise the income threshold to
such an extent that it is necessary to compensate the negative impact of
the introduction of the equivalence scale for the number of child
allowance beneficiaries.
The following graph illustrates the combined effects of: 1) the intro-
duction of the newly proposed equivalence scale from the social assis-
tance into the child allowance program, and 2) a compensatory
increase in the income threshold with child allowance.
The results are clear – for a three-member household with one child
it would be easier to be eligible for child allowance compared to the
system with an equivalence scale and higher threshold, whereas this
would be more difficult for five-member households with more chil-
dren compared to the existing policy. It is easy to find the cause of this
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– the use of the equivalence scale would take away less from households
with fewer children than from those with more children. That is
because of higher coefficients for children at the lower end of the birth
sequence than for those at the higher end, whilst all households would
benefit to the same extent from the higher threshold. However, this
outcome can  (and should) be viewed from the other side – five-mem-
ber families with 3 children are, according to the present system (with-
out an equivalence scale), privileged compared to families with one
child, as they benefit more from the non-existence of the equivalence
scale.
We can confirm this effect in the simulation performed by AZS. The
assumptions behind the simulations were:
• maintaining the same level of expenditures for child allowance,
which means (because of keeping the existing amount for one
allowance) maintaining the same coverage (number) of children
in the child allowance program,
• introduction of the newly proposed equivalence scale for social
assistance, and
• appropriate increase in the income threshold.
Which is better? If the existing instruments are adjusted in such a
way that the number of children receiving child allowances remains the
same, then we believe it is better to introduce the equivalence scale in
the child allowance program because it is fair to take into account sig-
nificantly falling expenditures of multi-member households. That is
why the previously mentioned structural changes are also just because,
according to the current system of child allowance, households with
more children benefit, as it is appropriate that economies of scale are
not taken into consideration.
Thus, the following changes are recommended:
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Figure 4.
Child Allowance
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1. introduction of the equivalence scale into the threshold calcula-
tion for child allowance, i.e. similar to that proposed for social
assistance,
2. increase in the income threshold for entitlement to child
allowance.
The effects of the proposed change of the equivalence scale are
shown in the following table:
In order to evaluate the effects of introducing an equivalence scale in
the child allowance program, two AZS simulations have been under-
taken: the first with the existing policy (a poverty line of 2,750 YUD
and with a per capita equivalence scale); and the second with the newly
proposed equivalence scale and with a requirement of no change in the
number of children (and thus the expenditure amount). The results are
as follows: increase in the poverty line by 65% (from 2,750 to 4,500
YUD) and a 4% increase the number of families entitled to child
allowance, which is (due to the same number of covered children)
equivalent to a decrease in the average number of children in the fami-
ly entitled to child allowance. In reality, this number is decreased from
1.83 to 1.77, which only confirmed our previous discussion that the
proposed change would make families with fewer children better off. 
Family allowance
Further improvements in social transfers could be carried out by
merging social assistance and child allowance into a single transfer
whose aim would be to support all poor households, especially house-
holds with children.9
Family allowance would use existing administrative procedures
existing, that is, the previously mentioned policies for social assistance
would also be valid for family allowance. An important difference
would be introduced to one element, and that is specially favorable
coefficients of the equivalence scale for children, so that families with
children can easily be entitled to family allowance and receive addi-
tional funds in relation to families without children with an equal
number of family members. Thus, the principal idea behind child
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Equivalence scale Poverty line No. of families
Per capita 100 100
Proposed 165 104
Table 7.
Effects of Introducing the Equivalence Scale
9 Making Transition Work For Everyone, World Bank, 2001, p. 301 .
allowance is maintained  – enabling a more favorable position for chil-
dren and families with children even when they are not considered to
be the poorest citizens. These coefficients could possibly be differenti-
ated according to the sequence of births of children, which would take
into account differences in the actual cost of supporting those children.
There are numerous reasons in favor of integration of the two types
of social transfer:
• the amalgamation of child allowance and social assistance would
improve targeting based on introducing child allowance (a pro-
gram that is weaker in targeting but much bigger) to the social
assistance program (a very well targeted program, both nationally
as well as regionally). The difference in targeting efficiency comes
as a result, above all, of different administrative and professional
capacities of the two services implementing these programs (due
to the two types of administrative tasks being different by law, as
field work is not envisaged in the area of child allowance),
• there is need for the increased sensitivity  of the system to the
income of the poor in order that the less poor receive less and
more to those who are poorer. With the existing system, these
social transfers (social assistance + child allowance) are relatively
non-elastic in relation to family income. Namely, they are elastic
enough with the poorest (those who receive social assistance), but
they are absolutely non-elastic with the somewhat better off poor
who receive child allowance but do not receive social assistance10
(see next graph).
• Both existing programs have the same objective – mitigation of
poverty – after the law in 2002 removed a significant part of the
population component from the child allowance program (i.e. the
child allowance’s reliance on the sequence of births of children,
different conditions for entitlement in areas with low and high
birth rates, etc.),
• Integration of the two programs would significantly contribute to
improvements in administrative efficiency – through avoiding the
duplication of the processing of households included in both pro-
grams, the integration of the databases, simplification of proce-
dures, better insight into household social status, diminishing
costs for both administration and beneficiaries, etc.,
• Avoiding certain conceptual issues associated with separater pro-
grams, e.g. how to regulate their mutual relations, i.e. how to han-
dle children in the social assistance program, and whether to
include income from one program into the income list of the
other one when establishing threshold, etc.
Integration of the two programs is facilitated by a number of factors:
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10 According to the existing policy, these two transfers, if observed together, are rel-
atively non-elastic in relation to the income scale of the poor due to fixed level of
child allowances. Elasticity could, however, be increase by switching child
allowance from a fixed amount to a differentiated amount.
• Both programs are based on the same methodology of establish-
ing eligibility – household resources are assessed and compared to
the income and asset threshold taking into account the number of
household members; many procedures and definitions are already
the same, or are becoming similar between the two programs,
• The basis for paying transfers, while currently different between
the two types of transfer (social assistance, paying a top-up, and
child allowance, paying a fixed amount), can be equalized by a
change in child allowance payment terms by moving towards top-
up payments, as was suggested in the previous chapter,
• Both transfers are currently handled by the same ministry, so that:
1) problems of poor inter-sector coordination cannot occur, and
2) the two services (social work centers and child allowance serv-
ices) can merge and improve administrative capacity.
There are also arguments against the integration of the existing pro-
grams:
1. problems of insufficient administrative capacities would arise
from handling new claims that such integration may bring. At
present, the social assistance program is relatively well adminis-
tered by social work centers. The child allowance program is not
as well administered by municipal services for child allowance
due to the previously mentioned policies (this poor targeting
may be deemed acceptable given that child allowances eventual-
ly reach families with children even when targeting is not good,
as is the case). A future system of family allowance should be
administered by social work centers, which would be above their
capacity, in the short term, at least, given the increased number
of beneficiaries in relation to the number of social assistance
beneficiaries. The integration of social work centers and munici-
pal services for child allowance is possible but it is not feasible
within the short term due to many reasons – the most important
of which is space limitations in social work centers,
2. there is a chance that in developing a new law in future, the ini-
tial concept of family allowance may be distorted away from the
interests of children. It is possible that the political process of
developing the law may lead to the abolition or reduction of ben-
efits that are proposed here for children (through particularly
favorable coefficients in the equivalence scale). In order to avoid
this danger, it is better to keep child allowances as a separate pro-
gram,
3. there is concern that some of the current child allowance benefi-
ciaries from the (lower) middle classes will avoid applying for
family allowance due to the possible shame (stigma) that they
might feel because of this program’s emphasized orientation
towards the poor. However, this potential problem is unlikely to
occur, or not to a large extent, because family allowance benefici-
aries will not come from the middle class but exclusively from
the poor strata of society. Of course, prior to this, it is necessary
129Proposal of Reforms of Financial Assistance to the Poor
to resolve a conceptual dilemma (already mentioned) about the
extent of the program’s coverage of children – whether its goal is
wide coverage, including the middle class, or it is directed only to
children from poor families (as the current social assistance pro-
gram is now).
Comparisons between the current system (social assistance + child
allowance) and the proposed family allowance is given for a four-
member family (2 adults + 2 children) in the following graph:
It should be noted that transfers, according to the present system
(MOP + child allowance), are non-elastic in relation to income, except
for the lowest income level where these two incomes are added; above
an income level of 3,300 only two child allowances are paid in the same
amount. It can be observed that in the integrated child allowance sys-
tem there is a strong elasticity of transfers to family income – more is
provided for the poorest families than in the present system (2,000
YUD more), and the better-off poor get 2,000 less, i.e. nothing.
The general outcome is that the number of families covered by an
integrated system would be less than against the two separated systems,
but that the poor would get more benefits.
An attempt to validate this reasoning has been made by means of
AZS simulations. The referential simulation is a combination of the
already analysed referential simulations of social assistance and child
allowance: the legislated thresholds (2,280 for social assistance and
2,750 for child allowance), the official equivalence scale for social assis-
tance and the per capita scale for child allowance, other filters, social
assistance payments through income top-ups and child allowance paid
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in fixed amounts; total expenditure for both social assistance and child
allowances would be 490 million YUD per month.
Alternative simulations with family allowance as the only instru-
ment are based on the following assumptions:
• a threshold of 2,280 YUD,
• the equivalence scale from social assistance regulations. These two
conditions should keep the poorest citizens (social assistance ben-
eficiaries with no children) at the same level of rights and benefits,
• significantly increased coefficients of the equivalence scale for
children. Two variations were developed: in the first one, each
child’s coefficient was topped up by an equal amount (additive
method), and in the second one, each child’s coefficient was
increased by an equal percentage (multiplicity method),
• total expenditure for the family allowance was the same as for the
two programs that are to be abolished – 490 million YUD.
The objective of the simulation was to determine the necessary
adjustment to the equivalence scale coefficients for children for expen-
diture on the family allowance to be within an overall budget of 490
million YUD per month.
The results of this simulation indicate that the additive adjustment
should be 1.05, and 2.05 for the multiplicative adjustment.
As shown, this confirms the earlier argument that introducing fami-
ly allowance would reduce the number of children and adults eligible
for the program.
Table 8 presents comparisons of the effects of introducing family
allowance in relation to the summary results of the child allowance and
social assistance programs (= 100).
The effects of introducing family allowance, in relation to the exist-
ing instruments (child allowance and social assistance), would be:
• there would be no change in the status of current beneficiaries of
social assistance without children  – the same families and indi-
viduals would switch to the family allowance program in the same
number and with the same amounts both for households and for
individuals,
• the number of households with children would be reduced by
37% in the family allowance program, as well as the number of
covered children in relation to the current combination of the
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No. of No. of household No. of No. of
households members adults children
Existing child allowance +MOP 178 588 385 203
Family allowance, additive coeff. 137 399 272 128
Family allowance, multipl.coeff. 144 406 276 130
Table 8.
Effects of Introducing Family Allowance (in 000)
child allowance and social assistance programs. All families with
children in the current social assistance program would move to
the family allowance program (this is not shown in the previous
table) and the entire adjustment in the number would be felt by
current child allowance beneficiaries who do not receive social
assistance, i.e. those who are among the better off (in the previous
graph, those are households of child allowance beneficiaries with
an income level above 8,000 YUD),
• the average transfer per household with children would be
increased in the family allowance program by 58% in relation to
the current situation, and by 66% for individuals. Thus, the
reduction in the number of beneficiaries of transfers would be
compensated by a significant increase in transfers to the poorest
of poor citizens,
• if all beneficiaries are included (without distinguishing between
families with or without children), the number of households
covered would be reduced by 23%, individuals by 32%, and chil-
dren by 37%, whereas the average transfer would be increased by
30% for households and by 47% for household members.
Overall, the simulation has confirmed that replacing child allowance
and social assistance with a family allowance would bring about a
reduction in the number of beneficiaries and an increase in transfer per
one beneficiary, which is a positive benefit to the poor.
The effects of raising the poverty line along with introducing a fami-
ly allowance are presented in the table 10.
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FAMILY ALLOWANCE – additively
Chld. Allow.+MOP=100 Families with Families with All
no children children
No. of families 100 63 77
No. of members 100 60 68
No. of children 63 63
Transfer per family 100 158 130
Transfer per member 100 166 147
Table 9.
Relative Effects of Introducing Family Allowance
Note: the results of the simulation with multiplicity coefficient are very similar
Poverty line No. of No. of No. of Total
households members children transfers
2280 100 100 100 100
2508 105 105 105 115
2736 118 118 118 131
Table 10.
Effect of Raising the Poverty Line by 10 and 20%
Raising the poverty line by 10 and 20% would lead to a moderate
increase in the number of households, all members and children, by 5
and 18% respectively in relation to the referential simulation (with the
poverty line at 2,280 YUD). The amount of total transfers, would be 15
and 31% higher respectively  due to the growth in the average income
deficit per household. We can see that in the last simulation the num-
ber of children would increase by 18% in relation to the referential
simulation, but it would be one-quarter lower in relation to the current
number covered by child allowance.
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Table A1.
Minimum Consumption Basket from AZS, FSO and RZS, 
Kg/Four-Member Household/Month
Lsms min. RSZ WFP  FSO
basket basket basket
White bread 15.7 33.0 31.4 26.0
Semi-white bread 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Whole meal. rye. integral bread 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Baked goods 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.0
Other kinds of bread 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5
Wheat and rye flour and semolina 6.9 5.0 10.2 4.0
Maize flour and maize 0.6 0.0 1.8 0.0
Flour products and paste products 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.5
Rice 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.0
Frozen pastry 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5
Potatoes 12.2 15.0 9.5 14.5
Beans. dried peas. broad bean
and lentil 3.0 1.0 1.1 1.0
Onions. garlic and leek 4.0 3.1 2.6 3.5
Carrot. greens. celery. beet 1.3 2.1 1.5 2.0
Cabbage. kale. escarole. broccoli 4.5 3.5 2.2 5.0
Spinach. mangle fresh and frozen 0.9 0.0 4.4 1.0
Cucumber 2.8 3.0 0.0 4.0
Tomatoes (fresh) 2.1 4.0 1.1 4.0
Peppers (fresh and frozen) 1.3 2.0 1.8 4.0
Lettuce 0.0 0.0 1.1 3.0
Peas. string beans. fresh and frozen 2.0 2.5 1.5 6.5
Mushrooms 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other fresh vegetables 0.3 0.0 1.5 4.0
Pickled vegetables 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.5
Manufactured (ketchup. canned) 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3
Apples 1.5 0.0 1.5 8.0
Pear 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.0
Plum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
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Lsms min. RSZ WFP  FSO
basket basket basket
Grapes 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0
Other fresh fruit 1.1 3.0 0.0 2.0
Orange. lemon. tangerine 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.0
Other citrus fruit. bananas.
pineapple 0.3 2.4 0.0 1.0
Walnut. hazelnut and almond 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8
Jam. stewed fruit. marmalade 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.5
Beef (with and without bones) 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.0
Baby beef (with and without bones) 0.4 0.8 0.0 1.5
Pork (with and without bones) 1.5 2.0 1.8 2.5
Mutton. lamb and goat 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5
Poultry 3.9 4.0 2.6 4.0
Other fresh meat and offals 0.2 2.0 0.0 1.0
Dried and cooked bacon 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0
Dried meat 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Salami and sausages -various kinds 0.7 0.8 0.4 2.0
Hot dogs. bratwurst 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5
Other sausage products 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.0
Canned meat and meat products 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fresh and frozen freshwater fish 0.3 1.0 0.4 1.0
Fresh and frozen salt-water fish 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fish products 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pig fats. leaf fat. suet 1.3 0.0 2.2 2.0
Edible oil 3.6 5.0 1.8 2.5
Margarine 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0
Fresh milk 19.2 20.0 20.1 31.0
Sour milk and yogurt 2.8 4.0 1.5 15.0
Home-made cheese (all kinds) 2.4 2.0 1.8 2.5
Other cheeses (caciocavallo) 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.0
Butter 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
"Kajmak". cream. sour cream 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ice-cream 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Eggs (chicken and other) 88.9 90.0 41.2 90.0
Sugar (refined. lump sugar. icing) 3.0 3.0 2.6 4.0
Salt 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.5
Honey 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5
Chocolate - all kinds 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5
Cookies. biscuits 0.2 1.0 0.4 1.0
Coffee (green. roasted. ground) 1.0 0.6 0.7 1.0
Spices 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2
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Lsms min. RSZ WFP  FSO
basket basket basket
Mayonnaise. mustard. ketchup 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
Instant pudding. creams 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wine 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Beer 2.9 2.0 0.0 0.0
Other alcoholic drinks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mineral water. carbonated/
non-carbonated 3.0 3.0 0.0 15.0
Carbonated and non-carbonated
soft drinks 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
Natural fruit juices 
(from concentrate) 1.8 1.5 0.0 1.5
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Table A3. Determinants of Poverty Index
Probit estimates Number of obs =   6386
LR chi2(37) = 622.02
Prob. (P) > chi2 = 0,0000
likelihood = –1808.5726 Pseudo R2 = 0.1467
poor dF/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| x–bar [    95% C.I.   ]
sage06 –.2319377 .044181 –5.17 .000 .040181 –.318531 –.145344
sage714 .0264856 .0294438 .90 .369 .060316 –.031223 .084194
sage1518 –.039011 .0351938 –1.11 .268 .038054 –.10799 .029968
sage1925 .0718904 .0276973 –2.59 .009 .07815 –.126176 –.017605
sage2645 –.0659527 .0190245 –3.44 .001 .224838 –.10324 –.028665
sage65 .0411135 .0122621 3.36 .001 .265899 .01708 .065147
lhhsz .0505031 .0095655 5.25 .000 .974352 .031755 .069251
hdage –.0003591 .0004501 –.80 .425 56.3835 –.001241 .000523
hdfemale* –.0005147 .0087041 –.06 .953 .242773 –.017574 .016545
hdedprmi* .1362852 .0170055 1.33 .000 .20917 .102955 .169615
hdedprmc* .0997134 .0133895 9.21 .000 .1933 .073471 .125956
hdedhigh* –.0422523 .0104185 –2.88 .004 .061404 –.062672 –.021832
hdeduniv* –.0658326 .0072342 –4.29 .000 .082753 –.080011 –.051654
hdlfp2* –.002017 .0207775 –.10 .923 .052356 –.04274 .038706
hdlfp3* .0135496 .0255347 .56 .573 .072928 –.036498 .063597
hdlfp4* .0106463 .0518145 .22 .828 .005374 –.090908 .112201
hdlfp5* .0432136 .0211257 2.39 .017 .061133 .001808 .084619
hdlfp6* –.0057195 .0106914 –.53 .594 .428763 –.026674 .015235
hdlfp7* .0866519 .0252366 4.41 .000 .048379 .037189 .136115
slfp2 .0360491 .0208948 1.72 .085 .068352 –.004904 .077002
slfp3 –.0380304 .025036 –1.52 .128 .068302 –.0871 .011039
slfp4 .0347097 .0331153 1.05 .295 .016563 –.030195 .099615
slfp5 .0712284 .012857 5.55 .000 .143585 .046029 .096428
sowprr –.0430658 .0094661 –4.53 .000 .236035 –.061619 –.024513
sowpru –.0102119 .0101303 –1.01 .314 .138165 –.030067 .009643
sowoth –.0639895 .0302024 –2.11 .034 .019431 –.123185 –.004794
strata2* .0259029 .0208782 1.39 .166 .037292 –.015018 .066823
strata3* –.0249965 .0096155 –2.33 .020 .171331 –.043843 –.00615
strata4* –.0155008 .0107187 –1.34 .180 .117878 –.036509 .005507
strata5* –.0033383 .0166997 –.20 .844 .039914 –.036069 .029393
strata6* –.014838 .0121085 –1.13 .259 .068575 –.03857 .008894
strata7* –.023236 .0114282 –1.77 .076 0 .07928 –.045635 –.000837
strata8* –.016201 .0116526 –1.27 .204 .076607 –.03904 .006638
strata9* –.0110474 .0152447 –.68 .497 .044948 –.040926 .018832
strata10* –.025716 .0115787 –1.87 .061 .045325 –.04841 –.003022
strata11* –.0074693 .0142786 –.50 .615 .065335 –.035455 .020516
strata12* .0386832 .0175187 2.55 .011 .072206 .004347 .073019
obs. P .1031322 pred. P .0678863 (for x–bar)
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
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Tobit estimates Number of obs = 6386
LR chi2(37) = 644.28
Prob. > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = –6950.0812 Pseudo R2 = 0.0443
pgap Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
sage06 –2963.628 565.8006 –5.238 .000 –4072.788 –1854.468
sage714 482.8021 361.5969 1.335 .182 –226.0499 191.654
sage1518 –405.3198 433.9875 –.934 .350 –1256.082 445.4421
sage1925 –903.6037 344.9968 –2.619 .009 –1579.914 –227.2935
sage2645 –773.099 237.2339 –3.259 .001 –1238.158 –308.0405
sage65 469.08 151.5832 3.095 .002 171.9258 766.2342
lhhsz 604.5613 119.3185 5.067 .000 37.6568 838.4658
hdage –4.240037 5.517625 –.768 .442 –15.05644 6.57637
hdfemale –18.2966 107.2357 –.171 .865 –228.5147 191.9215
hdedprmi 25.043 122.7061 1.187 .000 1009.498 49.588
hdedprmc 961.0704 106.4302 9.030 .000 752.4312 1169.71
hdedhigh –726.3718 246.9059 –2.942 .003 –121.391 –242.353
hdeduniv –1388.363 326.8202 –4.248 .000 –2029.041 –747.6847
hdlfp2 –9.255053 264.7766 –.035 .972 –528.3065 509.7964
hdlfp3 144.8337 281.2101 .515 .607 –406.4331 696.1005
hdlfp4 313.5224 559.6278 .560 .575 –783.5371 41.582
hdlfp5 372.0954 187.4269 1.985 .047 4.675297 739.5155
hdlfp6 –32.67179 133.2269 –.245 .806 –293.8415 228.498
hdlfp7 864.7713 175.9568 4.915 .000 519.8367 209.706
slfp2 408.7332 258.9264 1.579 .114 –98.84989 916.3163
slfp3 –467.7784 31.4082 –1.507 .132 –1076.283 14.7265
slfp4 437.5797 409.2316 1.069 .285 –364.6525 239.812
slfp5 909.5314 158.7514 5.729 .000 598.3251 22.738
sowprr –587.7194 118.6461 –4.954 .000 –82.3058 –355.133
sowpru –149.3575 123.7978 –1.206 .228 –392.0431 93.32808
sowoth –73.8417 366.9066 –1.992 .046 –145.102 –11.58091
strata2 364.9614 203.7721 1.791 .073 –34.50066 764.4236
strata3 –344.9532 149.1361 –2.313 .021 –637.3103 –52.59604
strata4 –147.3542 153.8397 –.958 .338 –448.9319 54.2236
strata5 –86.17152 216.9615 –.397 .691 –511.4894 339.1463
strata6 –9.65639 175.3215 –.517 .605 –434.3458 253.033
strata7 –318.6599 186.098 –1.712 .087 –683.4748 46.15493
strata8 –169.4389 171.6722 –.987 .324 –505.9743 167.0965
strata9 –147.555 215.178 –.686 .493 –569.3766 274.2666
strata10 –20.4133 196.7671 –1.019 .308 –586.1433 185.3168
strata11 –83.01664 192.0371 –.432 .666 –459.4742 293.4409
strata12 427.619 159.3356 2.684 .007 115.2674 739.9706
_cons –2824.775 334.4544 –8.446 .000 –348.418 –2169.131
_se 1681.105 55.77286
Table A4. Determinants of Poverty Depth
142 Siromaštvo i reforma finansijske podrške siromašnima
Tobit estimates Number of obs. = 6386
LR chi2(37) = 626.88
Prob. > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = –11868.271 Pseudo R2 = 0.0257
psev Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
sage06 –5428310 1069821 –5.074 .000 –7525521 –3331099
sage714 978284.5 682957.8 1.432 .152 –360543.4 2317112
sage1518 –739867 821262.3 –.901 .368 –2349818 870084.3
sage1925 –1739820 65393.1 –2.661 .008 –3021744 –457895.8
sage2645 –1436190 44828.1 –3.204 .001 –2314970 –557409.9
sage65 769322.3 286087.5 2.689 .007 208494.2 1330150
lhhsz 1077271 225069 4.786 .000 636059.7 1518482
hdage –8218.502 10421.42 –.789 .430 –28648 12211
hdfemale –46042.62 202747.3 –.227 .820 –443495.9 35141.6
hdedprmi 2360914 231092.7 1.216 .000 1907894 2813934
hdedprmc 1748482 200928.2 8.702 .000 1354595 2142370
hdedhigh –1339027 470311.1 –2.847 .004 –2260996 –417058.9
hdeduniv –2560411 623363.1 –4.107 .000 –3782413 –1338409
hdlfp2 79993.85 499831.6 .160 .873 –899844.8 1059832
hdlfp3 303599.8 531435.6 .571 .568 –738193.3 1345393
hdlfp4 1064492 1027184 1.036 .300 –949135.1 3078119
hdlfp5 647066.5 35513.7 1.822 .068 –49109.67 1343243
hdlfp6 –28841.07 252159.3 –.114 .909 –523158.5 465476.3
hdlfp7 1713113 331073.1 5.174 .000 1064098 2362128
slfp2 738544.3 489959.5 1.507 .132 –221941.8 1699030
slfp3 –870486.9 586266.6 –1.485 .138 –2019767 278793.5
slfp4 766032.4 772077.4 .992 .321 –747500 2279565
slfp5 1691457 299711.5 5.644 .000 1103921 2278993
sowprr –1109041 224425.1 –4.942 .000 –1548990 –669091.9
sowpru –292634.9 233673.9 –1.252 .210 –750714.6 165444.8
sowoth –1281513 68868.7 –1.861 .063 –2631559 68533.82
strata2 706084 384567.4 1.836 .066 –47797.93 1459966
strata3 –68965.8 283528.6 –2.432 .015 –1245463 –133839
strata4 –208873.5 290254.1 –.720 .472 –777869.4 360122.5
strata5 –251434.5 413921.3 –.607 .544 –1062860 559991
strata6 –156035.8 331425.8 –.471 .638 –805742.3 49367.7
strata7 –618328.1 353536 –1.749 .080 –1311378 74721.83
strata8 –350636.6 325304 –1.078 .281 –988342.3 287069.1
strata9 –264445 407169.1 –.649 .516 –1062634 533743.9
strata10 –250114.1 369336.7 –.677 .498 –974138.6 47391.5
strata11 –17818.6 364575.6 –.489 .625 –892871.8 53651.6
strata12 76792.1 301299.9 2.549 .011 17727.5 1358570
_cons –5309853 629118.4 –8.440 .000 –6543137 –4076568
_se 3145314 99689.1
Table A5. Determinants of Severity of Poverty
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Table A6.
Consumption and Income by Deciles (Using Different Welfare Aggregates
and Ranking Criteria)
Consumption Consumption Income Income per
per capita per equivalent per capita equivalent
unit unit
First (bottom) 2856 3488 1948 2551
Second 4120 5018 3400 4341
Third 4920 5991 4256 5428
Fourth 5764 6980 5030 6314
Fifth 6605 8000 5874 7319
Sixth 7459 9045 6745 8212
Seventh 8526 10275 7729 9245
Eighth 9923 12001 9053 10537
Ninth 12045 14691 11065 12855
Tenth (top) 19559 23383 19178 20657
Average 8177 9883 7427 8744
Top decile– 6.8 6.7 9.8 8.1
–bottom decile
Note: Amounts in April-June 2002 dinars. 
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